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Dissertation Abstract
Government-business relations in postwar Japan have received a considerable amount of 
attention, as also the often associated scandals and back room dealing in Japan have been a 
recurrent and topical issue in academic circles and the popular press. Yet, despite this attention, 
scholarly and otherwise, much less research has been undertaken on these issues in Japan before 
the Pacific War. It is within this context that my Ph.D. dissertation “Politico-business relations 
in Taisho and early Showa Japan: An Examination of the Amalgamation of the Iron and Steel 
Industry, 1916-1934” is set. Employing the detailed records of the shingikai or. Councils of 
Deliberation, discussions between business and government are traced to determine, in the first 
instance, the success of business in realizing its aims. These findings are located within the 
larger conceptual framework of the overt and covert interaction between government and 
business in policy formulation. An important historical perspective is therefore offered by the 
thesis in examining this case study, providing analysis of the historical continuum frequently 
left out in assessments by commentators on today’s situation.
The findings are that the shingikai forum was perceived by business as a place its views could 
be expressed and an opportunity to influence policy outcomes. The factors which determined 
the extent to which business could realize its goals were, among others, the political and 
economic circumstances in which the actors found themselves. Evidence indicates that business 
viewed itself as an independent actor in its negotiations with government. As both government 
and business were important stakeholders in the iron and steel industry, their interests did not 
always coincide which was observed, at least in one instance, to have led to heated debates and 
the amendment of the bill at hand. This finding challenges the prevailing view in the literature 
that the shingikai was co-opted by government to achieve its own policy ends.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction*
1. Preamble
How we see politico-business relations in Japan today is largely a product of the 
literature on economic policy formulation and its related literature on the explanations for 
Japan’s post-war success. These works, largely by omission, cast the relationship between 
government and business as covert. In turn, it is suggested here, this perception has contributed 
to shaping how we see the relationship in the pre-war period. Furthermore, the paucity of the 
literature on the Taisho (1912-1926) period and early Showa (1926-1989) years in general, and 
specifically on the government-business relationship, serves the ends of speculation. That is, as 
we know so little of how the pre-war relationship worked, we easily slip into assuming that it 
operated in similar ways to those we see occurring in the post-war politico-business interaction.
This thesis aims to address this perspective that sees the interaction of government and 
business as covert. The following sections will attempt to make clear through empirical 
examination of the historical evidence the point that our perception of how things operate has 
been greatly shaped in recent times by the dominant explanatory paradigm of post-war politico- 
business relations. The process of policy making can be long and varied, and at a number of
‘ The “Chicago 14* A”style of footnoting is used in this thesis.
junctures business may have an opportunity to interact with government. One important nexus 
point along this chain of events are the meetings of the shingikai, or Councils of Deliberation, 
where government, business, academics and others may sit and discuss matters of mutual 
concern. This open and legally enshrined forum then provides here the opportunity to consider 
the above mentioned perceptions of government and business interaction. The intention is not 
specifically to challenge the arguments made by authors that use this framework in 
understanding post-war economic development but rather to observe and comment on politico- 
business relations operating in the open forum of the shingikai.
2. How the literature views post-war politico-business relations
It can be fairly claimed that Japan's post-war economic development was remarkable. Japan 
rose from the ashes of World War II to a mature, world economy in a handful of decades. 
Though perhaps recent economic troubles have made this example less compelling, the need to 
understand how Japan achieved this has not diminished. Explanations abound on the matter, a 
central component among them being the issue of economic policy formulation and its 
implementation. The thrust of the debates has been less over the efficacy of set economic 
objectives, and more how they were arrived at and how they were implemented. Underpinning
this literature is the issue of the working relationship of government and business. Although 
there is not a consensus among scholars about how the two sides work together, the extent of 
the attention that the issue draws suggests that a better understanding is important. There are 
several ^easops yvhy greptei; clarity in understanding politico-business relations in Japan is worth 
pursuing, not least of which is its relationship to economic policy formulation. Though some 
scholarship has questioned the useful impact of dirigiste policy on economic growth, few 
developing nations would leave all to the invisible hand. This is not to suggest that, given 
Japan's economic success, it offers a model to be emulated and certainly not one to be exported 
in unadulterated form - the factors that shape a country's experience and dictate its 
circumstances are unlikely to be found exactly the same elsewhere. However, regardless of 
success or failure, understanding the experience of one country may be valuable to another.
Views vary on whether the close proximity of business to government in Japan is good 
or not. At one end of the spectrum, it has been identified by some authors as part of the 
explanation for Japan's economic miracle and, at the other end, it is has been seen as stifling 
growth, not to mention its being lambasted as unfair by world trade bodies. Central to many of 
these arguments, regardless of where they are on the spectrum, is their characterisation of the 
relationship as closed and hidden from public view. Ironically, contributing to this perception 
are views on one particular institutional organ, aimed, ostensibly at least, at providing both an
open discussion forum for government, business and others, as well transparency in the political 
decision making process. The shingikai are seen by some as part of the means by which the 
‘real’ decision making process shrouds itself. This observation applies both to the post-war 
councils, and, by implication, to their pre-war progenitors. As will be discussed later, this view 
is not universally held, but has proved persuasive.
It is generally perceived that in Japan, government and business have worked closely 
together in the building of the nation, and that this relationship well antedates what is called the 
period of modem Japan, that is, from 1868 to present. Throughout this modem period, when 
raised in scholarly or joumalistic pieces alike, this relationship is often characterised as covert 
either by explicit statement or by elliptical reference. In the Japanese press, scandals frequently 
find themselves splashed on the front page and we nod to this as being how the ‘real’ Japan 
works. Scholarly works at the micro and macro levels have brought us closer to understanding 
how Japan operates, which we assume to be one of the keys to how it achieved its post-war 
economic success. However, the spectacular scandals poignantly remind us on which side of the 
black curtain we stand. What transpires in the tea rooms of Ginza is not for us to know and we 
are left with the lingering feeling that that is where decisions are made. Ironically, though, it 
should come as no surprise that in countries where there is more limited economic complexity 
and the number of actors small, as in the case of early developing Japan, relations between those
who make decisions and those whose interests are at stake are close.^ Their proximity, of 
course, has varied over time according to circumstances, and there have been shifts in the 
prominence of actors, but this, too, is to be expected. So, in this sense, a close relationship 
between business and government in developing Japan should not be considered unique. 
Similarly, the post-war reconstruction of Japan was an imperative, and to continue former 
modes of interaction was natural, if not also expedient. Indeed, were the opposite to be true, that 
is, ties to be loose and relations cool, there would perhaps be greater reason to wonder. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, it is not a clear cut case that all is covert when speaking of 
politico-business relations and reflection on this in terms of the development of the country 
deserves due consideration.
In the post-war period, the degree to which the methods of interaction of business and 
government has been treated in both business history and political history has been limited. In 
the literature on political economy, this relationship has gained greater expression but it is 
predominately written from the government perspective. In general, and this applies for the 
whole of modem Japanese history, business has tended to be handled as a research topic unto 
itself or, when included in the literature that embraces a more multi-faceted approach, the
^Gerschenkron provides an explanatory framework for industrialising nations which observes that 
government and business may be in close proximity in the early stages of development. SeeAlexander 
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book o f Essays (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962), This issue has also been taken up by institutionalists, for example D C. 
North in Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
business factor is only included in so far as it may complete the explanation. Knowing how 
business achieves its ends is not the issue. Furthermore, when politico-business conduits are 
addressed, this is typically handled superficially. The objective is rarely to explore how 
influence was exercised, but rather its results. This exercise is often described only in so far as 
to allude to the policy objectives of a trade association, for example, and in the next line 
describe how government modified its stance following lobbying. The connection is implied, 
and the reader is left to assume that fruitful, behind-the-scenes discussions had occurred. In 
short, the politico-business relationship has been seen in the order in which these words - 
politics and business - appear. Research has been pursued from the top down, so to speak, and 
the details of the interaction largely left unsaid.
The prime question that underpins the research agenda in post-war Japanese economic 
history is “How did Japan do it?”. The contending analyses differ according to the way they 
bring together the main actors - the bureaucracy, politicians and business - and, according to 
some accounts, the role of the market as well. Since the early 1980s, this tripodal configuration 
of actors has come to the fore with the seminal work of Chalmers Johnson entitled MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f Industrial Policy, 1925 -1975, which, with regards to Japan, 
has given common coinage to the term ‘developmental state’.^  Earlier reference to this
 ^Bai Gao, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from 1931 to 1965 
(New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1997), 7. Chalmers Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The
configuration can be found in Yanaga’s Big Business in Japanese Politics. With regards to the 
relative importance of these actors, Yanaga is decidedly on the side of business: “In terms of 
economic policies, it is easy to conclude that organised business rules supreme.”"* Such has been 
the impact of Johnson’s work that approximately a decade after its publication, one scholar 
viewed the state of the literature as follows: “The current prevailing conception of Japan, in both 
academic literature and the popular view, is of Japan as technocracy, ruled by a select group of 
bureaucrats motivated primarily by efficiency and by economic, rather than political concerns.”  ^
Johnson argued that the successful resurrection of the Japanese economy was achieved by the 
guiding hand of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which skilfully 
fostered the growth of select industries and re-channelled the resources of sunset ones. Business 
was seen less in terms of its own initiative but rather as the engine for economic growth 
conducted by MITI. Johnson devoted considerable space to leading the reader through the 
evolution of the bureaucratie-business relationship. Commencing with the formation of the 
Ministry of commerce and Industry in 1926,^ he demonstrated that it was through a painful trial 
and error process that a number of different styles of accommodation were employed before an
Growth o f Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982),
'* Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 28.
 ^Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 22
 ^The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was formed from the division of the former Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce into two new ministries, namely Agriculture and Forestry and. Commerce and 
Industry.
acceptable arrangement was reached. Prior to the 1930s, ‘self-control’ was employed where “the 
state licenses private enterprise to achieve developmental goals.”  ^An example of this was state- 
sponsored cartels where the running of the show was left to the enterprises. Following this was 
‘state control’ which “refers to the attempt to separate management from ownership and to put 
management under state supervision. It was typically the form of the relationship preferred by 
the ‘reform’ (or ‘control’) bureaucrats of the late 1930s and the whole state bureaucracy during 
postwar reconstruction and the early stages of high-speed growth.”* The third was a synthesis of 
the two; ‘public-private cooperation’ “leaves ownership and management in private hands... 
while it affords the state much greater degrees of social goal-setting and influence over private 
discussion than under self-control.”^
Johnson pointed out that the ‘public-private cooperation’ mode was not unique to Japan. 
In essence “The so-called military-industrial complex in the United States, to the extent that it 
identifies an economic relationship and is not merely a political epithet, refers to the same 
thing.”*® However, the extent to which this relationship was found in the economy of the United 
States in comparison to Japan is distinctly different. It was “thought by Americans to be 
exceptional, whereas it was the norm for Japan’s leading industrial sectors during high-speed
 ^Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, 310. 
 ^Ibid.
^Ibid.,3l\.
^Ubid.
growth.”"  The reasons for this were at the nub of why Johnson claimed that the contemporary 
politico-business relationship could be characterised primarily as covert and one that operated 
along informal lines.
Both business leaders and the bureaucracy, he argued, strove to create a co-operative 
rapport with the aim of facilitating communication. It would appear that maintaining a positive 
personal relationship and extensive network of contacts was considered in Japan to be of greater 
priority than concerns for maintaining an open democratic policy making process. This is not to 
say, though, that the relationship has always been an easy one, but rather that it was seen as 
central to the developmental state approach .T his ‘problem’ to which Johnson referred was the 
striking of a balance between control and latitude of action. “Industry is quite willing to receive 
governmental assistance, but it does not like government orders... [while] Government is often 
fhistrated by the excessive competition and preemptive investment of industries it is trying to 
foster...
On one level there is a natural affinity between the leaders of business and 
government, Johnson argued. In the first instance, those who led Japan through the high growth 
period all experienced the war and the hardships during its af termath.A high proportion of
"/W .,312. 
"JW ., 309-10. 
"/W .,312. 
" /W ., 70.
bureaucrats and industrial leaders had a common educational background (for instance Tokyo
University’s law faculty) which helps shape a common outlook and facilitates the establishment
of personal networks. Beyond this, there was “an extensive cross-penetration of elites because
of early retirement from government service and reemployment in big business....
Amakudari, literally translated as descent from heaven, is an entrenched practice among
bureaucrats where, at their forced retirement age of 55, they are located in key positions in
industry and elsewhere. “Preferential access to the government for the strategic industries in
Japan is not an unintended consequence of the developmental state; it is in fact an objective of
the developmental state. This is the true significance of amakudari”*^  Johnson argued. Finally,
there is the institution of ‘administrative guidance’ which played a prominent part in MITI’s
practice of directional control, though one could also mention exchange postings between this
ministry and industry. Although not based on any explicit law, the authority of administrative
guidance comes from the laws that established the ministries which allowed them to “issue
directives {shiji\ requests iyôbô), warnings (keikoku), suggestions {kankoku), and
encouragements {kansho) to the enterprises or clients within a particular ministry’s
jurisdiction.”*^ The exercise of this is done on a personal basis that facilitates private discussion.
It may be assumed that efforts were made to harmonize interests within the aims of the
'^/W.,312.
*^/W.,71.
Ibid., 265.
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bureaucracy, though this did not always assure the compliance of business.
One implication of this argument is that the extent to which co-operation has been 
achieved should not be seen as a cultural given. As has been seen, different modes of interaction 
were tried, each located in different historical settings. The well-functioning of the 
developmental state is based on the perspicacity of MITI to foster industry and business’s 
vigorous implementation of MITT s directions. Both sides of the equation are important. Never 
easy to keep on track, a co-operative relationship, at heart, was necessary in order for success. 
The post-war relationship is the product of past attempts. Both sides have sought economic 
recovery, with neither side accepting of domination by the other. Conversely, in the post-war 
period, neither side could have controlled the other. Both sides had sufficient strength that 
riding roughshod over the other, even if it were seen as appropriate behaviour, was not possible. 
The delicate balance of affording latitude of action while retaining sufficient control to guide 
industry was not a matter left to open round table discussions, Johnson’s argument would have 
us accept.
Johnson’s work has been important in terms of shaping views on how things work in 
Japan. He presented a historically detailed and forceful framework for understanding how the 
various components in the policy making process come together and an explanation for Japan’s 
economic success. He placed this laurel squarely on the head of MITI, characterising Japan as a
11
strong state and cogent economic policy formulation and implementation as central to its 
economic development. In recent years, serious objections have been made to his thesis which 
challenge his statist approach, though Johnson still maintains that government has an important 
role to play in economic development, as do others as well.'* Among the contending works, 
David Friedman’s The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in 
Japan presents a refutation of MITI’s central role in efficaciously promoting economic 
development. He asserts that the dynamism of the Japanese economy stems from the rapid 
growth of small to medium sized enterprises and their flexible manufacturing approach. This, he
claims, accounts for Japan’s high-speed growth.
Japanese manufacturing growth resulted, I believe, from the dramatic expansion of 
smaller producers throughout the nation’s economy. Special circumstances in Japan... enabled 
smaller-scale producers to implement more flexible manufacturing strategies than those which 
were possible for firms that pursued mass production alone. The result was to enhance the 
ability of Japanese manufacturers to adopt extensive, continuous product changes more easily 
than producers in other countries....Consequently, my argument takes odds with the 
conventional interpretation of Japan’s economic success and its policy implications.'^
In stark contrast to the developmental state thesis, Friedman asserts that in at least one 
important industry MITI was particularly ineffective in its attempts to direct the economy, its 
guidance was in fact not heeded and that the Japanese state was decidedly weak.
In 1995, Johnson published a further work which was essentially a compendium of essays that had 
appeared separately elsewhere. In effect, this work stands as Johnson’s re-iteration of the correctness of 
his position. Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1995).
David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1.
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Though the bureaucratic regulation thesis contends that Japanese industry was guided by a 
“strong state,” the machine tool industry exhibits an unbroken record of policy features dating 
from the late 1920s. From the Depression to the present there is not one example of the 
adoption, let alone the success, of a MITI or an MCI initiative. If we think of a strong state as 
one that sets goals then manipulates financial and other incentives to achieve them, Japan 
appears to be extremely weak: the government was forced to provide resources but could not 
insist that its goals be met in exchange.^ ®
In short, Friedman turns the developmental state paradigm on its head.^* Where co-operation 
between big business and MITI carried the day for Johnson, Friedman does not deny interaction 
but, in the case of his examination -  the machine tool industry -  at least, the relationship is seen 
as much less harmonious; when policy suited both sides, co-operation was forthcoming, 
however, in times of interest conflict, the industry was not chary of opposition. During a period 
of considerable strain for the industry during the 1960s, MITI urged consolidation but its 
recommendation was not received favourably. As one president of a major machinery 
manufacturer put it: “’They told us to form into larger companies. We told them ‘the hell with 
that’ and refused. On the issue of the conduit through which interaction occurred, Friedman 
is less specific. In the main, exchanges are seen between the industry’s representative body, or 
gyôkai, and MITI, with little reference to individuals. The assumption is that discussions
^ /W ., 125.
It should be noted that Friedman also challenges the thesis that “Japanese development was the result 
mainly of market forces... [where] government activity provided at most a favorable environment for 
industrial expansion by manufacturers who were responding primarily to market cues.” Ibid., 3. This 
position is closer to his own but one which he holds is incomplete.
Ibid., 100.
13
transpired behind closed doors, though there were exceptions/^
This emphasis of interaction through the conduit of representative groups or trade 
associations and government^'* is found as well in Ronald Dore’s Flexible Rigidities: Industrial 
Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy 1970-80. In line with Johnson, Dore 
sees the history of Japan since 1870 as strong evidence for the argument o f the development 
state/^ The ‘management’ of the economy is seen as something that is regularly monitored 
through discussions between bureaucrats and industry with politicians viewed as little more than 
ratifiera in the policy making process. Interconnectivity is stressed between representatives of
trade associations and the ministries beyond levels typically found in the west.
The role of the politicians in the making of economic policy becomes, then, largely one of 
ratifying rather than shaping the consensus which emerges from the -  very open and public -  
debates between the main ‘organized interests’. In the matter of month-to-month ‘conjunctural’ 
management of the economy, the main ‘organized interests’ are the Ministry of Finance, the 
Bank of Japan and what is known as "zaikai’.^ ^
The term zaikai literally means financial circle. Dore wishes to stress the cohesiveness of the 
Japanese configuration as a factor that contributes to economic success. “One condition for that
One example is the first post war White Paper which was published by the gyôkai and “set a precedent 
whereby industry itself signaled appropriate policy for the bureaucracy to act upon.” Refinements of the 
original proposal were made in “liaison discussion groups between gyôkai members and bureau 
representatives; occasionally, academics or other ‘neutral’ parties attend these discussions.” Ibid., 76.
Though dated and superseded by other works, Yanaga provides a useful outline of the various kinds of 
business groups and how they m i^t seek to influence policy making. Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese 
Politics,
Ronald Dore, Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy 
1970-80 (London: The Athlone Press, 1986), 25.
^ /W ., 23.
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recipe to work is that the gains from trust and co-operation -  the elimination of a lot of time- 
wasting intransigence and unpredictability and fear of cheating from market bargaining 
relations, especially labour relations -  should compensate for the reduction in the spur of
competition.”^^
Kent Calder in Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 
1949-1986, suggests that this close proximity, at least in part, stems from financial 
considerations occurring in economic development. High-speed growth demands high capital 
investment particularly in the case of heavy industry. As debt-equity ratios increase, the stake in 
success shared by both lender and borrower rises as well “which welded state and industrial 
society into ever more intimate interdependence.” *^ Calder’s objective, though, is to 
“understand the processes of Japanese public policy formation rather than to comprehend the 
Japanese growth process or its implications for their own sake.”^^  He observes a pattern of 
accommodation between government and its opponents (intraparty and interparty) at points of 
impending crisis when, for example, an “administration’s tenure in office is perceived to be 
severely threatened or internal political unrest seriously impairs its international credibility.” ®^ 
Once this juncture is passed, a lull follows in policy formulation, only to shift into higher gear
^^/W.,250.
Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 442. 
Ibid., 461.
^Ubid., 25.
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when instability threatens again. Thus, the “central political force driving policy transformation 
in Japan between 1949 and 1986 was the crisis and compensation d y n a m i c . . . . A t  these crisis 
points, there is a plurality of influences that jockey for position in order to realise specific aims. 
In an effort to regain stability, bureaucracy and big business tend to be acquiescent. The process
of negotiation and accommodation is removed from public scrutiny.
The road from crisis to compensation, in short, has led through pluralism and rivalry among the 
Japanese elite, albeit often behind closed doors, combined with a transcendent consensus on the 
importance of political stability. In the face of crisis, interest groups, mass media, and 
legislative pressures on a fragmented conservative ruling party have given strong momentum to 
proposals for welfare-oriented change, which both technocratic and business elites have been 
disposed to accept in the interest of political stability.^^
The implication again is that big business and the bureaucracy are closely aligned and operate 
largely behind closed doors.
In shaping post-war views on government and business relations in Japan, Johnson’s 
work is of critical importance. Though it has been received critically by some, the fact that 
hardly a work since its publication on the matter can avoid its mention underscores this point. 
Many authors since then have adopted Johnson’s work as a point of departure and sought either 
to draw attention to its weaknesses and provide a more nuanced understanding of the inner 
dynamics of the developmental state, or to reject its conclusions and provide alternate
Ibid., 443. 
Ibid., \92.
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explanations. How we will come to see the model of the developmental state in future years is 
speculative but it is safe to argue that Johnson’s work has left us thinking of the Japanese 
success as based on a particular configuration of co-operation between the bureaucracy and 
business that is different from elsewhere. The issue here is not whether Johnson has got it right 
but rather to demonstrate that Johnson’s work has been a dominant force in recent years in 
shaping our perception of politico-business interaction.
The economic success of post-war Japan is thus widely seen to be linked to the effective 
co-ordination of business and government interests. It is both implied and stated explicitly in the 
literature that this co-ordination was behind closed doors. These views on how government and 
business operate, however, were formed in the period of post-war economic success. In terms of 
economic policy, though, the economic circumstances in which actors find themselves may very 
well shape or at least play a role in determining an actor's bargaining position. In contrast to the 
post-war period (1950s -  1980s), the Taisho and early Showa periods bracketed a much more 
varied pattern of economic development. The war years saw a boom, followed by a dramatic 
economic decline, and government’s approach to the management of the economy shifted 
dramatically. This suggests in turn that how business approached government may have varied 
in accordance with the changing economic conditions. An examination of the Taisho and early 
Showa period shingikai, then, may offer a vista into understanding not only the question of
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bureaucratie dominance but also whether business and government interaction changed with 
changing economic conditions.
It will be suggested in this thesis that during the initial years after the Meiji Restoration, 
there was a shift from the predominant reliance on informal, personal channels of 
communication between business and government to the formal venue, the shingikai, for their 
interaction. This shift can be explained as a function of changing social, political and economic 
circumstances. The aim of placing the shingikai in this framework is to see the appearance of 
this forum as something that springs from nation building, and in turn to consider politico- 
business relations as a function of shifting circumstances. It should be emphasised that this 
thesis does not attempt to analyse the shingikai as a means of reducing transaction costs, or to 
partake in the discussions on corruption and the impact of the institutionalisation of politico- 
business interaction on economic growth. Notwithstanding the possible fruitfulness of this 
avenue of inquiry, the necessity to formulate a plausible counterfactual may be a problem. 
However, it may be suggested that an understanding of this shift from the informal to the formal 
channel of communication, and analysis of whether the shingikai was a meaningfully exercised 
forum, would aid such research on transaction costs. Little is known of how government and 
business interacted in this period and, in this sense, this work may usefully serve to later 
facilitate this line of research.
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This work is at once economic history, in that the principal explanatory framework is 
derived from contemporary economic conditions; it is also political history, in that many of the 
actors were political figures and the political fluidity of the time contributed to shaping 
government and business interaction; but it is also importantly cultural in its methodology. 
Risking stating the obvious, the manner in which government and business interact is a function 
of economic, political and cultural factors. This thesis then is one that straddles a number of 
academic fields. The specific aim of this thesis is therefore to examine the influence that 
business exerted in shaping decisions or recommendations that arose in the context of shingikai 
deliberations. This will contribute to our present limited knowledge of how business and 
government operated in this period, much of which is presently based on conjecture. Before a 
framework for understanding politico-business relations in early industrial Japan can be 
established, a body of detailed empirical work is needed. Once this critical mass has been 
reached, a keen eye may discern a pattern and so bring our understanding to a higher level. To 
this end, this work will hopefully be of service. Associated with this objective is the more 
specific issue of the shingikai. Even less is known of this institution in this period than of 
politico-business relations in general. Debate continues over post-war councils, and 
extrapolations from this are made about those of the pre-war, but on the basis of sparse 
evidence. The thesis therefore also seeks to increase our knowledge of the pre-war shingikai.
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Finally, on the more general level is the issue of the relationship between covert 
politico-business interaction and Japan’s economic development. The assumption has been that 
a lot of the decisions on how post-war economic policy have been made and the discussions on 
how to realise these aims occurred behind closed doors. Business was party to this and, 
according to some, shaped outcomes. The implication is that, try as we may, we will ultimately 
never know exactly how the post-war success was achieved. Moreover, in terms of providing 
guidance for developing nations, we are left with the assumption that the covert approach was a 
positive contributing factor in Japan’s success. By looking at the converse, that is, the overt 
formal venue of the shingikai, some light may be shed on the merits of this assumption. This is 
not to imply that understanding Taisho interaction will explain how it happened in the post-war 
period. While the literature provides us a historical perspective for the covert side of politico- 
business relations, there is a paucity of works to provide us with a similar historical perspective 
on the overt relationship between these actors. In other words, the current state of the literature 
presents us with an unbalanced rendering of how politics and business operated. The 
implication of this is that how we understand economic policy formulation in Japan, in the 
contemporary and historical settings, may suffer from this one-sided perspective. Were the co­
ordination of business and government interests seen to have transpired in both formal and 
informal settings and the relative importance of one over the other to have varied according to
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the prevailing political, economic and social conditions, our views on how Japan operates would 
undergo change. Herein this thesis may be useful by helping illuminate how the formal 
economic policy making process occurred during Japan’s first steps in industrialisation.
It is also hypothesised that the relationship between government and business changed 
during the period of discussions according to changes in economic circumstances. It will be 
shown how the bargaining position of business was shaped by a number of different factors, 
including prosperity and depression, the number of actors in an industry and their aggregate 
stake hold relative to that o f government. When times were good, business was more willing to 
put up a fight to achieve its ends but when financial collapse was rife, the tune was very 
different. The implication of this examination is that if the shingikai are seen not to be a locus 
where business and government held meaningful discussions, then this will lend credence to the 
claim that co-ordination of interests occurred behind closed doors. Depending on the findings, it 
may, or may not, also reinforce the argument that the council meetings were orchestrated by the 
bureaucracy. If the shingikai were seen to provide a forum where both sides believed that 
meaningful discussions could be held, then this will challenge the claim that this forum was 
manipulated by the bureaucracy to serve its own ends. If the nature of politico-business relations 
is seen to have been circumstantially based, it may suggest that the institutions of Japan's post­
war economic development need to be seen in part in the context of its prosperity. In other
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words, assertions that claim a priori that government and business work well together and 
therefore have contributed to Japan's success can be turned on their head. This is not to suggest 
that either order of causality is more correct, but to draw attention to the circumstantiality of 
politico-business relations.
For the purposes of this thesis government is seen as including both bureaucrats and 
politicians. The economic policy making process in Japan, whether it be of the pre- or post-war 
periods, has been largely divided between three main groups of actors, namely politicians, 
bureaucrats and businessmen. The military were included as well during the years surrounding 
the war. On both the conceptual level and the individual case by case scenario, how they 
interacted to create policy and its implementation is problematic. In both the period o f the post­
war and that which is under consideration here, the bulk of the historical literature has focussed 
on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, with scholars debating the 
predominance of the one over the other. There is perhaps greater consensus that in the early 
decades after the Restoration, it was the bureaucracy which held sway but for the post-war 
period the divide between opinions is more marked. Overall, it is safe to characterise the 
relationship as complex, and not one that can be justly handled merely in passing.
How the zaikai, or business world, fits in is even less known.^^ What is intended here is
”  For further details see Matsuura Masataka, '"Zaisei Sewagyo' to Keizai Shisutemu No Kiki: Senzen 
Nihon 'Zaikai' No Keisei to Soshikika," in Hokkaido Daigaku Hôgakubu Raiburari - 3: Jôhô to Chitsujô
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to examine the extent to which business sought to exercise influence through a particular forum, 
the shingikai. This forum was composed of representatives from all three sectors. Looking from 
the perspective of the businessmen sitting at the discussion table, their concern was to realise 
their own ends by convincing the others of their case. When they expressed their opinions, it 
was directed to all convened members without discriminating between bureaucrat and politician. 
All members had equal say and it will be suggested that whatever predominance bureaucrats 
may have had over politicians, or vice versa, was not apparent. To deal with those aspects of the 
policy formulation process that deal with the interaction of bureaucracy and politicians is 
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis.
The councils offer an avenue for exploring the politico-business relationship, but there 
remains the fiirther methodological question of selecting a case study on which to focus. There 
were a number of industries or issues that might have equally acted as a vehicle for 
examination, but the choice has been closely related to the possibilities of pursuing in-depth 
analysis. There was at the outset the possibility of covering shingikai deliberations on a number 
of different industries or issues. This would have limited analysis to key documents and the 
focus to the results of deliberations as a yardstick to evaluate business success. Alternatively, 
one industry could be selected. This would mean a trawl through the records, seeking to draw
to Nettowaku, ed. Tamura Yoshiyuki (Hokkaido Daigaku Tosho Kankôkai, 1999).
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from the minutiae to bring to light the process of decision making. In the first instance, the 
evaluation of success would tend to be broader based, but analysis would tend to be constrained 
to juxtaposing initial goals and outcomes, and comparing the two. The weaknesses of the 
second, single industry-based approach is that any conclusions drawn would derive from the 
analysis of only one industry. General statements about how business operated in other 
industries might be risky, as would overarching conclusions relating to politico-business 
relations in the Taisho and early Showa periods. However, restricting analysis to one case study 
avails the historian of the opportunity to walk as closely as the records will permit along the 
path that led to a decision. In turn, the path becomes a focus of concern and affords glimpses of 
the dynamic of the interaction of the two sides. Here, the process based approach has been 
selected. The aim is to provide a study of the interaction of business and government in the 
process of a particular industry’s seeking to exercise its influence over matters of mutual 
concern. The issue chosen here through which to examine how business sought to exercise the 
shingikai forum in seeking its aims is the amalgamation process of the iron and steel industry 
that ran between 1916 and 1934.
Within the rubric of the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry, there are a number 
of issues which have been selected that run through the course of this 18-year process. The 
focus of analysis thus becomes not only the process of the decision making but also what was
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said by business and government about these specific issues. Among the numerous issues that 
were raised in the discussions during the duration of the amalgamation process, the following 
have been highlighted in this thesis: 1) the conflict of interest between pig iron and steel 
producers; 2) the awareness of the vulnerability of small producers and their resulting need for 
protection under a tariff regime or zaibatsu umbrella; 3) the growing international awareness of 
industry. These themes will be addressed in the following chapters. At one level, the content of 
the discussions is not only an indication of what concerned the participants but also in itself 
reveals the importance of the shingikai forum as perceived by its members. The fact that 
businessmen took the trouble to raise issues and advance their views, suggests that they 
perceived the forum to be one where gains might be realized. A topic might be brought up at an 
early point in a discussion, fall by the wayside, only to re-emerge later for a moment and then 
be passed over for something else. This pattern could repeat itself in discussions sustained over 
several days or longer and, though each instance of the discussion might amount to little, when 
assembled together they might say much about the concerns of industry or government. More 
obvious to detect than these patterns are the instances where prolonged exchanges occurred 
focussing on one particular topic. Apart from what is specifically stated, the fact that members 
would dwell on any one given topic is significant in itself.
What is critical in these observations of pattern or sustained discussion is the issue of
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friction. Regardless of the issue, what was sought was the identification of the points where a 
clash occurred between government and business. Arguments and conflict can be seen as 
evidence of a difference of interests, which suggested that aims or expectations were being 
challenged. On the other hand, the absence of conflict did not necessarily mean that hopes were 
being realised. Such as absence of conflict might be interpreted, for example, as meaning that 
there was no need to argue as fhiitful discussion held in informal settings may have been 
running in parallel. Ultimately, regardless of the discernible presence or absence o f friction, 
substantiation of the claims made here will be established through contextualization of the 
debates. The components of the explanatory framework will be drawn from the historical setting 
which, broadly speaking, will be primarily located in the economic and political context of the 
time. The content of the discussions themselves will provide the guidelines for this framework.
The identification and interpretation of friction points in historical records is a 
subjective task and one that is complicated by linguistic uncertainties.^'* This observation holds 
true in the case of the Japanese language. Indeed, as a very germane case in point, the Kôjien 
dictionary defines as “Fe” from the Periodic Table^^, indicating that it is neither pig iron or 
steel but rather the constituent element from which these two products are made. The 
explanation for the ideogram provided by The Modern Reader j  Japanese-English
These linguistic ambiguities have been confirmed with Japanese speakers and a Japanese scholar. 
Shinmura Izuru, ed., Kôjien (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1991), 1763.
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Character Dictionary {Nelson) is “iron and steel”.^  ^When the ideogram is used in combination 
with other characters, typically it was clear in the documents whether “iron” or “steel” is being 
referred to. In the case of “iron”, the combination “# # ” or pig iron, is frequently used and, in 
the case of “steel”, “# # ” is typically found. Though the usage of “# # ” in the records was, in 
the main, clear, the translation of the combination “# # ” was frequently problematic. As seen 
in the documents, the authors’ intended meaning may have been either the manufacture of pig 
iron or steel. One suggested reason for this vagary stems from the fact that “# ” refers to “Fe” 
and in combination with the ideogram “M ”, refers to the idea of using Fe in a manufacturing 
process but not the product itself. A further reason may be seen in the definition o f“# # ”. The 
entry for “# # ” in the Kôjien is as follows:
The refinement of iron ore and the making of iron or steel material ( # # ) .  Normally, 
using a blast furnace, the process of making pig iron.^ ^
This uncertainty is also reflected in the literal reading of these characters provided by Nelson: 
the English equivalent is “iron manufacture” *^ which means, strictly speaking, neither the 
production of pig iron or steel. This is further complicated by the case of the combination
Andrew Nathaniel Nelson, The Modern Reader's Japanese-English Character Dictionary, 2nd ed. 
(Tokyo: Tuttle, 1990), 910.
Shinmura Izuru, ed., Kôjien, 1763.
Nelson, The Modern Reader's Japanese-English Character Dictionary, 809.
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Place where is made. In many cases, not only [is made in this place]
but also a place that has steel manufacture, ingots, rolling etc. Integrated works.^’
In the records used here, was mainly used to mean Yawata, the government-
owned integrated iron and steel works. However, as we can see this definition does allow 
for uncertainty in interpretation. Given that this dissertation is on the amalgamation of the 
iron and steel industry, the interpretation of these linguistic vagaries can be crucial to our 
understanding of the authors’ intended meaning and, in turn, our analysis. When such 
uncertainties arose, the context of the passage in which the ideogram or combination of 
characters was located was relied upon. In some instances, the entire passage is provided in 
translation to make clear the reasons for the interpretation. A further language related point 
to be made is that in this thesis the Japanese equivalent of the names, institutions, select 
committee names and reports is provided in Appendix 1. In the body of the thesis, the 
names of records of the shingikai meetings are provided in abridged form and their 
complete titles are provided in Japanese in Appendix 2.
Shinmura Izuru, ed., Kôjien, 1763.
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3. Survey of pre-war government-business relations: historical legacy, political merchants 
and zaibatsu
In the introduction to Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from Japan s Prewar 
Experience, William Wray states that “A new direction has emerged in the past half-decade in 
Western writings on Japanese economic history. This development falls under the rubric of 
“business history” or “industrial history”'*® and is a clear departure from the Marxist 
interpretation of Japan’s economic development that was previously dominant in Japanese 
historiography. Where the Marxist perspective tended to portray the business and government 
relationship in monolithic fashion, this has given way to a perhaps more varied view on how 
they operate together. Wray indicates that this has been until recently largely company specific 
monographs, but this is now changing and the focus has broadened to include government- 
business relations.'** Wray adds “A further characteristic of recent business history is ... 
concerned with the interaction between the internal dynamics of the institution under study and 
the external influences on the institution by the broader economic, social and political context of
William D, Wray, ed., Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from Japan's Prewar Experience 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 1.
/6/ûf. A retrospective view of Marxism in the historiography is provided by Andrew E. Barshay,
""Doubly Cruel": Marxism and die Presence of the Past in Japanese Capitalism," in Mirror of Modernity: 
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, Twentieth-Century Japan: The Emergence o f a 
World Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
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the This conference book was published in 1989. In the past decade or so, some work
has been written on politico-business relations of the Taisho period but these works are 
regrettably limited in number.
As mentioned, research in economic history or the political economy of this period, 
too, is driven by knowing how Japan ‘succeeded’. Work on the late 1930s and through the war 
has fed into this research by drawing out institutional learning and other continuums.'*^ Much of 
the literature on the Meiji period (1868-1812) is an attempt to explain how Japan managed to 
adopt so quickly its new ‘modem’ institutions and put itself on the path of industrialisation. 
Falling in between is the Taisho period and the first Showa years - the specific area o f concern 
here. Relative to the surrounding pre-war years, there is in many respects a curious dearth of 
research on the years 1912 - 1930. Reasons for this are unclear. The Taisho period is seen by 
some as a brief episode in Japan’s modem history when it experimented with westem 
liberalism, bracketed by periods in which more autocratic approaches dominated. The view that 
the ‘honeymoon’ was short and need not be considered in understanding how Japan really 
operates perhaps helps explain the paucity of literature. Whatever the reason may be, our 
understanding of how business and govemment operated in this period is limited. As we have
Wray, ed., Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from Japan's Prewar Experience, 2.
For further details refer to Tetsuji Okazaki and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, "Japan's Present-Day 
Economic System and Its Historical Origins," in The Japanese Economic System and Its Historical 
Origins, ed, Tetsuji Okazaki and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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seen, in regards to politico-business relations and economic policy formulation, the economic 
history of the post-war is underpinned by understanding Japan’s success. Contending 
explanatory frameworks drawing on detailed empirical research have pushed our conceptual 
understanding of how business and govemment operate in this post-1945 period. In contrast, 
however, the pre-war literature lacks a broader perspective viewing the period as a whole. 
Research is driven by events or questions which are frequently more narrow in focus. Perhaps 
this is a reflection of our level of knowledge of the period in general and research is still filling 
in the holes, so to speak, or, perhaps it is simply that we have not yet stumbled upon a 
‘question’ that would unify the period. This is speculation but the important point here is that 
this expose of politico-business relations reflects these observations. The assumption that 
business and govemment operated in hand-in-glove fashion is much more entrenched, though 
not equally matched by empirical research. Stated differently, as we have a limited 
understanding of how business and govemment operated, the scope for speculation on the 
importance of covert interaction is that much wider.
An early problem faced by private enterprise in pre-war Japan was “the difficulty in 
reconciling traditional values of group-orientation with the profit-orientation inherent in the 
institutions of private enterprise....” '^* Byron Marshall in Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar
^  Byron K Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite, 
1868-1941 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 3.
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Japan: The Ideology o f the Business Elite, 1868-1941 provides an explanation for business 
“reluctance to break with the values of the past,”^^  This hesitancy, Marshall points out, was not 
due to govemment imposition but rather stemming from business views on its own contribution 
in the development of the nation/^ He further explains that business occupied the enviable 
position of having the support of govemment without any fear that the extent of govemment 
intervention posed a threat to business interests. With regards to business views on the pre-war 
labour movement, this must be tempered. Marshall explains that though by the “ 1920’s the 
business elite in Japan had already gained a measure of political power... their position proved 
to be a highly precarious one, dependent as it was on the power of the political parties in the 
Diet, and its importance should not be exaggerated.”'*’ However, with regards to economic 
matters when they impacted on business conditions, Meiji business leaders were not chary of 
openly criticising govemment policy where business interests were at stake.'** Marshall explains 
that a mutually beneficial relationship existed between govemment and business. Given the 
national goals set by govemment leaders for industrialization, they “were convinced that they 
must do everything in their power to encourage private enterprise... .”'*^ From the business 
perspective, “the expansion of the economy and of business opportunities, depended greatly
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 92.
28.
Ibid.
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upon the active participation of the government’s commitment to rapid industrialization and the 
nationalistic temper of the times to obtain the types of intervention most favourable to private 
business.” ®^ In short, there was a recognition on the part of both govemment and business that 
some degree of cooperation was necessary. Although the degree of dependency or independence 
o f action is likely to have varied according to the matter at hand, one side would appear not to 
have dominated the other.
“In the early years of the Meiji, two new types of businessmen emerged in the private 
sector: the seisho (political merchants), who rode on the crest of govemment favors and used 
every opportunity to amass fortunes for themselves... and the many second-rate businessmen or 
industrialists who had neither experience nor capital but only enthusiasm.” ‘^ This second group 
identified themselves as jitsugyôka, literally meaning ‘a man who undertakes a real task,’ and 
often is referred to as ‘entrepreneur’; the term ‘seisho’ , on the other hand, carried a “derogatory 
meaning ... [branding] the lobbyists who relied on their friends among officials to receive the 
coveted govemment contracts.”^^  “Govemment patronage took the form of subsidies, grants of 
monopolies or special privileges, favourable credit arrangements, and sales of state enterprises 
at nominal prices.”^^  By way of example, the house of Mitsui began its financial connection
^Ubid.
Johannes Hirschmeier, The Origins o f Enterpreneurship in Meiji Japan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), 163.
^^Ibid.,21%.
Hidemasa Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan (Tokyo:
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with governmental authorities in 1689 when “the Mitsuis were made purveyors of apparel, 
ornaments, and personal accessories to Shogun Tsunayoshi.” '^^  Further pursuing this, the Mitsui 
house under the son Hachirobei established exchange brokerages, or ryogaeya, in a number of 
cities including Osaka, where the bakufu’s treasury was located. He made a proposal for the 
reform of the bakufu’s money transfer system which was met with approval, and in 1691 “the 
House of Mitsui became an official money-changer for the hakuju’s t re a su ry .S u c h  was the 
start of the connection between Mitsui and govemment. Other well-known family names such 
as Mitsubishi also later formed close ties with governing authorities through mutually beneficial 
arrangements.
Johannes Hirschmeier in The Origins o f Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan makes the point 
that the traditional prejudice held against the merchant clan had diminished under the Tokugawa 
Bakufii (1603-1868). In the public eye however, these gains were lost during the initial years of 
the Meiji Restoration (1868) due to the “total disregard of the public interest”^^  that the former 
merchant class showed in pursuit of financial gain. It was recognized by Fukuzawa Yukichi and 
Shibusawa Eiichi, two leading figures of this time, that in order to foster entrepreneurship in 
Japan a public image had to be created that was distinct from that of the tainted political
University of Tokyo Press, 1992), 3.
John G Roberts, Mitsui: Three Centuries o f Japanese Business (New York: Weatherhill, 1973), 24.
Ibid., 25.
Hirschmeier, The Origins o f Enterpreneurship in Meiji Japan, 163.
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merchant. Thus, the common characterisation of the relationship between govemment and large 
merchants as being close is not only a latter day historical view. It was also widely recognised 
by the contemporary public as being close and operating along informal channels. It should also 
be noted that despite the aims of the new entrepreneurial class to set themselves apart and 
appear ‘clean’, they were not above receiving special favours from govemment. Shibusawa, for 
example, did benefit from his political connections though not to an extent which would tamish 
his reputation.Hirschmeier points out that, “in a certain sense all Meiji entrepreneurs were 
political merchants. The strict separation of the central and the private wing of the economy was 
slow to evolve in the politically emotional climate of the period.” *^
From the outset of the Meiji period, Japan embarked on the large scale project of 
revamping its political and administrative organs along with the development of various 
industries. The required capital and technical and administrative expertise was substantial. 
Those merchants that remained after the bankmptcies during the restoration were chary to invest 
for lack of experience in the modem industries, so at the outset the Meiji govemment took the 
lead, but eventually found willing entrepreneurs among the traditional merchants. “On 
discovering such businessmen, the regime [Meiji govemment] formed close connections with
279. 
^Ubid., 282.
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them and supplied generous assistance, creating a new type of political merchant.” ’^ Perhaps the 
leading example of this was the sale of certain state mines and other enterprises at very 
favourable terms. T.C. Smith in Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: 
Government Enterprises, 1868-1880 argues against this “cabal interpretation” ®^ which claims 
that “govemment enterprises were sold at nominal prices and on the easiest terms to a few 
wealthy families with the purpose o f effecting an alliance between the government and a small 
but wealthy capitalist class o f  merchants and ex-daimyô [emphasis in the original].”®* Similarly, 
he finds arguments that the sales stemmed from a govemment move to a more liberal, laissez- 
faire approach to economic management incorrect.®^ Rather, “the evidence strongly suggests 
that govemment enterprises were sold for financial reasons.”®^ The Meiji govemment 
recognised that its deficit could no longer be sustained and such sales were a remedial measure. 
What is to be bome in mind is that, as this example illustrates, financial considerations were 
critical to early developing Japan and though big business and govemment had a history of 
close operating relations, this did not necessarily imply underhanded dealings. In any case, the 
sale of these enterprises facilitated the evolution of certain wealthy merchant families in their 
later more diversified form known as zaibatsu (family-owned business groups). “This
Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan, 4.
®® T.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868- 
1880 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 87.
®* Ibid.
®^/W.
^Ubid.,m.
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transference of State factories to a few private firms mark[ed] an important state in the evolution
of the zaibatsu who in later years dominated the modem sector of the economy ))64
Political merchant activity and mining shared a characteristic: both were carried out on a 
monopolistic basis with strong barriers to entry. Political merchants had personal ties to 
powerful govemment figures, and mining companies had exclusive rights to mineral resources; 
these advantages presented almost insurmountable obstacles to latecomers. The profits fi’om 
political merchant and mining operations, maintained as they were through monopoly, were 
naturally large.®^
Perhaps more importantly, as Penelope Francks in Japanese Economic Development: 
Theory and Practice points out, the sale of the mines and other state owned operations bore long 
term implications given the state’s aim of industrialisation. From this point of view, the sale of 
state enterprises not only marked the start of a ‘partnership’ between govemment and big 
business to industrialise Japan, but also made consultation hard to avoid when forming 
industrial policy.
the change of policy [sale of state enterprises] meant that, from then on, the state could not 
influence the industrialisation process directly through its own enterprises but instead had to 
make it worthwhile for private entrepreneurs to bring about the goal of industrialisation... the 
sale of the govemment enterprises in the 1880s strengthened the informal links between the 
bureaucracy and the private entrepreneurs who were to develop major areas of industry
^  G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History o f Modern Japan 1867-1937 (with a Supplementary Chapter on 
Economic Recovery and Expansion 1945-1970), 3rd. ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972),
52.
Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan, 4.
“  Penelope Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1992), 
36.
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The creation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (MAC) in 1881 provided an 
institution through which the intercourse could run and was an initial step in the development of 
govemment expertise on such matters. This is not to suggest that all communication was now 
channelled through this conduit, as we may suppose that direct contact between high level 
figures remained and was in particular exercised when important matters were at issue. 
Nonetheless, MAC was, ostensibly at least, to co-ordinate “state activities in the promotion of 
industry and agriculture... [and] early industrial entrepreneurs were able to obtain a range of ad 
hoc subsidies, loans, technical assistance and so on, in developing the areas of industry the state 
considered essential.”^^
Though the solicitation of wealthy trading merchants helped ease the burden of the 
state much remained to be done to place the industrialisation process on a firmer footing. To this 
end, the reform of the banking system was seen as a means to generate capital for further 
investment. Under Count Matsukata Masayoshi, banking policy shifted toward adoption of an 
English model. He recognised that an effective financial system needed the existence of banks 
with specialised functions to meet the various demands of Japan’s economic development. 
These banks were “all instruments of a national purpose which changed little during the period 
of their existence. From the beginning they all had close financial connections not merely with
Ibid.
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the Government but also with great financial institutions of the zaibatsu, themselves part the 
agents o f national policy.” G.C. Allen suggests that the connection between the zaibatsu and
leading political actors was not exercised with the exclusive benefit of national development.
The operations of the financial system have been extremely susceptible to political influence. In 
the case of official banks and the Treasury Deposits Bureau this need not be insisted upon. It is 
true, however, even of the large banks owned by the zaibatsu because of the association of those 
houses with the Govemment and the close relationship which they had with the political 
leaders.^’
Both the Big Four zaibatsu, namely Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, and other 
smaller ones such as Asano, Furukawa, Fujita and Kawasaki, benefited from the business 
opportunities that World War I afforded. Though the Big Four held a major position in the 
economy during the conflict and the immediate ensuing years, it was not until the 1920s, given 
the failure of smaller businesses to weather the recession, that they “established a clear 
hegemony”. Though “their influence extended beyond business and into the political world, 
they did not have a monopoly on economic power.”’® Allen sees this as marking a transition in 
their relationship with govemment. Premised on the argument o f economic clout, by the late 
1920s zaibatsu had greatly enhanced their ability to influence govemment decisions.
Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan 1867-1937 (with a Supplementary Chapter on 
Economic Recovery and Expansion 1945-1970), 55.
^Ubid., 57.
Takafiisa Nakamura, A History of Showa Japan, 1926-1989, trans. Edwin Whenmouth (Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 1998), 4.
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Thus whereas in early Meiji days they could be regarded as agents of the Government, 
though probably never as merely passive agents, by the later twenties they had reached 
a position in which they could to a increasing extent impose their wishes on the
Government...’*
Between 1914 and 1919, the three largest Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo,
accounted for approximately 28 percent of the total assets of the top 100 companies in Japan, 
excluding those owned by the government, for example Yawata.’  ^Their position, though, varied 
according to the industry. In mining they accounted for 64.3 percent of private sector assets in 
1914 and 57.1 percent in 1919. In the case of the iron and steel industry, which is the focus of 
this thesis, their position diminished from 84.5 percent of private sector assets in 1914 to 41.7 
percent in 1919.’  ^In some other industries, the Top Three had no investment whatsoever. In 
many sectors of production there were other companies which were sufficiently large to 
exercise a “leadership role in the business world” as well, for example, in the textile industry 
(Kanegafuchi Spinning, Tôyô Spinning, Dai Nippon Spinning, Fuji Spinning Co., and Nisshin 
Spinning Co.), paper production (Oji Paper Co. Ltd and Fuji Paper Co.) and sugar (Dai Nippon
Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan 1867-1937 (with a Supplementary Chapter on 
Economic Recovery and Expansion 1945-1970), 134.
Yawata is also rendered into English as Yahata.
Takeda Haruhito, Zaibatsu No Jidai: Nihonkei Jigyo No Genryü, 3rd ed. (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1997), 
108.
40
Sugar Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Taiwan Seito Co.). '^* Thus, despite the dominant position of 
the zaibatsu by the time of World War I their economic position alone was not sufficient to hold 
sway over all other companies.
In trying to determine what political influence business held, however, it is necessary 
to go beyond any assessment of economic clout. Nakano Buei, the president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, when addressing members in 1908 encouraged them to help advance business
interests through political means:
To whatever extent possible, I would like chamber of commerce members to bestir themselves 
and stand as candidates in the forthcoming Diet election.... It may be said that up to now we 
have been followers or lantern carriers in the battles among the political parties.... However, this 
time the businessman must separate himself from the political parties and set himself up as a 
candidate in the interest of this business organization.
By 1917, of the 381 seats in the House of Representatives, 30 members had extra-parliamentary 
careers in the bureaucracy (7.9 percent), 192 members were businessmen (50.4 percent) and 20 
had careers which were both in the bureaucracy and business (5.2 percent).^^ The entrenchment 
of the business position in government was also further enhanced by the funding o f the two 
main political parties from the coffers of Mitsui and Mitsubishi. The former directed its funds to
Nakamura, A History ofShôwa Japan, 1926-1989,4.
Arthur E. Tiedemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," in Dilemmas o f Growth in Prewar 
Japan, ed. James W. Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 276-77.
Takeshi Ishida, "The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of Political Modernization in 
Japan," in Political Development in Japan, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), 307.
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the Seiyûkai and the latter to the Kenseikai. John Roberts in Mitsui: Three Centuries o f 
Japanese Business claims that “Hara^^ was amply funded as president of the Seiyûkai. At the 
end of each year dietmen belonging to the party used to visit his home to pay their respects and 
receive envelopes stuffed with money. It was generally assumed that Mitsui provided a share of 
the party’s funds; evidence of the fact became public in 1920.”’* Direct involvement in 
government affairs by Mitsubishi can be traced to 1896, with Iwasaki Yanosuke, head of the 
combine, helping to bring about the second Matsukata Cabinet.’  ^Kinship played a crucial part. 
From 1908 Iwasaki’s cousin, Toyokawa Ryôhei, who was head of the Mitsubishi Bank and 
chief director of the Tokyo Clearing House, “undertook a role of leadership among Diet 
members.”*® Katô Takaaki, who married Iwasaki Yatarô’s eldest daughter, became president of 
the Kenseikai in 1916 and led a coalition cabinet in 1924. Similar influences were at work in the 
founding of the Industrial Club of Japan which, as we shall see, was a key organisation in the 
business-politics relationship as it pertained to heavy industry. The funding for the Club was 
evenly divided between Mitsubishi and Mitsui, with Baron Dan Takuma, general manager of 
Mitsui, being its president from the outset of the Club in 1917 until his assassination in 1932.
”  Kara Kei was a prominent politician in the Meiji and Taisho periods. He became the first prime 
minister in 1918 to head a majority party cabinet and hold a seat in the Lower House.
’* Roberts, Mitsui: Three Centuries o f Japanese Business, 210.
Tiedemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," 278.
*® Ibid. Toyokawa Ryôhei participated in the final Joint House Committee on the Proposed Law for the 
Future of die Iron and Steel Industry which will be examined later.
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Kaneko Kentarô, a close friend of Baron Dan since their student days in the United States**, and 
whose younger sister married Dan, became Minister of Agriculture and Commerce in 1898 and 
Minister of Justice in 1900-01. He played a central role in the establishment of the Club.*^ In its 
founding vision, the Club undertook to promote the nation’s industrial growth and serve for the
betterment of Japan as a whole.
To strengthen co-ordination and co-operation among the members for the sake of the nation’s 
industrial growth; to study joint problems and to seek their solution with the view to common 
advantage; to improve the contribution which each member can make for the good of the 
country and in this way foster its progress and development.*^
Whatever intentions it had for the good of the nation, the “common advantage [of its members] 
and the growth of the member firms was the uppermost concern.*'* Hirschmeier and Yui feel that 
as the leadership of the Club was chosen from among the executives of the largest zaibatsu, they 
had a “dominant influence”*^  and “the big businesses represented in the Industrial Club 
systematically promoted proposals and espoused viewpoints that went against the interests of 
the small firms.”*^  It “lobbied with the government for subsidies for heavy industry, for the 
establishment of a Labour Council Board, and for a change in tariff rates. In all these aims it
*'After graduating fi-om MIT, Dan returned to Japan and found work teaching English. Two of his 
students were Hamaguchi Osachi and Shidehara Kijürô, both of whom later become prime minister,
*^  Horikoshi Teizo, ed., Keizai Dantai Rengôkai Zenshi (Tokyo; Chûô Kôron Jigyô, 1952), 42.
*^ Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu Nijflgo Nen Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu NijUgo Nen Shi, 2 vols. 
(Tokyo: Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, 1943), 10-11.
*“* Johannes Hirschmeier and Tsunehiko Yui, The Development of Japanese Business 1600 - 1980,2nd ed. 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1981), 185.
*^/W.
Ibid.
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was successful. It was also for some time successful in forestalling labour legislation, and in 
postponing universal suffrage.”*’ Andrew Gordon provides a summary of big business’ efforts 
headed by the Industrial Club to oppose the passage of labour bills. During the course of 
approximately a decade, business opposed the passage of the Health Insurance Union bill and 
the bill to revise the Factory Law in 1922. In the first instance Club efforts, and those of others 
as well, failed, but through the 20s, the business voice became increasing unified. Dan Takuma 
led the concerted effort to defeat the Union Bill in spring of 1930. Calling on the support of the 
Seiyûkai, the then opposition party, and through a nation-wide organisation o f business voices, 
the bill was defeated in March 1931. “Although the Minseito Party majority in the Lower House 
held together and approved the bill, Seiyûkai supporters and the industrialists in the House of 
Peers worked together to bottle it up in committee.... Of greatest importance, however, was 
continued business lobbying, which mobilized the sophisticated and coherent organization**... 
Business pressure bore fruit in the House of Peers.”*^
*’ Ibid. In 1922 the Economic Association {keizai renmei) was founded to assist the financial sector. At 
the outset its membership was largely from the banking world but expanded later. In addition to heading 
the Club; Dan Takuma was also chairman of this group. Following his assassination in March 1932, the 
Association took over the prime functions of the Club, though it continued to function, it did so with a 
much more reduced remit. Thus, “The Industrial Club had only a brief existence as the representative 
organization of big business, but during its time it was very powerful indeed.” Hirschmeier and Yui, The 
Development of Japanese Business 1600 - 1980, 186.
** The Industrial Club of Japan had previously formed five regional industrial organisations in Tokyo, 
Osaka, Nagoya, Northern Kyushu and Hokkaido as a means of further garnering support for its lobby 
interests.An&ew Gordon, "Business and the Corporate State: The Business Lobby and Bureaucrats on 
Labor, 1911-1941," in Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from Japan's Prewar Experience, ed. 
William D. Wray (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 63.
^Ubid.
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The 1930s marks a shift in politico-business relations that was driven by changing 
economic priorities as seen by government, their growing intervention in economic planning 
and the presence of the military. Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara in The Japanese Economic 
System audits Historical Origins characterise the pre-1930s Japanese economy as Anglo- 
Saxon. They cite that “in the eighteen years between 1902 and 1919 there were on average 24.6 
bank collapses per year, in each of the thirteen years between 1920 and 1932 there were 43.5, 
and in the thirteen years between 1933 to 1945 there were 7.8.”’° The implication is that 
government became increasingly interventionist and, given its wartime economic planning, 
determined to exercise central control. It was the “young bureaucratic elite as well as the 
military... [who] abhorred the free market system with its possibilities of making profits out of 
scarcities””  that in particular rankled with business, and in the initial years certain well-known 
businessmen clashed with government. Notwithstanding this antagonism, as the war years 
progressed and the strain on Japan increased, this “weld[ed] the government and the business 
community together in a joint purpose. But their views did not coincide on business matters.”’  ^
In contrast to the 1920s and 30s, when it was rare to find businessmen assuming cabinet 
positions, this changed in the 40s and we find a number of prominent business figure in key
^  Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, "Japan's Present-Day Economic System and Its Historical Origins," 13. 
Hirschmeier and Yui, The Development o f Japanese Business 1600 - 1980, 247.
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government posts
Notwithstanding these connections stemming from economic strength, political 
participation and friendship, it is not clear that the large zaibatsu directly exercised their 
influence to receive specific benefits on a quid pro quo basis. Dceda Seihin, who took over the 
helm of Mitsui after Dan’s death, acknowledged that financial support was given by both Mitsui 
and Mitsubishi to political parties. However, he claims that given the strength of the Big Three 
zaibatsu, they did not need to resort to underhanded means in order to have their interests taken 
into account: given their economic size, their interests would be naturally considered in the
political decision making process.
Since we had rapidly grown big through our own strength alone, we had no need to borrow 
strength from the government,,.,Military men seeing only that the zaibatsu were giving money 
thought that the zaibatsu must be doing improper things, but I certainly never did anything 
improper,,,,Small zaibatsu may have tried to make money in this way, but big zaibatsu such as 
Mitsui or Mitsubishi or Sumitomo did not use such sordid business methods.
Since Mitsui had many friends among the Seiyûkai men and Mitsubishi among the 
Minseito [amalgam of Kenseikai and Seiyü Honto], each used to give help to these friends at 
the time of a general election. It was not a matter of managing the Diet by making requests of 
these men. It was simply helping them at the time of a real general election, I think these men 
felt sympathy for Mitsui or, as the case might be, Mitsubishi, Therefore if there was some 
blunder committed and Mitsui or Mitsubishi were attacked, these men would probably 
sympathise and speak up for us behind the scene. But there were no deals. In my time we made 
no deals with these men,,,,’'*
”  Ibid.
94 Dceda Seihin Denki Kankokai, Ikeda Seihin Den (Tokyo: Keio Tsushin Kabushiki Kaisha, 1962), 210- 
1 1 ,
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Dan’s own biography, posthumously written by a committee in 1938, claims that he would have 
no truck with political money - bribery and in fact it was only late in life that he developed 
an interest in politics. Moreover, as a member of Mitsui, he was not allowed to participate in 
politics as there was a strict code that forbade such activ ityP erhaps it can be argued on the 
basis of personality that Dan was particular in these views among his contemporaries, but even 
Nakamigawa Hikojiro, vice president of Mitsui bank, recognised in the Meiji period that 
“Mitsui Bank’s operational difficulties stemmed fi'om its dependence on government 
patronage”, and in 1892 introduced reforms that started to steer the zaibatsu^ s bank from the 
traditional path of the political merchant.^’
Matsuura Masataka^* points out that Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo disliked the
participation of their members in political affairs:
In reality, the “zaibatsu” had structural power based on large economic strength. For this 
reason, pre-War politics was closely associated with the zaibatsu which was another term for 
the business world. It was said that there were many instances where the zaibatsu had direct 
control in political affairs. However, in the case of the three large zaibatsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi 
and Sumitomo, they transformed from “political merchants” to “zaibatsu”. During the huge 
systématisation that occurred after the Sino-Japanese War [1894-95], as well as during the post- 
World War I period that strengthened “zaibatsu control”, officially these zaibatsu disliked the
K5 Dan Danshaku Denki Hensan linkai, ed., Danshaku Dan Takuma Den, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Ko Dan 
Danshaku Denki Hensan linkai, 1938), vol 2 132.
Ibid., vol 2 130. Article 6, Point 1 of the Mitsui Constitution 1900 states that “The members of the 
House are forbidden to do the following acts: 1. To join any political party or to associate themselves 
officially with any political activity”. Roberts, Mitsui: Three Centuries o f Japanese Business, 519.
Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan, 21.
Typically, “zaikaF is translated as business world or financial world, however the author’s emphasis on 
the role of the sewagyô, or intermediaries, in the overall economy, and thus the meaning of “zaikaF is 
perhaps closer to “economic system”.
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participation of their members in politics and there were many cases where their participation 
was forbidden. With regards to this, there are explanations that for the large zaibatsu they 
already had special connections with structurally based authority, government and people with 
political power, and there was no special reason for them to participate in politics. In the post­
war [World War I] period, in general enterprises that were part of former zaibatsu already had 
huge economic power and were secure in their close association with the political elite, so they 
did not feel a need to participate in politics.^
That the economic position of the large zaibatsu was such that it was not necessary to 
participate in politics does not imply that they did not actively exercise their influence through 
other informal means. Furthermore, as Ikeda pointed out, they were confident that given their 
structural position in the economy their interests would be taken into account in political 
decisions. Also, despite whatever rules had been established to prevent direct political 
participation, there seemingly was a Nelsonic blind eye in at least two of the zaibatsu houses: in 
the 58* Diet of 1930 1.8 percent of Minseito members and 1.7 percent of the Seiyûkai members 
held positions in Mitsui and 3.7 percent of the Minseito and 1.7 percent of the Seiyûkai were 
from Mi t subi sh i . I t  should also be noted that the remainder of the business community did not 
enjoy the same privileged position as the large zaibatsu and probably they did not fetter 
themselves with house rules preventing their employees from getting a leg-up on the 
competition.
^  Matsuura Masataka, '"Zaisei Sewagyô' to Keizai Shisutemu No Kiki: Senzen Nihon 'Zaikai' No Keisei 
to Soshikika," 314-15.
Tiedemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," 281.
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In the end, however, it is difficult to go beyond speculation and evaluate the degree to 
which business exercised its influence in government. Certainly there are examples indicating 
that at least until the 1930s, zaibatsu were quite influential, particularly in the 20s. In contrast to 
the post-war literature, the perspective is less ‘top-down’. However, there is a decided lack of 
detail on how this interaction occurred. Though not anecdotal, assumptions are made on the 
basis of economic strength, diet presence or otherwise, that business was having its way or at 
least having a say. There is thus a clear need for detailed empirically based work to demonstrate 
the truth of this. The limitations imposed by the scarcity of documents make systematic 
empirical research in this area difficult, but no less necessary.
4. Shift to formal from informal lines of communication
Between the Meiji Restoration and the political and economic changes that eventually 
led to war in the 1930s, interaction between government and business shifted from one where 
communication was primarily through personal channels to one where the informal conduit was 
exercised along side the formal, one important example being the shingikai. More will be said 
of this forum later but at present the aim is to examine some of the primary factors that drove 
this shift. Formalisation of politico-business interaction grew out of the nation building process.
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This observation is not unique to Japan and could apply equally to other developing countries. 
Industrialisation, wherever it may be found, along side the development of new bureaucratic and 
political organs, brings with it an increased complexity of the economy and, concomitantly, 
competing interests. In the early years of developing Japan, the actors were fewer in number and 
the co-ordination of interests was handled primarily behind closed doors. However, as new 
industrial sectors emerged and the political climate changed, the informal channel proved to be 
less appropriate. As these new sectors developed, their voices strengthened. Further, as the 
representative party system came into its own and the people’s demands increasingly entered 
the political calculus, in turn, greater transparency in governmental decision making was 
demanded.
With the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853 and later the conclusion of the so-called 
‘unequal treaties’, Japan was confronted with the decision of how to address the Western 
presence. Nearby China provided an example of a possible outcome if it did not squarely face 
up to foreign encroachment. The overwhelming Western military superiority supported by the 
home industrial complex, necessarily placed Japan in a precarious position. The latter half of the 
19th century proved to be pivotal. Japan made the transition from an agrarian based largely 
autarkic economy with an isolationist foreign policy to a nation embarking on the path to 
‘modernisation’. This rested on the adoption of Western industrial technology, military
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armament and Western-styled political and bureaucratic systems. From the perspective of 
politico-business relations, it was agreed in principle by both sides during this period that it was 
in Japan's interest to adopt a pro-Western political stance and economic development based on 
industrialisation.
The point here is that during most of the period considered, it is the manner of the 
Japanese response to the combination of the external military threat and the need to overcome 
particular domestic weaknesses in order to respond to this threat that drove business and politics 
together. This is not to say that had these factors not been present during the early years of 
Japan’s industrialisation, business and government would not have co-operated, as the historical 
legacy of their close interaction had already predisposed them to do so. However, in addition to 
this, the factors of external threat and scarcity of resources heightened whatever affinity already 
e x i s t e d . O n  the one side, government, concerned over national defence, needed industry to 
establish the requisite defence infrastructure and, on the other side, business sought government 
aid in creating favourable circumstances for domestic industry. However, in the period covered 
in this thesis, as the Western oriented modernisation policy, which formed the ‘glue’ that held 
both partners in close proximity, shifted to a policy where the focus was on Asia, the closeness 
of the relationship changed. This is not to imply that there were not contentious issues between
On the issue of impact of scarcity of resources and its impact on national security see Michael A, 
Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987).
51
politics and business before this time but that they did not undo the underlying bond. It was only 
after the Washington Conference of 1921-22 that pro-militaristic, anti-Western influences came 
to the fore but during the late twenties, whilst these forces rose, there was not a unified nation­
wide approval of the prevailing jingoism and its impact as it eventually appeared in the early 
1930s. Thus, for the politico-business relationship the overriding defining feature during our 
period is not that Perry had forced Japan's doors open but the manner of the Japanese response.
In terms of the development of the economy, although the growth of light industry preceded 
that of the heavy industry sector, what is of specific concern here the emergence of the heavy 
industry sector. The industrialisation process implied the promotion and expansion of heavy 
industry, such as the chemical and machinery industries, and, in particular, the manufacture of 
iron and steel. A domestic productive capacity of steel was deemed necessary for military 
n e e d s , a n d  this competed with demands stemming from the expansion of the domestic 
infrastructure such as rail lines or construction. To this end, the sharp increase in western 
demand for iron and steel during World War I facilitated the rapid expansion of the domestic 
manufacturing base. The boom years of the war were followed by a rapid contraction of the 
market which severely impacted on not only iron and steel manufacturers but the economy as a 
whole. The depression that ensued dragged through the 20s, forcing the closure of many
For further details consult Nagura Bunji, Heiki Tekkô Kaisha No Nichiei Kankeishi - Nihon Seikôjo to 
Eikokugawa Kabmushi: 1907 - 52 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 1998), 154.
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enterprises and driving the less infirm to the zaibatsu fold.
Running parallel to these changes were developments in the political world, whereby 
cohesion of opinion was becoming fragmented in the face of divergent interests, and the ability 
of the elite to control was progressively weakened. Through the period under question here, we 
see the gradual emergence of a representative party system breaking out from the constraining 
order formed in the early Meiji years. In the immediate post Restoration period, Japanese 
society was still loosely formed along traditional lines of social caste delineation. Western 
concepts such as human rights or Rousseau's social contract were foreign ideas to the 
relationship between political power holders and the masses. In particular, the idea o f popular 
political participation in shaping Japan's future was remote from the minds of the architects of 
the Imperial Japanese Constitution (also known as the Meiji Constitution) of 1889, which 
sought to maintain power within the hands of the ruling elite.'°^ It was neither intended nor 
deemed wise to enfranchise the populace at large. As will be seen later, under the Meiji 
Constitution, authority and influence were not necessarily co-located. One source of 
omnipresent influence was the genrô, or elder statesmen, whose continuation of non­
constitutional oligarchic control rested on two basic factors. First, as the number of oligarchs 
dwindled, control needed to be extended to a like-minded elite. Secondly, it was imperative that
For further details see Richard H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Ithaca; Cornell 
University Press, 1976).; Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991).
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democratic sentiments be contained so as not to affect the power base. In the long run, neither of 
these occurred. The oligarchic rule which had orchestrated politics weakened as the genrô died 
and a younger generation of more democratically sensitive politicians took control.
One of the first steps in the devolution of oligarchic control can be seen in the 
changing composition of the backgrounds of the new generation of politicians. The genrô were 
largely men of the Chôshû and Satsuma domains. Hanbatsu-hdLSQÔ recruitment ensured loyalty 
and authoritarian control of the nation. As the genrô aged, they gradually withdrew from the 
breach ôf politics and directed affairs through their appointees. Assuming on the one hand the 
existence of sufficient loyalty of the designee and, on the other, sufficient control by the patron, 
little would have changed. But, the institution of a new merit-based recruitment process proved 
to undermine genrô control.
In the late Meiji period, young aspiring bureaucrats had to sit for exams, and based on 
their results, the most promising were chosen. Many then, as also today, were graduates of 
Tokyo University's*®"* law faculty. Commencing as civil servants, some later sought political 
careers. These politicians were in education and outlook distinct from those whose 
appointments were based on their hanhatsu pedigree. The study of Western thought and a 
facility in English or one of the European languages was considered desirable and aided rising
Then Tokyo Imperial University
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through the ranks.
the Taisho generation of political leadership constituted not only a new national elite, unfettered 
by loyalties to their own local provinces and personally identified with the growth of a strong 
and enlightened central government, but also one selected by the oligarchic generation 
themselves.
Though merit had become increasingly important for advancement, personal connections and 
patronage remained critical for the attainment of high office. As we move through the Taisho 
and in particular early Showa years, the critical role of genrô favour diminished. This was not 
that perceptions had changed but rather that given the advanced age of the genrô and their 
diminishing numbers, the remaining were increasingly less capable of exercising their former 
influence. This, in turn, facilitated greater latitude of action for the younger breed of 
politicians.
As the influence of the oligarchy waned and the next generation of politicians came to 
the fore, we see the influence of popular demand in political decision making rising. During the 
war years, the Japanese economy experienced an unprecedented boom, only to be followed in 
1916 by severe inflation which increasingly widened a gap between wage levels and commodity 
prices, resulting in more than a seven-fold rise in the number of strikes between 1914 and
Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), 52.
13.
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1 9 1 7  107 Yi^ ig unrest reached a crescendo in 1918 with wide spread demonstrations known as the 
Rice Riots.'®* It was recognised in government that the unrest was not an isolated incident, but 
part of something larger, and that a coherent political response was necessary to address a 
changing Japan.
In 1919 Home Minister Tokonami Takejiro spoke for many when he described Japan's 
industrial system as having reached a crossroads. The state could choose, and seek to build, 
harmonious and cooperative industrial relations, or it could allow social and industrial tension 
to grow unchecked. Tokonami's concern reflected a broad post-World War I belief that the 
creation of a coherent labour policy had become absolutely necessary...
In this sense, social unrest proved to be a means of drawing the attention of government, if not 
modifying perceptions. In terms of political impact, it succeeded in forcing the politicians to 
recognise that they could ill afford to disregard the people.
The vote, in a series of steps, was extended to an ever widening percentage of the 
population."® The original provisions of the Constitution afforded approximately only 1 percent 
of the population the right to vote. Qualification for voting was based on tax payment and, by 
approximately 1920, this had reached roughly 10 percent of males over age twenty-five. After a 
number of attempts to grant universal suffrage, this was finally achieved in May of 1925 with
W. Dean Kinzley, Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan: The Invention o f a Tradition (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 29.
On the labour movement in this period see Stephen Large, Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in 
Interwar Japan, or Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan.
Kinzley, Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan: The Invention of a TYadition, 146.
For labour perspective on the events that led to the expansion of suffrage see Gordon, Labor and 
Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, 131-43.
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the passing of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act extending the vote to all men over age 25.” * 
Though change was afoot and government becoming comparatively more responsive 
to public interests, this change should not be exaggerated. To be sure, universal manhood 
suffrage was an indication of Japan’s new political winds and an important milestone in the 
démocratisation of this nation. However, this needs to be juxtaposed to the prevailing views of 
contemporary political leaders. In philosophical and practical terms, what remained in the minds 
of politicians such as Katô Takaaki and Kara Kei was not to offer the Japanese people the 
opportunity to choose and select their nation's destiny, as might be interpreted by this revised 
legislation.**^ Though Japan's political leaders were aware that in the wake of World War I 
change was afoot in Japan and significant social and political transformations were occurring 
abroad, this, it was commonly felt among them, did not seem to apply to Japan. In the case of
Japan, the fundamental cause of social action was seen to be economic.
If the Kenseikai leadership was sensitive to the "trend of the world" toward democracy, they 
were equally aware of the "mass awakening" within Japan. Most of them seem to have felt that 
the new stirrings of social unrest, whether it took the form of rice riots or industrial strikes, 
sprang from economic causes. * ”
" ‘ it should be pointed out that while such changes to the vote were brought in, other changes were also 
happening, helping ensure control over social levers. The Peace Police Law of 1900 remained in effect 
throughout the Taisho period. As Manhood Suffrage was realised, this Law was shortly afterwards 
replaced by the Peace Preservation Law which, in its inexplicit wording extended greater latitude to 
enforcement agencies. Paradoxically, as Japan moved further down the path of industrialisation and 
formal démocratisation - hallmarks of modem nationhood - ever present in the background remained the 
levers of social control. The bars to the cage had been extended but ultimate emancipation not achieved. 
For further details see Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan.
' "  For details on Kara Kei’s views on suffrage expansion see Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in 
Prewar Japan, 61.
Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan, 144.
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This economic interpretation of Japan’s social unrest in the post-war period is illustrated in both 
Hara’s ‘positive policy’ which emphasised ‘wealth and strength’ of the nation and Kato's more 
electorate sensitive approach. In Kato’s appeal to the people he addressed matters of direct 
concern to the masses, such as the stabilisation of incomes, labour problems and the 
amelioration of education. Notwithstanding, this was done as a calculation to ease the social
tension while maintaining the essential kokutai (national polity).
he (Katô) was hoping small concessions would be sufficient to avoid future upheavals that 
might affect the kokutai or damage the economy. Certainly he felt that a policy of concession to 
the demand for reform was far preferable either to repression or empty appeals for "moderation" 
and "harmony."
So, though the claim that by the 1920s a representative party system had come into its own 
must be tempered, it is safe to say that popular demands had become increasingly difficult to 
ignore. As we approach the latter half of the 20s, a new factor entered into the calculus, namely 
the rise of military influence in political decision making. The factors that facilitated the gradual 
usurpation of power by the military found its roots in the demise of the genrô, the sustained 
economic problems encountered after war and through the 20s, and the disenchantment, in 
government and among the people, over Japan’s relations with the West. This would have 
enormous repercussions for the relations between government and business.
""/W ., 146.
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In this context, politico-business relations are seen here as a function of social, 
economic and political factors. Between the early Meiji years and the rise of militarism in the 
1930s, the manner in which business interacted with government shifted from one where 
communication was primarily informal, to a situation where transparency in political decision 
making was increasingly demanded. The emergence of the representative party system roughly 
coincided with strong social demands along side the widening of the electorate to all male 
voters. This crucible of coalescing factors is the context in which the amalgamation o f the iron 
and steel industry occurred. Importantly, had this process transpired during the early Meiji 
period, one might speculate that much of the debate would have been held behind closed doors 
with perhaps few representatives of the industry. However, as will be shown, the amalgamation 
process was achieved, ostensibly at least, through debates located in the formal institution of the 
shingikai. A recently formed voice of organised industry represented the interests of iron and 
steel producers throughout the proceedings, both in the forum itself and through memoranda 
and other publications expressing the industry’s interests. In short, the comparatively open 
manner in which the amalgamation process occurred reflects the differences between Meiji and 
Taisho Japan.
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5. Stability and the establishment of a government and business relationship
Argument has been made for the fluidity of the period under question. The Taisho and early Showa 
periods are presented as set between the social, economic and political construct of the pre­
industrialisation period and the new configuration of these elements after the early 1930s. The 
government and business relationship during the period of the amalgamation of the iron and steel 
industry is seen as set in a transition period. The question then arises, given the dynamics of this 
period, what does this mean for the government and business relationship?
The explanatory frameworks of government and business interaction are based on observed re- 
occurring patterns, but the observations are also time specific and operate under particular 
economic and institutional conditions. These observations are historically specific and in turn these 
explanatory configurations, given their temporal limitations, give way to revisions that take into 
account changing circumstances. The corporatist model observes a close configuration of the 
government and business relationship as depicted by its architect Philippe Schmitter.'*^ This model 
has been applied in the post 1930s period in Japan to describe the government and business 
relationship though modified to exclude l a b o u r . I n  the post war period, the corporatist model has
Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," in Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation^ 
ed. Gerhard Lehmbruch (London: Sage Publication, 1977).
T.J. Pempel and Keiichi Tsunekawa, "Corporatism without Labor? The Japanese Anomaly," in Trends 
toward Corporatist Intermediation, ed. Gerhard Lehmbruch (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).
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given way to the dominant developmental state paradigm which, as we have seen, places 
politicians, government and business in close alignment in the policy formulation process and 
economic development. Challenging this ‘statist’ approach, Richard Samuels in The Business o f the 
Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective argues that it is rather 
the case that government and business operate on a basis o f ‘reciprocal consent’, stressing the 
notion of reciprocity in his analysis of Japan’s energy industries. Perhaps not clear in detailing how 
this relationship operates,'*’ Samuel’s analysis shows that though government has jurisdiction, de 
facto^ business maintains control, thus a modus vivendi or ‘understanding’ has been achieved. 
Germane to our purposes, in order to achieve this understanding, whether it be labelled as
corporatist, or reciprocal consent, stability is important.
Reciprocal consent is the mutual accommodation of state and market. It is an iterative process 
of reassurance among market players and public officials, one that works better where the parties to 
these negotiations are stable and where the institutions that guarantee their compacts are 
enduring,"*
Stability, however, should not be misconstrued as absence of conflict, as Samuels observes in the 
case of the energy markets that friction between government and business was not uncommon. 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘reciprocal consent’ should not be seen as implying trust, but rather as 
suggesting that an established mode of interaction is in place.
James Babb, Business and Politics in Japan (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 9. 
"* Richard J. Samuels, The Business o f the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 8.
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Conflict and stability have produced an undeniably pervasive, developmental state....The pervasive 
Japanese state has nearly always been congenial to private interests, in large measure because 
private firms have learned how to surrender jurisdiction while retaining control of markets. By 
privately ordering markets to conform to a perpetually negotiated, state-sanctioned economic order, 
private investors have found one solution -  some would say the optimal solution -  to the vagaries 
of capitalist development. Risk is frequently socialized, costs often transferred. This solution 
involves the intimate involvement of state agencies, of course, and as a result the politics of 
reciprocal consent is often confused with state leadership, mutual trust and mutual sanction from 
which it is derived.*119
What is critical for our purposes is that regardless of whether trust exists or not there is an 
‘understanding’ between government and business on how to operate together. As will be seen, this 
‘imderstanding’ is not observed in this case study. It is suggested that, as outlined above, the 
requisite economic and political stability for the establishment of an ‘understanding’ between 
government and business in the period of 1916 to 1934 was not present. This understanding, 
though, did develop in the ensuing years, as Miles Fletcher, in The Japanese Business Community 
and National Trade Policy 1920-42, points out that by the mid 1930s it was recognized by
business that an ‘understanding’ with government was to their advantage.
The business community during the interwar era gradually became convinced of the need for what 
scholars would now label a corporatist relationship in order to pursue effective trade policy.... By 
the mid-1930s executives envisioned a formal stmcture of mutual consultation with the 
government. The situation fits what Richard J. Samuels has called "reciprocity” in that "control 
[was] mutually constrained." Business had gained "systematic inclusion in the policy process" and 
"rights of self-regulation" while "grant[ing] the state some jurisdiction over industrial structure in 
the 'national interest.'”*^**
**’ /6i£/.,261. 
120 William Miles Fletcher, The Japanese Business Community and National Trade Policy, 1920-42
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Economie and political stability are important factors in engendering an understanding 
between government and business which, expressed differently, can be seen as the forces that 
shape their interaction. Reciprocity, as observed by Samuels in his examination of the energy 
industries, was established in an industry in which government was not a prime stakeholder but 
was accorded jurisdictional authority. In the case of the iron and steel industry during this 
period, government had the mandate to pursue policies that it saw fit for the development of the 
industry, given its strategic importance. In addition -  and critically so -  government was also 
the largest stakeholder and largest integrated producer.
6. The structure of the iron and steel industry
The history of the iron and steel industry from the first steps taken in producing iron 
until the amalgamation of the industry in 1934, and indeed beyond, was closely interwoven 
with government involvement.*^' Yawata works, the largest, and for much of the period under
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 6-7.
Acknowledgement is made here to Yonekura Seiichiro’s The Japanese Iron and Steel Industry: 1850 -  
1990 which has been of great assistance in framing the historical background of the development of the 
iron and steel industry in this section and elsewhere. Similarly, Yasui Kunio’s Senkanki Nihon Tekkôgyô 
To Keizai Seisaku has been useful the examination of various shingikai. His approach, however, is less 
concerned with the process of the shingikai deliberations than outcomes and their relationship with 
economic policy.
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consideration here, the only integrated producer, was a government run operation. Regardless 
of the extent of private sector expansion, and its later reorganisation and consolidation under 
mainly zaibatsu control, Yawata remained the largest single producer of iron and steel.
This structural characteristic of the emerging industry -  the gigantic Yawata in the center of the 
market surrounded by the private firms -  most distinguishes the early industry from the post- 
Second World War industry.
Smith has argued that Japan industrialized faster than other Far Eastern countries 
because of its “knowledge of the West, and particularly its technology, [which] was more 
advanced in Japan than elsewhere almost from the beginning of Western intercourse.”*^  ^
However, Francks later posits that though prior to the Meiji Restoration Japan had an 
indigenous iron industry, it was “nowhere near as large-scale and capital-intensive as that 
facing, for example, contemporary China and South Korea”*^ '*, and offered little by way of 
technological know-how and production level as a base to press forward with industrialisation. 
Similarly, Samuels points out that though domain lords had established iron production capacity 
for weapons-making, the potential for exploitation was limited as the “technology was... 
preindustrial, relying on charcoal, water wheels, and poor-quality Japanese pig iron.”*^^
Seiichiro Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), 74.
Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880,1. 
Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice, 67.
Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological
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Regardless of the extent of this technological base, however, it is clear that the development of 
the iron and steel industry was rooted in the Bakamatsu period and Japan’s initial learning of 
western technological methods.
This knowledge was largely attributable to Japan’s keen interest in the Dutch 
understanding of things scientific. Through the laborious efforts of translating a wide range of 
works into Japanese, Japan gained a wider understanding of the West and its extant scientific 
knowledge. As Japan’s interaction with foreign countries increased during the eighteenth 
century, “Dutch studies [became] part of a program of national defense.”’^ ® Centres of Dutch 
learning were few in Japan, but among the han^ it was pursued in Satsuma, Saga, Chôshû, Tosa 
and Mito, the first two of which built experimental models of the reverberatory fumace.^^^
Realizing the military potential of western technology, the Tokugawa and the leading 
han took it upon themselves to press ahead with the development o f Japan’s military capability 
and the industrial capacity associated with it. Given the strategic nature of such endeavours as 
iron, armaments and shipbuilding, the urgency of their development and the absence of a 
capitalist class, private interests were excluded.*^* Through the efforts of Saga han, the first
Transformation o f Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 72. ; see also Nakaoka Tetsuro, Ishii 
Tadashi, and Uchida Hoshimi, Kindai Nihon No Gijutsu to Gijutsu Seisaku (Tokyo: Kokusai Rengo 
Daigaku, 1986), 23.
Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880, 2. 
A furnace or kiln in which the material under treatment is heated indirectly by means of a flame 
deflected downward from the roof
Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880,4.
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successful reverberatory furnace was made in 1850, facilitating the production of metal for guns 
out of iron ore. The development of a modem military infrastructure was thus underway three 
years prior to Commodore Perry’s arrival.
Within a few years, other han had developed their own iron production capabilities.
By 1853 Satsuma had built its own reverberatory furnace, and a blast fumace'^® in the following 
year. By 1858 Mito and Tokugawa had succeeded in building one or more reverberatory 
furnaces as well. With this development in smelting capabilities, the rate of gun production 
increased rapidly, and according to one report, between 1853 and 1856 Saga “employed about 
one hundred workers ... in casting ... and Saga filled an order from the Tokugawa for two 
hundred of the new guns before 1857.” Impressive as this may sound, the volume of 
production remained limited.
By way of providing a measuring stick, a short tale of Japan’s early iron making 
efforts may be edifying. The authorities of the Mito domain commissioned Oshima Takatô, a 
technological pioneer in this area, to construct a blast furnace. The first efforts in 1855, 
employing the traditional Tatara method of smelting iron sand, met with limited success. In 
1857 Oshima’s expertise was sought again but this time by wealthy merchants from the domain
Ibid.
A furnace which forces hot air through molten matter.
Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880y 5. 
For details on the early development of Japan’s iron and steel industry, refer to Nagura Bunji, Nihon 
Tekkôgyô Shi No Kenkyü (Tokyo: Kondo Shuppan Sha, 1984).
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of Nanbu. Using charcoal as the fuel source and substituting iron sand for iron ore, Oshima's 
furnace managed to produce about “one ton a day."*^^
It is a curious that though the Tokugawa bore the prime reasonability for national 
defence, the central regime’s development of iron ore production lagged behind a number of 
han by several years. After 1858, though, the Tokugawa adopted a more expansive approach by 
developing the iron industry in conjunction with shipbuilding.’^ '* And, by “ 1874 the Meiji 
government [had] built the Kamaishi Ironworks on the site of the coal mines in Iwate using 
imported equipment and instructors....”’^  ^During these initial stages of the development of 
Japan’s iron and steel industry, there remained considerable reliance on Western technology. 
Through learning from hired Western experts and the advancements forged by such institutes as 
the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan, reliance on foreign technology gradually diminished.’ ®^ 
Within decades, Japan had made significant strides in establishing its own home 
production capacity. With the aim of reducing domestic dependence on imports, the Navy 
established an open hearth furnace at the Yokosuka arsenal in 1890 and made improvements to 
the Kamaishi mill. By the mid-1890s, the development of steel self-sufficiency was accelerated
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity.
Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880,6-
7.
Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice, 72.
For details on technology transfer see Nakaoka Tetsuro, Ishii Tadashi, and Uchida Hoshimi, Kindai 
Nihon No Gijutsu to Gijutsu Seisaku.
67
by the shortage driven by Sino-Japanese war/^^ The first of several requests for construction 
was submitted to the Diet in 1897 and, in 1901, the furnaces of the newly built government site 
at the village of Yawata on the north Kyûshû coast, were first fired/^^ With a capacity of 60,000 
tons, Yawata was the largest mill in Asia though “still less than 1 percent the size of U.S.
Steel.”' T h e  use of modem technology in its production of iron and steel was increasingly 
adopted, as well as the establishment o f training academies, facilitating the education of skilled 
workers and providing centres for research. The near absence of adequate domestic iron ore and 
coal, though, forced Japan’s reliance on imports. Even by “ 1896, imports supplied 60 per cent 
of Japan’s consumption of pig-iron and almost all that of steel.”'"'® The theme of Japan’s acutely 
felt vulnerability, stemming from this and other factors, and its connection with national 
security has been explored elsewhere,'^' but, for our purposes here, what is germane is that 
Japan’s iron and steel industry was significantly influenced by external factors. Its reliance on
Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological Transformation of 
Japan, 72. Also see Nagura Bunji, Nihon Tekkôgyô Shi No Kenkyü.
Nakaoka Tetsuro, Ishii Tadashi, and Uchida Hoshimi, Kindai Nihon No Gijutsu to Gijutsu Seisaku, 14.
Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological Transformation o f 
Japan, 72. Note that Samuels indicates that Yawata “was built...by the government and managed by the 
Imperial Navy... .’’(Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological 
Transformation of Japan, 72-73.) Penelope Francks state that the mill was “owned and managed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce” (Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and 
Practice, 68.). Similarly, Yonekura states the Council of Iron and Steel Production, which drew up plans 
for Yawata, was established by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1895. The members who sat 
on the Council were drawn from MAC, the Navy, the Army and the Ministry of Communication and 
Transportation. Disagreement arose between MAC and the Navy over expanding Yawata which led the 
Navy to develop the Kure Navy Arsenal (Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity 
and Discontinuity, 35-38.). Also, based on shingikai membership lists and who were the prominent 
government speakers during the meetings, the Navy played a distant second role to MAC members.
Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice, 68.
For example: Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941.
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foreign ore from China and Manchuria, for example, added a further dimension to Japan’s 
concerns over mainland political development and, as we will see, during the 1920s India’s 
cheap iron production put the screws on domestic Japanese producers.
Shifting the focus to domestic limiting factors on the development o f Japan’s iron and 
steel industry, the comparatively backward infrastructure need to be mentioned. Among factors 
to be considered were the limited domestic market integration and transportation networks. Not 
uncommon with developing economies, during the early stages of industrial growth, markets 
tend to be regionally based. Indeed, the expansion and mergence of local markets into a 
cohesive domestic market may be a critical turning point along the path of industrialisation.
That success is often, in part, attributed to the establishment of a network of rail lines and roads 
to facilitate the transportation of raw materials and produce between markets on a national scale. 
In the case of Japan, government in many instances promoted these developments either 
through direct ownership of companies or the subsidization of firms. In this sense, the success 
of the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry is directly attributable to other government 
and private sector successes in related areas.
Further on this theme of coordinated domestic growth, the comparatively weak 
economies of scale stemmed from the iron and steel industry’s lack of integration, which will 
figure large in this study, was of critical importance. A historical perspective is necessary in
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explaining the comparative lack of efficiency in the industry. If one argues that a more 
perspicacious government policy in Meiji period would have obviated later non-integration 
problems, this must be counterpoised by the economic reality that a newly developing country 
faces in trying to establish a costly iron and steel producing base.*'*^  As opposed to, for example, 
some production processes in light industry, the establishment o f iron and steel manufacturing 
capability was very capital intensive. For a newly industrializing nation such as Japan, this 
factor was a principle determinant factor that shaped the framework within which its industry 
would operate and, in turn, the choices that investors had. Without need to refer to additional 
considerations such as location, quantity and quality of natural resources, the constraints 
imposed by the initial financial outlay implied that, a priori, only government and those of the 
private sector who had access to large sums of venture capital could think of establishing an
integrated production process straight off the bat.
First of all, state-owned projects had a great financial advantage over private projects, 
particularly for costly projects such as an iron and steel works. For the first ten years, die 
financial situation of Yawata was far from self-supporting. It is generally considered that the 
Yawata was not technologically and financially established until 1910, when it made its first 
sales profit, 52,000 yen. This figure, however, does not take into account any interest payments, 
dividends, depreciation, or cumulative losses. The cumulative losses by 1910 had reached 11.12 
million yen and the total investment by 1909 was 36.93 million yen. It earned a 52,000 yen 
profit in 1910 only because its losses had been transferred annually to the national deficit, and 
because its annual budget, when renewed, had been based on the previous fiscal year’s budget 
without any consideration of the losses. This would not have been possible for a private 
company. Only a state-owned facility could have borne the huge initial cost and losses, which 
inevitably came in the attempt to catch up with Western levels of large-scale
See Alexander Gerschenkron {Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective) for discussion on 
industrialization approaches for late industrializing nations and the problems that they face. For specific 
discussion on the case of Japan, see Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice, 66- 
73.; Nagura Bunji, Nihon Tekkôgyô Shi No Kenkyü.
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production.
To wit, the problem for Japan was not simply a matter of capital investment but also one 
of risk. Though certain individuals in Japan had studied advanced Western iron and steel 
production methods and foreign specialists were employed, the implementation of this 
technology was fraught with difficulties. It was not only a matter of acquisition but also one of 
adapting the production process to the particular circumstances of the site and the associated 
learning process. Calculating the upfront cost of purchasing and transporting the necessary 
machinery was comparatively easy but more precarious was that of predicting the cost of 
climbing the potentially expensive learning curve. Learning through trial and error, though 
inevitable, implied that costs could have run between being relatively inexpensive, if things 
worked well, to prohibitively expensive when things did not. Naturally, this uncertainty was 
hard to predict. The combination of the heavy sunk cost and inexperience steered all but 
government and the most intrepid and well backed of entrepreneurs from investing.
Under these premature conditions, Japan needed two kinds of entrepreneurship. One 
was a dedicated individual who was prepared to establish the technological and organizational 
base of the iron and steel industry whatever the difficulties and risks. The other was a more 
institutional entrepreneurship that could bear with the initial difficulties and risks associated 
with the introduction of new technologies and businesses.*'*^
These constraints provide substantial rationale for why, from the outset, the Japanese 
iron and steel industry was characterized as non-integrated and marked by its distinction 
between Yawata, the principle integrated producer, and the iron or steel producers of the private 
sector. Though integration was achieved under the entrepreneur Tanaka Chobei at Kawanishi
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 54-55. 
"^^ Ubid., 18.
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Works, it was decidedly the exception among private producers. Though other sites under 
zaibatsu control did achieve limited integrated capacity during brief periods in the first decades 
of development, their production capacity was limited and efficiency in question, as suggested 
by their inability to sustain their integrated production capacity. In general, private sector firms, 
whether under zaibatsu control or not, produced either pig iron or steel. The long term 
implications of having a non-integrated production base were significant.
In domestic situations where producers are divided between pig iron and steel, ideally 
pig iron production should be matched with steel demand according to a 1:1 ratio, thereby all 
pig iron produced is used by steel producers. The reason for this was because there was limited 
use for pig iron as a product in itself. By this stage in metallurgical developments, steel had 
widely replaced pig iron and wrought iron as the preferred product of purchase, implying that 
pig iron’s principle value was as an intermediary step leading to the production of s t e e l . I n  
turn, this meant that pig iron producers necessarily had to sell to steel producers as alternative 
markets were limited. Steel producers were in the enviable position of being able to select the 
cheapest pig iron, whether that be produced domestically or elsewhere. This advantage was 
furthered by the production flexibility afforded by the Open Hearth Furnace (OHF), which 
allowed steel producers to vary the proportion of scrap iron to pig iron used in production. In 
times when scrap iron was cheap, pig iron producers found themselves not only competing
There were “specialty steel producers and iron casters who ... [made] up a small portion of the market 
share”, however they are not included in this study. Ibid., 9.
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against often cheaper international producers but also scrap iron suppliers. In other words, had 
Japan’s steel producers adopted a furnace with a less flexible production process, there would 
have been greater incentive for steel producers to merge their production system with iron 
producers to achieve economies of scale. Also the additional consideration “that impeded the
integration of the ironmaking phase was that the market was just plain small »»146
In 1920, total output of crude steel in Britain, Germany, and the United States was 9.2. 
8,5, and 42.8 million tons, respectively, while that in Japan was 0.8 million tons. With such a 
limited market and facing such serious competition, it seemed far wiser for the private steel 
firms to produce steel using the relatively cheap imported iron or scrap rather than to integrate 
iron production.***’
The arguments presented thus far in explaining the factors that created the distinction 
between integrated and non-integrated producers in Japan were not, strictly speaking, based on 
factors unique to Japan but can be more broadly identifiable with new industrializing nations. 
The initial steps in the establishment of a viable and efficient industrial base in Japan were 
particularly subject to economic imperatives. Barring the restriction of entrepreneurial 
investment in the industry, these imperatives suggest that the decision to establish a production 
capacity implied that it would have necessarily become one characterized as non-integrated and 
divided between iron and steel producers. As venture capitalists seeking to reduce risk, this
93.
83.
148 This section of the development of iron and steel in developing nations is derived from Ibid. and 
Francks, Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice.
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distinction was further reinforced by later marketing decisions. Some early producers managed 
to attain a degree of economic security through the establishment of a close sales connection 
with government agencies. By tailoring their production to meet the specific need of, for 
example, the Navy, they helped ensure continued demand. In some instances, producers had 
established a secure niche as providers of pig iron, while others specialized in steel products. 
From the point of view of national interest, this development became a disincentive to partake
in the later movement towards rationalization and integration of the industry.
The important factors in the economic growth at that time, which were military expansion, 
completion of the trunk railroads, and rapid increase in iron and steel imports, were reflected in the 
structure of the emerging iron and steel industry. The structure moulded the emerging private firms 
into four categories, characterized as follows:
1. Firms supplying the special products demanded by the Navy and the National Railways Bureau, 
that the Yawata Works could not cover, and which were often machinery producers as well as 
steelmakers.
2. Firms that specialized in blast furnace operation and that supplied pig iron for iron casting or steel 
producers.
3. Firms catering to the domestic demand for finished goods that the Yawata Works could not cover. 
These firms bought pig iron fi’om those in the second category or imported foreign pig iron and 
scrap.
4. Firms that operated in China, Korea, and Manchuria, and used the raw materials there.*'*®
Thus, in contrast to the energy industries examined by Samuels, government was both a 
competitor and a regulator in the iron and steel market. Its financial stake, by sheer economic
*'*® Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 59.
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argument, ensured that a priori^ it could not be a passive player and, in turn, by virtue of its 
predominant market share combined with the mandate to form economic policy strongly suggests 
that it would have considerable leverage in determining outcomes. Samuels has indicated that the 
“Japanese steel industry has always been the object of public nurture, and its health has always 
been identified with Japanese national security.”*^® The ensuing analysis will call this assumption 
into question. In terms of the government and business relationship in relation to the iron and steel 
industry, the dual role of the government and the structure of the industry will be borne in mind in 
the ensuing analysis.
7. Non-constitutional formal bodies
The need for representation stems from community of interest. Once common interests 
are identified, there typically follows the organisation of those interests and the selection of 
individuals to act as spokesmen. As was mentioned earlier, small groups of members may come 
to realise new common interests which draw these select members together, and this is 
frequently followed by subdivision and the start of a new representative organ. The case of early 
industrialising Japan is an example of this observation. As will be shown below, the increased
Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological Transformation of 
Japan, 72.
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complexity o f the growing economy brought with it new sectors whose businessmen often felt
their representative organs were no longer sufficient and sought their own voice new the 
formation of new representative organs. Though membership in these new bodies were more 
limited in number, the voice o f the new organisation was more focussed, and less compromise 
was needed in establishing policy. In the case of heavy industry, this was furthered by the 
significant financial strength that its leading members had and the powerful positions that they 
occupied in the economy. In this sense, economic development brings with it specialisation. 
This increased economic complexity implies an increase in voices competing for government 
attention, and in turn leads the specialised sectors to organise in order to be better able to attract 
political attention.
The Chambers of Commercial Law (Shôhô Kaigisho) were first established in 1878.*^ * 
In contrast to its Western counterpart whose roots stemmed from the community-based 
merchant guilds, the Japanese version was fostered by the government. The Chamber of 
Commercial Law was directed towards the promotion of national interests and offered 
government protection in this pursuit. From the perspective members of the local Chambers, it 
was also recognised that their non-unified state did not afford them the strength that unification
The following section relies on Miyamoto Matao, "The Development of Business Associations in 
Prewar Japan," in Trade Associations in Business History, ed. Miyamoto Matao (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1988).
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would ach ieve.Fo llow ing  this, in June of 1892, during the Kansai Chambers of Commerce 
meeting in Osaka, participants expressed their strong views for the formation of a national 
organisation. The establishment of a national organisation was decided upon during the 
following meeting in September. Later that month in Kyoto, representatives from 15 Chambers 
of Commerce across Japan gathered and opened the first meeting of the new national 
organisation.’^^  The National League of Chambers of Commerce {Zenkoku Shôgyô Kaigisho 
Rengôkai) gradually became the main organisation for businessmen, adopting a more 
independent role than its forerunner.M em bership was open to all firms and company 
executives, with certain restrictions tied to the size of the business or income tax paid, thus the 
majority of participants were of smaller-sized businesses. Subsequently it underwent 
reorganisation in 1922 with the formation of a central office in Tokyo and was the "sole 
organisation representing the Japanese business world on a national scale." Its role at the turn of 
the century was to act in concert with government to bring in business from abroad and promote 
foreign trade. Few enterprises had the wherewithal to embark alone on establishing the 
necessary connections for foreign trade and in this aspect, the League served a very useful role. 
“In this sense, it can be said that one of the Chambers' functions was to complement the
Nagata Masaomi, Keizai Dantai Hatten Shi (Tokyo: Kofiiji Shoten, 1956), 42.
^^^Ibid., 43.
Powerfiil guilds existed during the Tokugawa period and before. For further details see volumes 1 and 
2 of George Sansom, A History o f Japan, 3 vols. (Kent: Wm Dawson and Sons, 1978).
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managerial resources lacking in individual firms.”*^^
However, after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), with regards to the development of 
Japanese capitalism its independence was marked by the imperialistic nature of its stance. This 
became increasingly blatant after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. It also urged 
government to foster the development o f heavy and chemical industries, which were ironically 
to lead to its e c lip se .W ith  the emergence of such sectors as the iron and steel industiy, 
industrialists increasingly saw that their interests could no longer be adequately represented by 
the Chambers. The “vast majority of members were smaller-sized businesses. This brought 
about a tendency for the Chambers to bestow favors on the many smaller establishments. So, 
zaibatsu and big businesses felt that their own ideas did not necessarily match those o f the 
Chambers of Commerce.” ’^ ^
Conflicts of interest within the Chambers of Commerce drove like-minded 
businessmen and zaibatsu to form the Industrial Club of Japan (ICJ). In turn, the Chambers 
increasingly turned to local or micro-economic problems, for example the establishment of 
schools for international trade, the planning of business lectures and the improvement of the 
infrastructure in local cities. As a result o f the split, in conjunction with government, the 
Chambers went under review and in 1928 the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was
Miyamoto Matao, "The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan," 15.
Nagata Masaomi, Keizai Dantai Hatten Shi, 70.
Miyamoto Matao, "The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan," 20.
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formed. As its new title implies, the Chamber made more explicit “that the organization was to 
represent the interests of industrialists as well as merchants...”, albeit primarily those of the 
small-to-medium-sized enterprises. Of greater concern here, though, is the representation of 
heavy industry.
Established in 1917, the Industrial Club of Japan stood as an “economic organisation 
for the representation of the private sector....”*^* The constitution of the ICJ outlined its aims as 
encompassing the promotion of industry and inter-industry communication, and research of 
industry-related matters. The influence of the Club grew such that “ it became the usual practice 
of the government to listen informally to the opinions of the ICJ on new bills before they were 
introduced into the Diet. Moreover, individual firms gradually became accustomed to consulting 
with the ICJ when they intended to lobby the Diet.” ’^ ^
The emergence of the Industrial Club of Japan marked a significant stage in the 
development of representative organisations for businessmen. Given the vested interests of its 
constituents, ICJ became the prime organ for the formal representation of these interests. From 
the outset, the leadership of the ICJ was in the hands of the zaibatsu. During the height of the 
Club's influence, spanning from 1917 to 1935, the chairmanship was held by a series of 
zaibatsu-Tt\dX.Q& figures; Dan Takuma, general manager of Mitsui; Kimura Kusuyata, general
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu Gojû Nen Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu Gojü Men Shi (Tokyo: 
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, 1972), 2-3.
Miyamoto Matao, "The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan," 26.
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manager of Mitsubishi; Wada Toyoji, who was closely associated with Mitsubishi and Mitsui; 
Nakajima Kumakichi from the Furukawa zaibatsu; Go Seinosuke, who was involved with the 
Qji Paper Manufacturing Company, an associated company of Mitsui; Ariga Nagabumi from 
Mitsui; and Kushida Manzô of Mitsubishi. Seated among the board of directors were managers 
from Sumitomo, Yasuda and Asano.
In due course, the further recognition of the growing complexity of national economic 
activity and the concomitant need for more specific representative organization than was 
provided by in 1922 to the formation of the Japan Economic Federation (Nihon Keizai Renmei, 
1 6 0  Ywo factors are identified that led to the formation of the Federation: “(1) the need for 
an organ to communicate with the foreign business world; and (2) a tendency toward 
cooperation between big industrialists and bankers.”*^ ’At the outset, leadership was provided by 
leading banking figures, however in 1928, when the Federation adopted a presidency system, 
Dan Takuma was appointed, and thus was at the same time at the helm of the Industrial Club of 
Japan and the Japan Economic Federation. Its prime functions were to “conduct surveys and 
research on important economic issues; to make proposals for the solution of the national 
economic problems; and to promote international economic relations.”*^  ^In concept and in 
practice, the Federation worked closely with the Club. “The eleven promoters of the JEF were
Nagata Masaomi, Keizai Dantai Hatten Shi, 120.
Miyamoto Matao, "The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan," 30.
'^^/W.,31.
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all from the leaders of the ICJ and had assumed office as managing directors of the JEF; and the 
JEF had its head office in the building of the ICJ.”'^  ^Though the Club was increasingly taking 
on the role as the voice for the business community in general, it retained its specialized concern 
over the burgeoning problem of labour.
In the main, industrialists viewed poorly the growing strength of labour and their 
accompanying demands. During the 1920s,*^ pressure increased for the legalisation of unions 
and by December of 1929, the Minseito government announced that it would support a labour 
union law.'^^ The draft of the labour union bill was prepared for presentation to the 1930 Diet. 
This Diet session soon became entangled in debates between the Minseito and the Seiyûkai over 
issues relating to the economic depression. In this delay of the debate over the union bill, 
opposition, which was centred in the business community, was afforded time to mobilise before 
resumption of proceedings in the 1931 Diet.*^ ® At the outset, the leading edge of the opposition 
was the Club with its members lobbying against the labour initiative. “Indeed, Dan, 
accompanied by Baron Go Seinosuke and Kimura Kusuyata, other leading lights in the Club, 
made frequent visits in 1930 to the offices of the Home Minister Adachi Kenzo to lobby against
Ibid.
For details on the early labour movement and the formation of the Kyôchôkai, see Kinzley, Industrial 
Harmony in Modern Japan: The Invention of a Tradition.
Stephen Large, Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 146.; see also Sheldon M. Garon , The State and Labor in Modern Japan.
Ibid.
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the labor union In 1931, the Club led the formation of the Zenkoku Sangyô Dantai
Rengôkai (Zensanren, National Federation of Industrial Organizations, NFIO). Representing a 
number of regional organizations, the prominent members of the Club took the helm and 
transferred its labour dossier to the newly formed organization.'^* Though, in terms of its formal 
functional role, the Japan Industrial Club had now limited itself to the role of general 
spokesman, it “remained hidden behind the JEF and the NFIO, but i t ... undoubtedly continued 
to have a substantial influence on Japan’s business world, frequently called ‘the inner shrine of 
the business world.
Thus, as the economy expanded and in turn become more complex, the identification 
of distinct and unique interests emerged among represented members. Further, as issues become 
more complex and required further specialized knowledge, new dedicated organizations were 
created. The employment of the shingikai in addressing the problems that developed in the iron 
and steel industry was located in the growing complexity of Japanese industry on the one hand 
and, on the other, the increasingly more sophisticated formal lobbying apparatuses with their 
research capabilities.
147.
Before the 1931 Diet session, a number of round table talks occurred with government, business and 
union representatives. Business opposition was strong and strenuous efforts were made to prevent the 
passing of the bill. Fujihara Ginjiro, president of the Oji Paper Company and representative of business 
interests, portrayed the socialist movement as detrimental to the kokutai and the Upper House. In the 
ensuing debates in the Upper House, the bill stalled and so brought an end to the passage of the bill. Ibid., 
148-49. Also see Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, 262-63.
Miyamoto Matao, "The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan," 35.
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8. Formal framework for decision-making
As in most political systems, constitutional provisions that determine the mechanics of how law 
making is to transpire and how it operates in practice are frequently not the same. This then 
begs the question of how different was Japan from other countries and, never lurking far in the 
background, is the penchant to label Japan as ‘unique’. The object here, though, is not to 
explore on a comparative basis the degree to which the Japanese case under the Meiji 
Constitution differs from other countries. Admittedly, a comparative understanding would be 
usefiil but would be a departure from the aim at hand. Specifically, what is to be undertaken is 
to provide some explanation of how, de jure, the process of law making was supposed to occur, 
followed by some of the factors which might have impacted on the process. These forces, if you 
will, were in some cases constitutionally provided as a check on certain institutions, while other 
sources of influence were outside the formally conceived process. Given this, an explanation of 
the process of how one particular bill was passed does not necessarily mean that another bill 
would be realised in the some way. How the various sources of influence come together to 
shape the law making process is a case-by-case matter.
In broad-brush strokes, the Meiji Constitution was a “hybrid of traditional Japanese and 
modem Western influences -  the latter mostly reflecting Pmssian precedents -  [it] ... ascribed
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extensive imperial prerogatives, or taiken, to the emperor which served notice that he would 
henceforth rule, as well as reign over, Japan.”*^ ° The cabinet was appointed by the emperor and 
responsible to him. The Privy Council was set up in 1888 as a committee to advise the emperor 
on major policy matters. The bureaucracy and peerage were strongly represented at this Council 
and ministers had the right to attend meetings. Its powers were extended in the 1890s and 
included constitutional amendments, declarations of martial law, treaties, imperial rescripts and 
ordinances. In effect, it acted to preserve the powers of the emperor and keep in check those of 
the Diet and the political parties. Both the army and the navy were not responsible to the cabinet 
and outside the control of the Diet. The chain of command provided that they report directly to 
the emperor and experience would show that this provision facilitated considerable influence in 
the palace. The Constitution provided for the establishment of the Imperial Diet, which 
consisted of the House of Representatives (Lower House) and the House of Peers (Upper 
House). The former was made up of 300 elected members who were originally selected on the 
basis of limited suffrage but, as noted above, their selection was from 1925 by universal male 
suffrage. The House of Peers was composed of members of the imperial family and nobility, 
imperial appointees and representatives of the highest taxpayers. By the 1930s, the Upper House 
had grown in numbers to over 400. The Diet, which refers to both Houses, had limited powers
Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito & Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London: Routledge,
1992), 7.
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other than over budgetary matters. In order for the budget to be passed, the approval of both the 
Lower and the Upper Houses was needed, but if approval was not given, the previous year’s 
budget would be used, thus weakening the Lower House’s check on sp e n d in g .In  effect, when
considering the structure of the political decision-making as a whole, the
only governmental organ with any direct accountability to the electorate was the House 
of Representatives [Shügi-iri\. On the one hand, all statutes required the consent of both houses 
of the Diet and countersignatures of each minister of state. On the other, however, 
administrative ordinances [meirei\ required no legislative action, only ministerial advice. Thus, 
except for the elected House of Representatives and the autonomous judiciary, all other 
branches of government were either constituted by or accountable only to the throne.
In short, though a representative system had been instituted, the Meiji Constitution assured that 
the exercise of political power was maintained in the hands of elites, and ultimately in the 
emperor himself, which has given rise to the term “emperor system” (tennô sei).
In the late Meiji and early Taishô years, the behaviour of the Japanese Diet and its 
political parties was much less about political ideals and the banding together of men of like- 
minded philosophical bent and more about power and pork barrel politics. In the early years
ideology played a limited role in defining party lines.
Diet members did not band together in parties to promote a particular set of views or policies, 
much less to give expression to “popular opinion.” What brought them together was the 
elementary perception that in unity there was strength. With few exceptions, the parties
J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics o f Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in 
Imperial Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35.
John Owen Haley, Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 78.
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in the Diet were in their origins tactically rather than ideologically cohesive. 173
By virtue of numbers, parties gained leverage and, in turn, were able to influence outcomes for 
their own ends. This fostered an element of cohesiveness and identification with a set of policies 
which lent credence to their espousal of being a political party. By the early 1920s, two parties -  
the Seiyûkai and the Kenseikai -  had emerged as reasonably established fixtures on the political 
landscape.'^'* Yet, even then, “policy positions did not necessarily reflect ‘popular opinion’ nor 
even the opinions of the individual party members themselves.”*’  ^Thus, the shingikai debates 
during much of the period examined coincided with the end of a several decades long process of 
political party formation which was primarily driven by competition for power and not 
ideology. The implication is that the shingikai forum was located in a political framework that 
operated to appeal to the concerns and needs of political and financial elites.
That having been said, the Lower House was not a pawn of the oligarchy but, indeed, 
did prove to exercise a greater degree of influence over government decisions than had been 
anticipated by constitutional architects. It is argued by Gordon Berger that the Lower House was 
established as a means of legitimising the taxation burdens to be levied on the working classes
Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan, 29.
For a broad perspective on party formation in conjunction with other political and economic factors 
refer to Nakamura Takafusa, Showa Shi 1 1926-1945,2 vols., vol. 1 (Tol^o: Tôyô Keizai Shinpo Sha,
1993).
Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan, 29.
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to pay for the development of Japan’s economy and military: though “sceptical of the political 
wisdom of the masses and jealous of their own powers, the drafters of the Constitution deemed 
it wise to provide a means for those who paid the taxes to establish some sort of identification 
with the state through participation in national affairs.” '^  ^Exercising its power to veto the 
budget, the Lower House did prove to be a check on the cabinet and other organs of 
government. Oligarchs turned to political parties, which often had their power base in the 
representative house, for their support. The price exacted by the parties was a measure of 
influence over the oligarchs’ executive powers and later commanding positions in the Cabinet. 
With time a modus vivendi had been established such that by the beginning of World War I,
“the parties’ tactics for obtaining and maintaining a major share of political power beyond the 
Lower House had been clearly defined.”
The birth of the Seiyûkai came in 1900 under the guiding hand of Prime Minister Ito 
Hirobumi, a leading political figure, as a means of controlling party politics. In contrast to the 
approach of others, Ito thought the best tactic was not to confront the parties but rather 
incorporate them. Forming the Seiyûkai based on members loyal to his leadership, he envisaged 
the shaping of national policy with the backing of his loyal followers. This, though, proved not 
to be the case. “Its members were delighted to have such a prestigious leader, but they were not
Gordon Mark Berger, Parties out o f Power in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 10. 
Ibid., 15.
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inclined to follow his dictates docilely.”*^* Frustrated, Ito resigned and passed the reins of power 
to Saionji Kinmochi, another member of the genrô. By astute political alliances, the Seiyûkai 
soon filled a central role in domestic politics, managing to place one of its leaders in every 
cabinet between 1906 and 1912. Its primary opposition party was the Kenseikai, originally 
known as the Dôshikai. In 1913 Katsura Taro -  a protégé of the genrô Yamagata -  and a 
number of dovû-Seiyùkai members formed the Dôshikai as a means of challenging the growing 
influence of Saionji’s party.
Thus, with the emergence of a two-party system, the process of political decision 
making, in turn, gained a greater degree of consistency. This is not to suggest that the politics in 
the 1920s -  which is of prime concern in this study -  was static but rather that there was 
comparatively less shifting in party affiliation. Certainly change occurred, for example, in 1927 
with the merging of the Kenseikai and the Seiyû Hontô, a group that split fi'om the Seiyûkai in 
1924, but political power was primarily held in the two-party configuration. This increased 
stability facilitates our understanding of how policy was formed and the role played by business.
The point o f genesis of a law was, as anywhere, with the recognition of a particular 
political, economic problem or otherwise which may have originated from within government 
or from without. Preliminary discussions, typically informal, would not have followed any
Peter Duus, Modern Japan (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 174.
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particular procedure. Once either the requisite political or bureaucratic will had been formed, 
the process of drafting a bill began. Though at the outset there might have been input from the 
minister regarding the contours of the envisaged bill, the details were formed through a process 
called ringisei. Commencing at the lower echelons of a bureaucracy, the designated section was 
responsible for the initial drafting of the bill, which would subsequently be passed through the 
various sections o f the ministry gradually moving towards the top. At each step of the way, 
input was solicited from the reader, who in essence was offered to partake in the shaping of the 
bill. Once it reached the final echelons, it was reviewed and amendments may have been made,
but typically this was not the case.
Although in a technical sense the legal competence to grant or withhold final approval for the 
ringisho [the sheet which accompanies the circulated document and is signed-off] lies with the 
highest executive (e.g. the minister in a ministry or the president of a private business), in actual 
practice he is expected to approve it without change or modification because of this long 
process of prior scrutiny -  in fact decision-making -  by lower administrators.
With the approval of the relevant minister and, presumably, the prime minister, the bill would 
have been presented before the Lower and Upper Houses. “It became law only if both houses of 
the Diet passed it in identical form by majority vote.... A cabinet minister would then submit it, 
with his advice, to the Emperor. If the Emperor approved it... a minister would then countersign
Kiyoaki Tsuji, "Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of Ringisei," in Political 
Development in Modern Japan, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 458.
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(fukusho) it and it would become law.... In principle, then, this procedure gave both houses of 
the Diet a  veto.”'*® During this process, reports and recommendations solicited from the 
shingikai may have been sought at various stages and thus will be examined later.
Such was how a law would have proceeded through the various steps on its way to 
final approval were it not subject to various potential influences, some of which have been 
suggested above. Policy making in pre-war Japan was in fact a tricky business, for reasons 
which have been hinted at, and which will be examined in greater depth shortly. The central 
difficulty in seeing a law through its various stages to receiving the emperor’s imprimatur, was 
in balancing the actors who saw their interests as vested in the outcome of the law in question. 
This balancing act was reflected in the unstable coalitional nature of cabinet formation. Though 
the emperor was to decide on the composition of the cabinet, in practise he acted on the advice. 
of a variety of sources, some of which were from within the palace itself, as well as the Privy 
Council and genrô and, potentially, also naval and army officers. Once a cabinet had been 
chosen, the problems were not at an end. Apart from the questions of what policies a prime 
minister may have been able to push through, a cabinet’s longevity was closely linked with the 
arts of compromise and negotiation. For example, in 1912 “the Army brought down Saionji 
Kinmochi’s second Cabinet when Saionji refused to accommodate the Army’s demand for two
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, The Politics o f Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan, 35.
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nev divisions.”’** During the initial decades after the turn of the 20* century, such illustrations
abound. As David Titus puts it
The problem was not only to find a coalition appropriate to the times in terms of institutional 
mix. It was also one of finding Prime Ministers and Ministers of State, each of whom 
commanded the respect of more than one institution of imperial prerogative and would be 
willing to cooperate in forging a united policy which the institutions of prerogative would 
implement, willingly or unwillingly. This meant finding leaders with cross-institutional 
connections, political views that were representative of more than one institution’s parochial 
demands, sophisticated abilities in the arts of compromise and coalition building, and given the 
frequent assassinations of Prime Ministers and other leading officials after 1930, a great deal of 
courage.*®^
Perhaps the most poignant example of the ambiguity in the Meiji Constitution and the 
latitude that this afforded other actors was in the position of the emperor himself. As Stephen 
Large indicates in Emperor Hirohito and Shôwa Japan: A Political Biography, the wording of 
the Constitution gave room for the interpretation of the position of the emperor as one of 
absolute monarchy and, at the same time, limited monarchy.**^ Illustration of this and how it 
facilitated the potential influencing of law making can be seen in the de facto  process by which 
cabinet members were selected. In practise, the emperor was constrained in using whatever 
power his position afforded him. He “appointed the prime minister, but only on the
Da\id Anson Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1974), 104.
‘*2/6/d
Hebert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (London: Duckworth, 2000), 80-81 .places 
empha;is on the Shôwa Emperor’s role in the political decision making process though not denying the 
complocity of the process.
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recommendation of his closest advisers at court. He had virtually no say in the appointment of 
cabinet ministers and did not attend cabinet meetings. It was unclear whether the emperor could 
veto cabinet policy but in any event convention dictated that he did not do so in Meiji and 
Taishô Japan.”**"* However, this is not to say that the emperor did not try to influence policy by 
other means at his disposal, as indeed the “Emperor Meiji frequently endeavoured to influence 
government leaders when he questioned them at court about their policies and in that he was 
often successful, he was no mere ‘puppet’”.**^  In the case of the Taishô Emperor, the situation 
was different. The political machinery put in place during the Meiji period had facilitated the 
pluralisation of politics and in turn afforded the Emperor greater opportunity to seek influence 
through other means.
The Taishô Emperor was less influential but during his reign, the greater political pluralism of 
‘Taishô democracy’ and the growing sectarianism of institutions involved in national decision­
making made the court an increasingly important clearing house of policy resolution. Therefore, 
by Shôwa, the emperor, whose political activity was largely confined to the private zone of the 
court, was in an enhanced position to register informal influence on policies that he would 
sanction.'*®
The greater latitude this development afforded, though, was not fully exercised by the Emperor. 
Taishô, as he suffered from mental and physical illness. This led to the then crown prince 
Hirohito, later the Shôwa Emperor, being appointed regent in 1921. “It should be appreciated.
'*'* Large, Emperor Hirohito & Shôwa Japan: A Political Biography, 11. 
'*®/W., 13.
'*®/W.
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however, that no emperor could exert imperial influence autonomously. Like any sovereign, he 
was enmeshed in a ‘network of interdependence’ with others at court whose advice constituted 
another ‘external constraint’ on his activity.”**’ It is to this ‘enmeshment’ that we will now turn.
Within the palace there were a number of other advisors who were sources of advice for 
the emperor but not necessarily unbiased: the grand chamberlain, the lord keeper of the privy 
seal, the imperial household minister and the chief aide-de-camp.*** As important as these 
figures were in advising the emperor, in terms of guiding Japan and policy making of greater 
import were the g e n r ô The genrô, who collectively formed a non-constitutionally provided 
éminence grise, exercised influence that spanned more than three decades during a very 
formative period of Japan’s development. “The group was not created at one time. In a sense it 
was not created at all, but evolved gradually.... It is difficult to point to any particular stage at 
which the evolution was complete.... By 1898, the term ‘Genro’ had passed into common usage 
and there was public recognition of their involvement in politics if no clear definition of the 
scope of their powers.”*^** “The nine men who have in retrospect been recognized unequivocally
For further details see Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan.
Roger F. Hackett identifies three groups of political elites who guided Japan during the initial decades 
after the Meiji Restoration. They are 1) Saigo Takamori, Okubo Toshimichi and Kido Koin (they figured 
prominently during the first years); 2) the oligarchy, ^han' clique or genrô (their influence carried through 
to the early 1930s); and 3) jûshin (senior statesmen who in the 1930s and 1940s were “court ofticials and 
former prime ministers who were called on to advise the emperor on the selection of new prime ministers 
and on other important matters.” Roger F. Hackett, "Political Modernization and the Meiji Genrô" in 
Political Development in Modern Japan, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), 67.
Lesley Connors, The Emperor's Advisor: Saionji Kinmochi and Pre-War Japanese Politics (London:
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as Genro were Kuroda Kiyotaka, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi,
Inoue Kaoru, Saigo Tsugumichi, Oyama Iwao, Katsura Taro and Saionji Kinmochi.”’^ * There 
are varying criteria by which this selection was made but the “most widely used as a definition 
of a Genro was the fact that all received, on one or more occasions. Imperial commands that 
they should receive the honours due to elder statesmen {Genkun).^^^^  ^A second criteria was that 
they all had served in the Sangiin, which was composed of a group of senior councillors who 
presided over the work of various ministries during the 1870s. There were two main roles 
played by the genrô: 1 ) overseeing foreign policy and 2) recommending cabinets; it was the 
second that “gave them their greatest and most enduring influence in Japanese politics.”^^  ^As 
has been noted above, their influence diminished through the late Meiji and Taishô years. 
“Though their influence was at its height at the start of the First Katsura Cabinet [1901-1906] 
and declined thereafter, they remained, despite the prophesies of the second generation 
hopefuls, an extremely potent force in politics.”*^'^
The role of the genrô in Japanese development has received a range of interpretations, 
in some cases being seen as a stabilising factor, while in others emphasis is placed on their 
“unscrupulous manipulation of power and their hostility to the growth of genuine representative
Oxford University Press, 1987), 43.
Ibid., 44.
^^Ibid.
Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 50-51.
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govemment.”*^  ^While the bureaucracy, fostered by the hand of the genrô , may be argued to 
have proved “to be a major obstacle to the development of political party power”'^^ one 
observer has argued that, on balance, the genrô had a positive role in the overseeing of Japan’s 
development in the early years.N otw ithstanding the differences in perceptions, the genrô are 
seen as having been an influential force in Japan’s development and as having operated behind 
closed doors. The genrô were involved from the outset of Japan’s efforts at industrialisation 
and the implementation of its reform programme. “Each rose through one of the three channels 
of the new bureaucracy: departments concerned either with economic developments, such as the, 
Ministries of Finance, Public Works, or Hokkaido Development; with military modernisation;
or with foreign affairs.” '^ *
The genrô were those who dominated the ministries of the government in the middle decades of 
the Meiji period. But their influence extended beyond the central bureaucracy. For example, 
Matsukata’s long tenure in the Finance Ministry suggests his controlling position in the 
financial affairs of the government but does not disclose his vast influence in the business world 
through marriage connections and other associations. Similarly, Inoue’s role as an adviser to the 
Mitsui Company extended his sway far into the commercial and industrial world. Oyama’s long 
service as war minister does not properly underline his eminence as a field commander and war 
hero. What this and other official career data confirm, however, is that those who became genrô 
were intimately connected with the birth and early growth of the modem bureaucracy...
Hackett, "Political Modernization and the Meiji Genrôy' 67.
Richard Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1869-2000 (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2001), 92.
91-92.
Hackett, "Political Modernization and the Meiji G e n rô 71.
71-73.
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The ‘enmeshment’ that ensured the influential position occupied by the genrô was, as suggested 
above, furthered through marriage. Roger Hackett provides an expose of the interconnectivity of 
the members of the oligarchy: “marriage alliances... gave the genrô greater cohesiveness as a 
political body. Indeed the complicated maze of marriage connections among the leaders of 
government, business, education, and the military seemed to interlock the top levels of Meiji 
society.” ®^®
The position of the genrô was further entrenched within the political architecture itself 
through the establishment of the Privy Council. In 1871 the new Meiji leaders established three 
councils that were to help oversee the development of the new government apparatus. They 
were the “Council of the Left”, the “Council of the Right”, and the “Council of the Center”. 
These three later came to be known as the Council of the Elders {genrô in)}^^ Later, the 
“oligarchs transformed the Council of Elders... into the Privy Council {SUmitsu in) and 
authorised it to preside over the drafting of the co n stitu tio n .B ey o n d  whatever services this 
institute was to provide in the name of nation-building, the oligarchs “envisioned the Privy 
Council as a way to institutionalise their power. The Council would continue into the 
parliamentary era as the oligarchs’ protective institution.” ®^^ “As with statutes, the Privy
Ibid., 73.
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, The Politics o f Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan, 22. 
Ibid., 32.
Ibid.
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Council could block any ordinance as long as the Privy Council controlled the emperor. In 
practice, as we would expect under these circumstances, the cabinet cleared bills with the Privy 
Council before submitting them to the emperor.” ®^'* The access that the Privy Council had to the 
emperor facilitated the genrô^s exercise of influence over legislation, cabinet selection and 
ultimately in determining the direction of Japan’s development. However, the significance of 
the Privy Council varied during the Meiji period and was at times eclipsed by the genrô 
themselves. When Ito Hirobumi, a prominent member of the oligarchy and constitutional 
architect, became the first President of the Privy Council, it “initially seemed destined to play a 
significant political role.” As the genro^s position during the Meiji years strengthened, the Privy 
Council came under shadow of oligarchy dominance. This tendency was reversed, though, as 
the “inclusion o f ...  three Genro amongst its numbers in 1903 invested it with an increased 
importance and gave the Genro, whose supervision of government was now more indirect, a 
further lever for controlling its sometimes recalcitrant protégés.
It is therefore apparent that law making in Japan during the period under consideration 
here and, indeed, for much of the pre-war period, was a process highly subject to the influences 
of entrenched political elites, some being constitutionally enshrined and others not. The genrô, 
though standing outside of the constitutional architecture, were of immense influence during the
Ibid., 36.
Connors, The Emperor's Advisor: Saionji Kinmochi and Pre-War Japanese Politics, 50.
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Meiji period, though this influence diminished with time.
A further non-constitutional influence was that of business. Links between the 
oligarchy and big business existed. Such connections were certainly not unique to the genrô for, 
after all, the numbers in Japan’s upper echelons at that time were limited. From this perspective, 
the enmeshment that is typically seen as characterizing Japan, at least in this period, was
extensive. As Maruyama Masao has observed about the political process in pre-war Japan
irrational arrangement prevailed in which decisions depended on fortuitous human relations, 
psychological coercion by the Elder Statesmen {genrô} and other ‘officials close to the Throne,’ 
shifts in the relative strength of cliques, deals among wire-pullers and bosses, assignation-house 
politics, and so forth.^ °*
As we have seen, the view that the policy making process in Japan was an exercise in ‘wire­
pulling’ and, by implication, those with the greater personal network tended to wield greater 
power, is prevalent. Further to this view is the argument that the institutions which provided a 
formal framework for policy making were but extensions or tools, if you will, of the adept 
Japanese politician, bureaucrat and businessman. The shingikai, being one such institutional 
organ, has been seen by some as part of the larger orchestrated show and in reality offering little 
by way of serving the democratic end.^°^
Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), 232. \
This issue will be discussed in the following section. Two observers critical of the role played by the 
shingikai in the political decision making process are Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The 
Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. and Yung Ho Park, "The Government Advisory Commission
98
9. Shingikai
The historical context provided thus far argues that political-business relations 
operating on the basis of discrete personal contacts shifted towards a situation where informal 
communication was exercised alongside more formal lines -  one such example of this formal 
channel was the legally established forum called shingikai. The bulk of the existing literature 
deals with post-war shingikai and translates this term as ‘councils of deliberation’ or ‘advisory 
bodies’ (ABs). They are used as a collective term to include bodies referred to as shingikai, 
chosakai, iinkai, shinsakai, kyôgikai and kaigi. In keeping with this practice, the term shingikai 
is employed as a collective term here as well. These commissions are convened to deliberate on 
issues as seen fit by government and provide informed recommendations. Critically, they do not 
have the power to decide, though in particular situations they may be given the scope to do 
so.^ °* Under present day taxonomy, there are statutory and non-statutory advisory bodies. The 
former are typically known as shingikai, and may be either ad hoc or permanent.^®^ The latter 
are often referred to as kondankai, kenkyukai, or konwakai. “These are informally established by 
the prime minister, cabinet members, other heads of government agencies or high-ranking
System in Japan," Journal o f Comparative Administration 3, no. 4 (1972),
Ogita Tamotsu, "Shingikai No Jittai," Gyosei KenkyU Nenpô 7 (1969): 22.
Ehud Harari, "The Institutionalisation of Policy Consultation in Japan: Public Advisory Bodies," in 
Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi, ed. Hamhiro 
Fukui (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 145.
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government officials to act as their advisers and are collectively referred to as ‘private advisory
bodies’ (shiteki shimon
In comparison to the scholarly research on the shingikai of the post-war, much less is
known of its pre-war model. Very little work has been done in either Japanese or English on the
institution, in particular with respect to its role in the political decision making process. They
were “formed by prime ministers, cabinets, individual ministers or high-level bureaucrats...
[and the] legal instruments for their establishment were mainly imperial edicts, cabinet orders
and ministerial ordinances, though several were formed by legislation.”^" In some instances a
committee would be formed on the request of extra-government interest, though in the main
they were established in response to initiatives from the “particular administrative unit
concerned,”^" As seen in this research, in the case of an imperial edict, the emperor’s office
would provide the operating rules and instructions as well as select one of the divisions of the
bureaucracy which would organise the committee. In some instances, at least, membership
numbers were determined by the emperor’s office, and also the numeric break down between
the main members and those to be called upon as experts in case of need. It would seem that the
names of the members were selected by the bureaucracy itself. Presumably, were the shingikai
established by cabinet order or ministerial ordinance, the remit and details of operation of the
^^Ubid.
2" Ibid., 147.
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committee would have been determined by these initiating authorities. According to one survey, 
“membership was dominated by bureaucrats from relevant ministries; other salient categories of 
members were university professors and leaders of industrial and agricultural interests. A small 
number of labour leaders -  and only those on the right wing of the labour movement -  served 
on a negligible number of advisory bodies.” '^^
At the outset o f the first meeting a committee chairman (iin cho) would be selected by 
the presiding members from among their ranks who “more often than n o t... [was a] 
bureaucrat.”^Som etim es committees were chaired by prime ministers, one of his cabinet 
ministers or gakushiki keikensha (persons of learning and experience); in most cases these 
were Tokyo Imperial University professors and leaders of industrial and agricultural 
interests.” '^^  At the start of the following meeting, introductory words would be made by the 
chairman who would then turn to the head of the ministry or his representative. He would 
outline the remit of the committee and provide words of guidance. In some instances, a draft of 
a proposed law would have been provided for members by the ministry and discussions would 
revolve around its content. In cases where a sub-committee had sat, their findings would have 
been circulated at the outset of the meeting, followed typically by a spokesman for the sub­
committee expanding on the written document. In any of the above scenarios, the contours of
148.
147-48
215 Ibid., 148.
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the discussion were set out at the beginning of the meeting and the committee chairman would 
preside to ensure discipline and that the talks remained on track.
Though the shingikai that were formed in relation to the issue of the iron and steel 
industry were early leading examples of the exercise of this forum they were not the first. 
“During the 1890s, the first decade under the Meiji Constitution, Abs were involved in such 
famous reforms as those of the legal system {Hôten Chôsakai) and the monetary system (Kahei 
Seido Chôsakai); in the process that led to the passage of the Factory Act of 1911 (Nôshôkôtô 
Kaigi); and in the formation of education policy {Koto Kyôku Kaigi)^^^^ Other pre-war issues 
that saw the use of the shingikai were welfare {KyûJigyô Chôsakai, 1918), labour relations 
{Shihon Rôdô Mondai Kyôgikai, 1918; Rinji Sangyô Chôsakai, Shakai Seisaku Shingikai,
1929), land reform {Kosaku Seido Chôsakai, 1920), the burakumin or social outcasts of 
Japanese society {Shakai Jigyô Chôsakai, 1921), and the reform of the administrative structure 
and the financial and taxation systems {Rinji Gyôsei Zaisei Zeisei Shingikai, 1930).^'^ One 
“survey conducted in the mid-193Os for the Okada Cabinet identified ‘over one 
hundred’ [Advisory Bodies]...
This use of the institution of the shingikai during the period of modem Japanese history 
has changed over time. In turn, this raises the issue of whether it is apposite to use the term
Ibid., 147. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
102
when referring to the pre-1945 institution and that of the post-1945 period. To be sure, the term 
"shingikai ’ is used in the academic literature when referring to this institution regardless of time 
period and, in this linguistic sense, signals that there are characteristics shared by the pre- and 
postwar institutions. However, in terms of both function and form, the institution of the 
shingikai has changed during its history.
Since its inception in 1893, the institution has undergone a number of changes as a 
result of legislative provisions. The issue to be considered here is whether it is valid to argue 
that a historical continuum exists between the pre and post war shingikai, or are these two 
institutions sufficiently different that, though generally the same term is used for both, 
substantively they should be considered as separate entities. Schwartz identifies that the 
“contemporary commissions differ from their pre-war cousins in nomenclature, legal basis, 
membership, and function.”^'’ His ensuing discussion, though, is less about contrasting the pre­
war institution with its post-war relative and more about identifying the changes that have 
occurred since the American occupation, and seeing whether these changes have brought the 
institution closer in line with the democratic intentions of the US reformers. Discussions of the 
nature of the pre-war institution have been much more limited. Moreover, little attention has 
been paid to the possibility of change in the institution during the pre-war period. As Harari
Frank J. Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Consultation in Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 48.
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States in his treatment of pre-occupation shingikai (or ABs as he calls them), “I have not found a 
list of all ABs in existence prior to the Occupation period, nor have I found quantitative 
analyses of the legal status, structures, tasks, functions, manner of operation, sources of 
information and other characteristics of the ABs during that period.”^^® In as far as the limited 
treatment allows us to draw conclusions, pre-war shingikai have been seen as static and non- 
evolutionary. This relative paucity of work on whatever evolutionary changes may have 
occurred in the pre-war period underscores the need for further research, as well as for caution 
here in identifying the presence or absence of historical continua.
In terms of nomenclature, the collective usage of the term shingikai is consistent 
throughout the history of the institution, though what this term refers to changes and, indeed, it 
is inconsistently used. Schwartz points out that in the case of the post-war period, “there are no 
consistent rules for naming councils; [the terms] ‘council,’ ‘commission,’ and ‘advisory body’ 
[are used] interchangeably, this study [i.e. Schwartz’s ] does not distinguish among the different 
Japanese names, subsuming them under the catchall shingikai. One differentiation, though, 
is that whereas “agencies now distinguish shingikai from purely administrative committees that 
do not include participants from outside the government {iinkai)', prewar officials made no such
Harari, "The Institutionalisation of Policy Consultation in Japan: Public Advisory Bodies," 147. 
Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics o f Consultation in Japan, 59.
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distinction.”^^^
Assessing change in the legal basis of the shingikai is important as it may signal how 
legislators have perceived the institution. Dramatic reform may suggest that the formation of a 
new institution is intended even though the name of the institution may remain the same. In the 
case of the pre-war shingikai, “the genealogy of the Advisory Council... goes back to the Code 
of Law Investigative Council {hôten chôsakai), established in 1893.”^^  ^Neither Harari nor 
Schwartz make explicit the legal nature of the institution, however the term “genealogy” does 
underscore an institutionally based historical link. It would appear that whatever legal status the 
institution was afforded, the authorization for its implementation was often gained by means 
outside of its architect’s aims: “Throughout most of the postwar era, it has been necessary to 
establish advisory bodies by law; although prewar authorities did establish several councils by 
law, they generally bypassed the Diet by means of imperial edicts, cabinet orders an or 
ministerial ordinances.” Thus, the distinction does not revolve around whether the institution 
was legally enshrined but rather that often prewar shingikai did not receive the approval of the 
Diet, Certainly in this examination, as we will see, certain shingikai were formed on the basis of 
Imperial Edicts.
48.
Ehud Harari, "Japanese Politics of Advice in Comparative Perspective: A Framework for Analysis and 
a Case Study," Public Policy XXII, no. 4 (1974): 539.; Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics of 
Consultation in Japan, 48.
Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics o f Consultation in Japan, 48.
105
The advisory bodies underwent a number of revisions during the period of the 
American Occupation (1945-1952), and afterwards by Japanese government initiative. The 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP ) held the opinion that the pre-war shingikai 
had been employed as a tool of the bureaucracy. It was perceived that between the political 
parties and the bureaucracy, it was the latter that was pre-eminent in the push and pull of policy 
making.^^  ^The shingikai was therefore to be taken out of the manipulative hands of the 
bureaucracy and enshrined in legislation, affording it a central role in the démocratisation of 
Japan. Article 8 of the 1947 National Administrative Organization Law provided the requisite 
statutory alterations.^^^
Contrary to the hope of SCAP, the ensuing years saw a steady rise in the number of 
shingikai. It was recognised that bureaucrats were “instrumental in the formation of most of 
them. Several shingikai, especially those dealing with issues in agriculture and regional 
development with high salience among the electorate, were formed by individual Diet members’ 
bills or in response to demands by interest groups.”^^  ^In light of these developments an Ad Hoc 
Commission on Administrative Reform (Rinii Gyôsei Chôsakai. or First Rincho)^^* was
Harari, "The Institutionalisation of Policy Consultation in Japan: Public Advisory Bodies," 149.; 
Bernard S. Silberman, "The Bureaucratic Role in Japan, 1900-1945: The Bureaucrat as Politician," in 
Japan in Crisis: Essays in Taishô Democracy, ed. H.D. Harootunian (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), 183.
Park, "The Government Advisory Commission System in Japan," 435.
Harari, "The Institutionalisation of Policy Consultation in Japan: Public Advisory Bodies," 149-50, 
Note that there was later in the early 1980s a Second Rincho which was fashioned after its forerunner, 
however its remit addressed pressing domestic financial and administrative issues importantly set in the
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established by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato in 1962 with wide support from all parties other 
than the C om m unists .In  its report of 1964, the bureaucracy was seen as having circumvented
the spirit of SCAP’s reforms and continuing to co-opt the institution.
[The First Rincho] concluded that to a large extent bureaucrats have subverted the spirit of 
SCAP’s reform of the consultation system by turning the shingikai into instruments for 
obscuring rather than clarifying administrative responsibility, and for mobilising support and 
consent for policies formulated by particular bureaucratic units rather than for facilitating 
genuine learning by both government and society
To bring an end to bureaucratic abuses, recommendations were put forward by the First 
Rincho, one of which was the reduction of the number of shingikai. And indeed, there was in 
1966 the “abolition of 10 councils and the consolidation of another 24.”^^ * However, this was 
seen by at least one scholar as ‘“just a drop in the bucket... [and that there was little hope as] a 
drastic reorganisation faces powerful resistance from bureaucratic sectionalism and political 
interests, and will be exceedingly difficult without a great deal of political leadership.’”^^ ^
Thus, the legal basis of the pre and postwar shingikai are different in that the institution 
was enshrined within the provisions of different constitutions. Further examination of the legal 
differences would be required to determine what, in concrete terms, these differences mean, and
economic upheaval of the oil shock in the 1970s. Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics o f 
Consultation in Japan, 95-97.
50.
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this lies beyond the scope of this work. Perhaps of greater significance than the differing legal 
bases are the differences in the aims of the institutions’ architects. Here again, our examination 
is restricted by the paucity of knowledge on the original aims of those who conceived the 
prewar institution. Given the presence of politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and academics 
who sat in these committee meetings, it seems likely that it was conceived as part o f the 
consultative process of government decision making. The aims of SCAP, as mentioned, were 
less about the re-conceptualisation of the institution and more about addressing what was seen
to be the abuse of the institution. These objections were
(1) to limit the powers of the bureaucracy, (2) to promote competent and equitable participation,
(3) to make state administration more open and better integrated, (4) to increase ABs’ autonomy 
by providing them with access to relevant and adequate information inside and outside 
government, and (5) to increase AB’s genuine influence by calling on government to pay close 
attention to their reports. In short, the general intention was to prevent ABs from turning into 
mere instruments in the hands of the bureaucracy for the mobilisation of public support and 
consent.^”
In this sense, though the legal basis was also different, in concept the aims were about reform 
rather than the introduction of a newly conceived function.
Closely related to function is membership. In the pre-war period, apart from 
bureaucrats and legislators, participation by individuals not from either business circles or 
academe was, though not necessarily forbidden, rare in the very least. At the same time it
Harari, "The Institutionalisation of Policy Consultation in Japan: Public Advisory Bodies," 149.
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should be noted that policy formulation was not seen as a matter where the input from the 
common man was necessary, though popular demands did enter the calculus of political 
decision making through the latter years of the Taishô period. Under SCAP reform and later 
amendments, participants of shingikai meetings could be drawn from “all walks of life..., and 
the inclusion of incumbent bureaucrats is discouraged....” That having been said, though, this 
increased socially representative characteristic of the postwar institution was only gradually 
achieved. Sato Hidetake charged that “The pretence that shingikai are established in order to 
contribute to the démocratisation of administration through the reflection of the views of all 
classes of the people is nothing more than a fiction.”^^  ^Similarly, the participation of 
parliamentary members was deemed contrary to the aims of the postwar institution. Under 
pressure from the First Rincho and elsewhere, the cabinet did attempt to curb Diet 
appointments to shingikai. Commissions with Diet appointees fell from 20 in 1974 to 10 out of 
214 commissions in 1984.^^  ^Less successful were the attempts to reduce the presence of ‘old 
boys’ in committee meetings. Despite pressure from the cabinet and the First Rincho, “retired 
officials occupied close to 18 percent of all council seats in 1995, down only a few percentage 
points fro a decade earlier.”^^® Thus, though legal provisions were in place, institutional 
change came after a more protracted period of re-evaluations, underscoring that caution be
Quoted in Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics o f Consultation in Japan, 62.
Ibid., 65.
^^Ubid., 68.
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exercised when delineating between pre and postwar institutions.
Thus, we see that the institution of the shingikai, as with most institutions, is not static 
but has evolved over time. Institutions are conceived to respond to particular needs, and as 
those needs change, so too does the institution. What drives this evolution, or devolution, as 
the case may be, stems from a variety of factors, one of which is the economic and political 
environment. It may be assumed that the institution was conceived in 1893 as a means of 
formalizing the incorporation of extra-parliamentary elements into the political decision 
making process. In keeping with the spirit of the Meiji Restoration, it was part of the larger 
process of placing the governing of Japan along western-oriented ‘democratic’ lines. As seen 
later by Occupation authorities, and others, the institution had been co-opted by the 
bureaucracy, which had perverted its use. The establishment of the postwar institution was, in 
part, aimed at taking it out of the hands of excessive bureaucratic influence. The widening of 
membership reflected the ideas of the Occupation authorities on how postwar Japan’s 
democratic framework should be. Similarly, the reduction of big business influence was 
reflected in the dissolution of zaibatsu and anti-monopoly legislation. From this socio­
economic perspective, we see at once continuum and departure between pre and postwar 
Japan. At one level, shingikai both periods part of the inclusion of voices outside of 
government in decision making. How that process was intended to operate varied in 1893 and
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in 1945. Each institution was enshrined in different legislation and it is likely that neither lived 
up to the ideals of its architects.
So, whether we are talking about discontinuity or continuity, is a matter of perspective. 
Choosing between the two is a matter of larger aims. At heart, this author sees the process of 
historical change as evolutionary and stresses the continuum at play, and this emphasis is often 
lacking in examinations of the shingikai. In that respect, this work may have something to 
offer. Also, to be sure, we have a limited understanding of prewar shingikai which underscores 
the hazardousness of making too much of this debate. Here as well, this thesis’s foray into the 
documents may be useful.
In recent years, examinations of the pre-war shingikai have gone beyond the original 
charge of their being a pawn on the bureaucrats board to see this argument as being somewhat 
simplistic.^^^ “[GJeneralizations [have been] ... based on a small number of cases or poorly 
substantiated, and, as well, include empirically substantiated generalizations that do not by 
themselves constitute direct evidence of bureaucratic domination. Since they are based on 
circumstantial evidence, they can only be suggestive, not conclusive.” Differentiation
One observation has been “Japanese society and politics which, among other things, have made 
inroads into the unrivalled predominance of the state bureaucracy in public policy-making.” Harari, "The 
Institutionalisation of Policy Consultation in Japan: Public Advisory Bodies," 153.; also the ‘bureaucratic 
dominant’ and ‘ruling triad’ models have come under attack as being an inadequate explanation of the 
pluralistic nature of contemporary Japanese policy making. See Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, 
"Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan," American Political Science Review 78, 
no. 1 (1984): 126.
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between issues and arguments is bringing us closer to the point that the scenario in which each 
shingikai is located, that is, the issue at hand, the actors and other factors, determine its 
effectiveness. In other words, though not expressed as such, a case-by-case examination is 
needed to determine whether the charge of co-optation is valid.^^  ^Methodologically speaking, 
analysis has moved beyond the anecdotal approach upon which the perception that the 
bureaucracy rules the roost is based to employing social scientific techniques of statistical 
analysis, questionnaires and interviews.^ "*® In so doing, research has shed light on the 
complexity of the role of the shingikai in the policy making process and has come closer to 
giving us a ‘feel’ for what happens. However, little work has taken a historical approach in 
walking through the document trail to challenge the charges levelled. So, what is being offered 
here is first and foremost a historical approach to a subject that has, methodologically, received 
little attention. It also seeks to show that pre-war shingikai are cousins of those that figure in 
the bulk of the literature, and in so doing draw out the historical continuum.
As was mentioned, the bulk of the literature is written by political scientists. Thus, at 
the outset, this work is set apart by its methodological approach by virtue of its emphasis on
Asian and African Studies 17, no. 3-4 (1982): 238.
Harari concluded that “Here several case studies of policy-making processes in different policy areas 
in Japan are instructive... These studies reveal tiiat government bureaucrats have indeed tried to dominate 
PABs [Public Advisory Bodies], but with only occasional success. Moreover, they show that members 
have definitely not been puppets in a bunraku (puppet theatre) play, and that the relationship between 
PABs and their appointing bureaucracies is a complex and changing one.” Ibid.: 238-39.
One such recent example is by Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics o f Consultation in Japan.
112
historical documents. Also, it is not the institution per se that is of concern here but rather its 
effectiveness as a venue for the expression of business interests. The question of whether the 
shingikai effectively served its intended role within the policy making process as conceived by 
its legislators is important here only from the business perspective. Whether the shingikai 
effectively upheld its role in the democratic process is not my bailiwick.
10. Discussion of Sources
This thesis is based on the documentation of the decision making process as it pertains 
to the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry (1916-1934). As the spotlight of this 
examination is on a main point of interaction between business and government, that is, the 
shingikai, the bulk o f the primary documents used is the records of the shingikai themselves. In 
an effort to provide a fuller picture of the (step-by-step) process by which the various actors, 
committees, and institutions formed their own positions regarding the issues at hand, related 
documents have been drawn together to illustrate the Qx\x2i-shingikai developments. In short, the 
aim is to furnish the reader with an understanding of how things happened, starting with the 
initial deliberations of, for example, the government or the Japan Industrial Club, and ending 
with the promulgation of a law, or whatever other terminal point there was.
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It has been explained that the decision making process was a composite of the use of 
informal and formal channels of communication. However, the nature of informal 
communication implies that no records were taken of the meetings -  they were in private and 
the number of attendees were deliberately kept to a minimum, sometimes with the selection of 
venues that ensured this criteria. It follows then that this examination can only deal with the 
formal lines of communication and therefore any judgements made here can not hold claim to 
be based on all aspects of the decision making process. Furthermore, though every effort has 
been made to acquire a full set of documents of shingikai records, there is no way of knowing 
what a full set constitutes.
There are a number of sets of volumes which contain documentation pertinent to this 
thesis. The records of the sub-committees {iinkai, tokubetsu iinkai) of the Lower and Upper 
Houses have been published in multi-volume sets, in particular those published by Rinsen 
Shoten (^J11 # Æ )  and Tokyo University Press have been used here. Also,
MITI has edited a number of multi-volume sets that deal with Japanese industry among other 
items. Volume 17 entitled “A Histoiy of Commercial and Industrial Policy: Iron and Steel 
Industry” Shôkô seisakushi: tekkôgyô; Tsûshô
Sangyôshô, 1970 ) and Volume 1, part 1 “A History of Commercial Industrial History: General 
Remarks” Shôkô seisakushi: sôsetsu, jô; Shôkô
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Seisakushi Kankô Kai, 1985) have been used. Though these are not strictly speaking primary 
sources, and rather closer to ‘official’ histories, they do contain copies of records such as 
recommendations made by the Japan Industrial Club and, where necessary, have been used in 
lieu of copies of the original items. Unpublished shingikai records have been sought out at the 
National Official Documents Archive Kokuritsu Kôbunsho Kan) located in
Takebashi, Tokyo. They are as follows: Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai
1919); Teikoku keizai kaigi 1925); Shoko shingikai
1927) and; Rinji sangyô shingikai 1930). Records held in
the Industrial Club of Japan have also been examined. This collection of documents is not open 
to the public and has received scant scholarly attention. Presently it is not catalogued and it is 
therefore impossible to be certain that all relevant material has been located.
Though most records of this period were type written, some key documents are only 
available in hand written form. Records of the Lower and Upper House committee meetings are 
verbatim transcripts affording a close examination of discussions, however, others for example 
those of the Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai), provide only a summaiy of what each 
speaker stated. Thus, in such cases, it is more difficult to penetrate the discussion and examine 
the arguments to the degree afforded by verbatim transcripts. In turn, greater significance is
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placed on interpretation where the historian is limited to summaries .
In the case of the Temporary Investigation Committee, as opposed to other meetings, 
it is interesting to note that this series of meetings was held in the prime minister’s private 
residence . The question then arises whether the location where a meeting was held is an 
indication of the approach taken to deliberations. Certainly, in the case of informal meetings 
held in tea houses, where no records exist albeit important decisions were made, the setting is 
indicative of the ‘back-room dealing’ to decision making. That this investigative committee met 
at the Prime Minister’s residence may have been for reasons of convenience or perhaps as an 
oblique way of creating the informality of the tea house setting. Also, there is the issue of the 
documents themselves, namely, why are they not verbatim records? Though the Temporary 
Investigation Committee met at the Prime Minister’s residence, this should not necessarily have 
precluded stenographic notes being taken. That is, if stenographers were capable of providing 
detailed, indeed perhaps verbatim records of the Promotion Law, why was this not possible in 
the case of the Temporary Investigation Committee? Perhaps it was perceived that because the 
discussions were still at the investigative stage, there was no need to provide exact transcripts. 
Without further investigation, this discussion will remain tenuous and speculative, however, 
these differences do suggest an attempt to maintain this significant and lengthy series of 
committee meetings on a more informal footing. The critical and unanswered question is why.
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Answers to this and others may be found through the examination of diaries, 
biographies, and autobiographies of participants, something which this thesis research has not 
been able to incorporate, largely for reasons of time. To some extent this has been done with 
respect to Dan Takuma, '^** but there is no doubt that further examination of biographies and 
other works would be useful. However, a large measure of caution needs be exercised when 
using such secondary sources. Even when written posthumously by committees, as in the case 
of Dan, there is often a tendency to embellish or perhaps distort events following the 
hagiographie tradition. Newspapers are also likely to be of use in providing corroboratory 
evidence or illuminating aspects which are not revealed by the documents themselves, even 
though the quality of reporting inevitably varies with the journalist and whatever particular 
agenda he may have had, as well as the paper. Similarly, industry journals can prove to be 
useful, although they too are not necessarily impartial mouthpieces. It must be accepted, 
therefore, that further development of this topic would benefit from secondary source 
‘triangulation’, but with the due caution appropriate given the nature of such material.
241 K5 Dan Danshaku Denki Hensan linkai, ed., Danshaku Dan Takuma Den.
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11. Outline of the Following Chapters
Chapter 2: The War Years 1916-1917
This chapter closely examines in step-by-step fashion the various paths that led 
business and government in establishing the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law. Records of 
individual actors, trade associations and the shingikai meetings are drawn from in showing how 
the formal decision making process occurred. It is seen that early in this lengthy process, both 
government and business began to establish their positions on how to deal with problems related 
to the iron and steel industry. Their views were, in certain crucial aspects, different which led to 
heated debates in the shingikai meetings. Over a series of meetings, both sides proved to be firm 
in their positions and an ad hoc, closed-door, meeting was held. Representatives of business 
and government discussed critical sticking points and arrived at a compromise position. It is 
shown that the consequent amendments to the bill were a product o f these discussions. The 
implication is that business perceived that the shingikai forum was provided an important 
opportunity to seek its end and, in fact, proved to be where a critical compromise was reached.
Chapter 3: Coping With The Immediate Post-war Economic Chaos 1919 and 1921
Over this three year period, shingikai meetings sat to examine protectionist measures 
and the revision of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law. In contrast to the discussions
118
seen in the previous chapter, these lengthy discussions were marked by far greater harmony.
The basic reason for this is two fold: 1) the prevailing economic situation was such that it was 
mutually recognized that close co-operation was needed in order to find their way through the 
economic depression; 2) the central issue was the implementation of tariffs which was intended 
to protect all actors in the industry and both government and business were in favour of its 
implementation. Some discussion revolved around the rate of the tariff but it did not prove to be 
divisive. The upshot is that changing economic circumstances altered the position of business 
and government to one where both sides saw their interests as similar.
Chapter 4: The Long Road to Amalgamation 1921 - 1934
Shingikai meetings were held on the issues of tariff revision, revision of the Iron and 
Steel Industry Promotion Law and the amalgamation of the industry. Given the continued 
economic depression through the 1920s and into the 1930s, tariff protection continued to be 
discussed in the first years but increasingly it was recognized that amalgamation of the industry 
was necessary to address the fundamental structural problems that underpinned the industry’s 
woes. The debates over these issues reflect greater animosity to the proposals made than in 
comparison to the debates seen in the previous chapter though significantly less than seen in 
debates of the original Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law of 1917. Limitations to the
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revision on tariff rates for pig iron are seen to be closely linked with trade relations with India. 
In a number of the shingikai meetings, discussions indicated that higher authoritative bodies 
were sitting at the same time, which influenced the extent to which some topics were discussed 
and, perhaps, in turn, influenced the degree to which dissenting opinions were expressed.
Chapter 5: Conclusion
The dominant question in the literature on the shingikai is “Who does the forum 
benefit?” In the main, the view is that the shingikai is rigged by the bureaucracy to achieve its 
own ends. This view is not supported by the findings in this thesis. It is seen that business 
perceives that the forum provides an opportunity to express its views and, through this, business 
may be able to influence outcomes. Further, given that both government and business are 
important stakeholders in the industry, both have vested interests in outcomes. Contrary to some 
views on government and business relations in this period, business is seen to act as an 
independent actor in discussions. The positions adopted by business are contingent on a number 
of factors, among those are the economic and political environment. In this sense, government 
and business relations in this period are circumstantially based and closely linked with 
economic factors.
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Chapter 2 : The War Years 1916-1917
The focus of concern of this chapter is the period of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law 
of 1917. World War I was a fillip for the expansion of Japan’s iron and steel industry, but it was 
accompanied by problems that affected the plethora of newly founded sites owned by 
entrepreneurs. It was recognised by these businessmen and by government, the largest 
stakeholder, that there was a need to establish a national policy for the promotion of the iron and 
steel industry. However, as for how this should be achieved, government and the private sector 
found themselves in opposing camps. The ensuing pages aim to lay out the process of formal 
decision making by which the different actors established their positions and sought their ends, 
and the outcome of the debate.
The onset of war is often accompanied by dramatic shifts in demand and supply to 
meet new military needs. World War I did this for many of the countries involved, and in the 
case of Japan too, though not a principal belligerent, the economy was seriously affected. For 
the iron and steel industry, the dramatic increase in demand combined with a shortage of supply 
created considerable problems. This highlighted some of the inherent weaknesses in the 
structure of the industry, and its vulnerability, and in turn, the necessity for these to be 
addressed became apparent. Despite this need being clear, it was the contentious third expansion
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plan of the government-owned Yawata Steel Works that precipitated change, culminating in the 
Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law of 1917. The submission of Yawata's construction plan 
sparked a series of private debates and missives by leading industrialists, while government 
launched an investigative committee to consider the long term development of the industry and 
some of the issues that so piqued the private sector. As a result, the Promotion Law’s measures 
not only reflected the imperatives that characterised the industry but also, importantly, the issues 
that were the focus of the private sector concerns.
Debates over these issues took place in a number of for a simultaneously. We find 
between January 1916 and June 1917 a process of position formulation occurring among the 
private sector and government on the one side, and concurrently, debates in the Lower House on 
the other. In response to urging from businessmen, the Department of Agriculture and 
Commerce formed in May 1916 a committee to examine the industry and provide 
recommendations which were submitted towards the end of the same year. At the same time 
there were the Lower House committee meetings. Though the first series commenced on 22 
January 1916, it was a full 10 months before the next sat in November and then finally on 29 
June 1917, just after the Industry Club of Japan submitted a report on the industry. Following 
this, between 11 and 13 July, the Upper House committee sat and hammered out the final form 
of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law, with its promulgation a few months later. It is
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this whole process that will be analysed here.
1. Historical Background '^*^
With the outbreak of World War I, the total annual demand for iron increased from 
505,000 tons in 1913 to 924,000 tons in 1919, and for steel, from 751,000 to 1,165,000 tons.^^  ^
This was met by expanding in particular the output of the established heavy industry firms, but 
it also encouraged a large number of new entrepreneurs to invest in their own sites. '^*^  Largely 
relying on external sources of iron and steel inputs, these domestic producers, in particular the 
newly founded ones, were vulnerable to shifts in market supply. At the same time, however, 
there was a serious decline in imports. The supply of steel and iron from Britain and Germany 
began to dwindle, though American steel imports did eventually increase because of a special 
arrangement for the exchange of steel and ships which was formalised in the U.S.-Japan Ship 
and Steel Exchange Pact of 1918.^ '*^  Between 1913 and 1914, iron ore and steel imports dropped 
36% and 25% respectively. With the export ban on steel imposed by Britain in 1916 and supply 
cut from Germany, the need for self-sufficiency was brought into clear relief and Japan faced
'^‘^ The following description of the policy formulation process has benefited from Teratani Takeake’s 
article "Dai Ichi Daisenki Ni Okeru Tekko Seisaku." in Nihon Keizai Seisaku Shi Ron.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 79.
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, "Seitetsu Jigyo Hogo Shorei Ni Kan Sum Kengisho," (Located at Nihon Kôgyô 
Kurabu, Tokyo, 1919).
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 79.
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what is often termed a ‘steel famine’.
At the same time, capitalising on the increase in demand and rising prices, the third 
expansion plan of the state owned and government managed Yawata Works was submitted to 
the 37* Diet in January of 1916^ *^^  and its construction budget was passed the following month. 
In principle, Yawata did not sell its pig iron produce in the domestic market '^^*, while Kamaishi 
Works, a relatively large private sector enterprise, used most of its foreign purchased pig iron 
for cast metal. In terms of reliance on the domestic supply of pig iron for the production of steel, 
this left the remaining part o f the private sector to rely on the 30,000 tons annual output of 
Wanishi Iron Works. '^^  ^Yawata then was the only integrated producer in Japan, and had adopted 
the policy o f not directly selling pig iron to private firms. Also, domestic steel producers feared 
that Yawata would further diversify its production of steel goods and hence strengthen its 
competition with the private sector.^^® Thus a sector reeling from the effects of tight supply of 
inputs, with many smaller producers carrying heavy debt loads, viewed poorly the government 
decision to give preference to its own interests. Wanting to capitalise on the strong demand for 
pig iron and steel, businessmen, “realising their once in a thousand years opportunity”, firmly
Ibid.
Nagashima Osamu, Senzen Nihon Tekkôgyô No Kôzô Bunseki (Kyoto: Minerva, 1987), 46. 
Ibid., 151.
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, vol. 17, Shôkô Seisakushi (Tokyo: Shôkô 
Seisakushi Kankokai, 1970), 177.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 83.
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opposed the plans for Yawata’s further expansion/^^ Following this submission, there was a 
series of organised meetings and declarations from the private sector, culminating in the 
formulation of the position of the Japan Industrial Club.
The first of these meetings occurred on 15 January 1916, when approximately 500 
members of the Rengo Danwa Kai met in the Tokyo Station Hotel. This group was comprised 
of the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan, and the Academies of Electronics, Machinery, 
Shipbuilding and Munitions. Inviting Oshikawa Norikichi, the head of Yawata Seitetsujo 
(Yawata), to attend, they formed the Tetsuzai Jikyü Toron Kai to address some of the issues that 
the third expansion plan had brought into relief. In addition to the above mentioned five groups, 
members from the Academies of Civil Engineering, Architecture, and Japanese Mining, having 
particular interest in the topic of discussion, were invited to attend. In the main, participants 
were derived from the academic and business worlds.^^^ In particular Imaizumi Kaichiro, the 
chief engineer and managing director of Nihon Kokan KK, a rolling mill plant of the Okura 
zaibatsu that specialised in producing steel tubes and pipes, and one of the directors of the Iron 
and Steel Institute of Japan, proposed his ideas for government and private sector co-operation. 
He argued that “the question of whether the demand for iron and steel is sufficient is only a 
problem for government managed steel mills (Yawata) and that in order to induce the rapid rise
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 178.
Teratani Takeake, ”Dai Ichi Daisenki Ni Okeru Tekkô Seisaku," in Nihon Keizai Seisaku Shi Ron, ed. 
Andô Yoshio (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1973), 209.
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of the private industry, Yawata should produce all the pig iron and the steel ingots etc., while 
the private sector should from this produce the finished products. Through this means, some of 
the pressure on the private industry can be alleviated.”^^  ^In response, Oshikawa of Yawata 
stated that
the plan for the expansion of Seitetsujo (Yawata) is still being investigated by government and a 
decision has not yet been made. Therefore, at present, it is not necessary to solicit opinions from 
all possible angles and also Imaizumi’s opinion regarding the expansion plan has not been 
considered [by govemment].^^^
Foreshadowing events to come, we see here for the first time not only the argument for co­
ordination in production between government and independent operators, but also the start of 
what would be a serious confrontation between the government managed Yawata Works and the 
private sector.^^^
In February 1916 the Tetsuzai Jikyü Toron Kai promulgated its views in “Proposal for 
the Establishment of a Committee of Inquiry into Joint Public-Private Iron and Steel
Manufacture”. The central issue was that
largely the import of commodities has been interrupted because of the outbreak of war in 
Europe and because of this Japan is encountering a serious shortage of iron and steel. I believe 
that the timing is right for the third expansion this fall but, in order to put on a more solid 
footing the independence of our industry, a policy for long term self-sufficiency in iron and 
steel must be tried.^ ^^
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 176. 
^^Ubid., 176-77.
Ibid., 177.
Quoted in/W ., 178-79.
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Concurrent with these developments, Imaizumi formally expressed his views in his 
“Opinion Regarding the Third Expansion of Yawata”, wherein he again emphasised the need for
co-operation between the government and private sector:
1. As much as possible, large quantities of pig iron should be produced by Yawata
2.0ne part of this pig iron should be offered to the private sector and the remaining part should
be made into steel ingots.
3.One part of these ingots should be offered to the private sector and the remaining part should 
be further made into steel slabs
4.As the raw material for private sector steel manufacturers, this steel slab should be offered 
and only in the case of having excess capacity, in the case of Yawata as well, steel materials 
should be made. However, even in this case, competition with private sector steel manufacturers 
should be avoided. “Yawata should stop the manufacture of private sector goods such as 
material for military use, large sized products, rails, and heavy metal sheets and other items.”^^ ^
The series of recommendations continued, this time submitted directly to the 
legislatures shortly before the vote on the construction budget for Yawata’s expansion, with the 
Lower House receiving one proposal and one petition, and the Upper House one proposal. Both 
Lower Chamber submissions advocated the expansion of Yawata, however Kawasaki Suketaro, 
a businessman from Osaka and one of the authors of this petition, outlined that private capital 
should be poured into Yawata Works and that management should be re-forged to include the 
private sector. The petition submitted by Nakano Buei, the president of the Tokyo Chamber of 
Commerce and founding chairman of Tôyô Iron Works, advanced the view that “the 
government’s Yawata works should make steel materials for the private sector sites.
Quoted in /W ., 177.
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semiprocessed goods and intermediate products for the private s e c t o r A s  for the Upper 
House proposal, it was urged that an investigation committee be established to consider the 
adjustment of the supply and demand between government and private sector. In February of 
1916, the construction budget of the third expansion plan was presented to the 37* session at the 
estimated cost of ¥34,515,450. To the dismay of the private sector, their attempts to alter it had 
failed and it was, without revision, passed through the Diet.
In May of 1916 the government formed the Investigation Committee of the Iron and 
Steel Industry, which was comprised of 20 members. Among them were executives from 
Yawata, including two former directors, and from Okura, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi zaibatsu, an 
army major general, the inspector general of the naval shipyard, and the director of Kamaishi 
Seitetsujo.^^^ This was the first time that, as participants in such an investigative committee, 
heads of private sector steel companies were present.^^® In addressing the committee, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce referred to the following four areas of concern: 1) the 
investigation into the location of raw materials and its supply for domestic use; 2) the 
investigation into the kinds of products from pig iron and steel that would be best for Japan; 3) 
the co-operation of private and government producers; 4) the necessity for the development of
179. 
Ibid., 180. 
Ibid.
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the industry Following the creation of this committee, two other subcommittees -  for 
Investigation into Matters Dealing with the Establishment of Standards and Criteria, and, for 
Investigation into the Present and Future Demand for Iron and Steel Products, were established. 
Towards the end of 1916 the joint results of the deliberations were submitted to the Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce in the Report of the Investigation Committee on the Iron and Steel 
Industry.
As the report is too long to be cited in full here, only the main points will be considered. 
With reference to the first issue of iron ore supply, the study suggested a wide range of options 
that might be examined including such possibilities as the use of low grade iron ore, supply 
locations farther afield such as in Australia and the South Pacific, and special government 
assistance. What this underscores was the severity of the lack of domestic iron ore, the implied 
vulnerability of Japan, and the necessity for the acquisition of adequate and secure supplies. 
Under point number two, on the kinds of products, future demand figures were calculated for 
pig iron and steel materials and figures for projected volumes of pig iron and steel materials 
production. The expected demand for and production volumes of pig iron and steel materials 
were as follows:
Ibid.
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Table 2.1 Estimated Pig Iron Demand and Production Volumes
Year Estimated Pig Iron Demand (metric 
tons)
Estimated Pig Iron Production (metric 
tons)
1916 — 726,000
1917 — 809,900
1918 360,900 1,351,500
1919 — 1,351,500
1920 430,000 —
1922 — 1,421,500
1924 533,800 —
1925 617,500 —
1928 743,000 —
Source: Tsûshô Sangyôshô, Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô (Dai 17 kan) (pp. 182-184)
Note: Estimates for pig iron demand do not differentiate between demand from domestic steel 
producers and otherwise.
Table 2.2 Estimated Steel Materials Demand and Production Volumes
Year Estimated Steel Materials 
Demand (metric tons)
Estimated Steel M aterials Production 
(metric tons)
1916 — 619,600
1917 — 746,000
1918 1,113,000 825,000
1919 — 950,000
1920 1,295,000 —
1922 — 1,270,000
1923 1,568,000 —
1925 1,786,000 —
1928 2,112,000 —
Source: Tsûshô Sangyôshô, Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô (Dai 17 kan) (pp. 182-184)
Hence, it was projected by the committee that in the ensuing years there would be an excess of
pig iron production while there would be insufficiency in the case of steel materials.
With regards to the third point of consultation, the co-operation between government and
the private sector, only one sentence of this relatively lengthy report is devoted to this issue, the
thrust of which is that through co-operation mutual competition could be avoided, thus fostering
development. The cursory manner in which this key issue for the private sector was handled is
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difficult to interpret, particularly in the light of the composition of the committee. Were only 
government members to have sat, then one might argue indifference. Had it been adequately 
considered and co-operation was not considered appropriate then one would anticipate a 
response reflecting the argument and time taken in discussion. However, neither of these cases 
apply. Given the private sector’s interest in closer cooperation with Yawata, it can be assumed, 
that this insouciance is likely to have rankled with the private sector. The fourth point of the 
report, and the one perhaps most important in terms of its contents, addressed the necessity of 
encouraging the development of the iron and steel manufacturing industry. As we will see later, 
debate over the promotion of the industry revolves around a few key issues, one of which was 
the capacity of the sites. The government position advocated the subsidization of sites whose 
annual production capacity of iron or steel was 35,000 tons or more, while the private sector 
sought a much lower level. We see here for the first time specific reference to this level. The
report stated as follows:
1) There should be a means for expropriating and making use of land for the expansion of sites 
of iron and steel mills with a production capacity of pig iron above 35,000 tons (with pig iron 
manufacturing as the base, the steel industry can be included.)
2) Long term loans or special sales of government forests^^ should be permitted where it is 
necessary for the iron and steel sites.
3) Iron and steel mills that have a production capacity of above 35,000 tons in pig iron and steel 
should be exempted from business tax, income tax, urban prefecture and prefecture tax, and 
city, town and village tax from the year after the opening of the site for a period of 10 years.
This provision may have been provided as wood was necessary to make charcoal which was used as 
fuel in the industry.
131
4) The government should encourage the production of low phosphor pig iron
5) Import tax should be levied for iron and steel produced in Korea
6) The government should as much as possible protect products of iron and steel mills that are 
managed by Japanese in China.
7) Take part of the profits fi-om government operated steel mills and use it for research into pig 
iron and steel manufacturing.
8) As much as possible help in the training of workers and technicians who work for 
government operated steel mills.“ ^
Seiichiro Yonekura observes that points 4, 5 and 6 “were insisted on by Mitsubishi, Okura, and 
the South Manchuria Railway Company, since they were establishing works in Korea and China 
that would produce over 35 000 tons of low phosphorous pig iron. Okura’s joint venture, Ben 
Xi Hua Coal and Iron Company, which had low phosphorous iron ore, was particularly 
interested in seeking governmental p r o m o t i o n .T h i s  raises the difficulty of assessing behind- 
the-scene influence exerted by zaibatsu and other large business interests in general and in 
particular the rationale for the barrier recommended in point number three.
In protest at the recommendations of the Investigation Committee of the Iron and Steel 
Industry, Shiraishi Motojiro, the director of Nihon Kokansha (Japan Steel-Tube, Inc. or NKK), 
in May 1916 launched a complaint to the Japan Industry Club. In particular his objections arose 
from the proposed 35,000 ton tax exemption barrier which excluded the NKK and many other
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 187.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 84. Evidence is not 
provided to substantiate this claim.
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companies/^^ He advocated policies that would strengthen the industry as a whole.
1) without distinction to pig iron and steel, also without distinction to present or future, all 
iron and steel companies should be exempted from tax for more than 25 years.
2) tax exemption on the import of machines and tools
3) 10 years of financial support (government)
4) the pig iron of government managed pig iron manufacturing sites, in large quantities, be
sold to private steel companies; furthermore, in anticipation of the end of the War and the
consequent influx of foreign products there should be implemented a prohibitive import 
tax on steel and iron.^“
The following month the Japan Industry Club submitted to the government its position in 
‘Report on the Opinion regarding the Future Protection of Our Iron and Steel Industry’.
2. The Position of the Japan Industry Club
At the outset of the report, Dan Takuma, chairman of the Japan Industry Club, emphasised the 
multitude of new companies that had sprung up since the start of the War and the need to 
establish a steel producing base in Japan that would provide the long term aim of achieving 
self-sufficiency. The hope was that through the implementation of the recommendations the 
country would be placed on the path to achieving self-sufficiency in pig iron, and through 
financial assistance for iron and steel the goal of steel self-sufficiency would be realised. With 
this in mind, the report outlined the following six points:
Ibid.
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 100.
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1) Measures should be implemented for steel making sites that have annual production
capacity above 35000 tons pig iron to acquire additional land for the expansion of the site.
2) Pig iron manufacturing sites of a capacity of annually more than 3000 tons and, sites 
of steel manufacturing capacity of more than 10,000 tons should be eligible for exemption 
from the year after opening for 25 years from business tax, income tax, urban prefecture 
and prefecture tax, and city, town and village tax.
3) With regards to steel manufacturing sites that produce iron as well as steel parts for 
various essential machines, they should be exempt from import tax for 10 years from the 
day of promulgation of the law.
4) Steel production sites that produce pig iron of an annual capacity above 3000 tons as 
well as steel manufacturing of an annual capacity greater than 10,000 tons should be 
granted suitable financial assistance for a period of 10 years with regards to their steel and 
iron.
5) With regards to special pig iron in particular those sites that are just starting should 
be given encouragement by the government.
6) Government steel manufacturing site(s) should as much as possible sell off to 
private steel manufacturers their produce of pig iron and steel ingots.^ ®^
In contrast to the recommendations of the Investigation Committee of the Iron and Steel 
Industry, what is perhaps most striking is the intention here to create concrete measures to 
develop the iron and steel industry as a whole. With the production capacity barrier set at 3000 
tons for pig iron and 10,000 tons for steel, a far larger number of sites would qualify for support 
than if the standards laid down by the Investigation Committee were implemented. As seen 
previously, given Bakamatsu levels of iron production, an annual production capacity of 3000 
tons or approximately 8 tons per day, was arguably a sufficiently low enough barrier to include 
all but the smallest of sites.
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, "Honpô Seitetsu Jigyô Hogo Shôrei Ni Kan Sum Ikensho," (Tokyo: Located at 
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, Tokyo, 1917), 1-3.
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An examination of the process of government and private sector position formulation 
not only draws out the issues but also provides an insight into the attitudes towards the 
problems. It was acknowledged by both sides that measures were needed to promote the 
development of the industry. Though there were differences in the recommendations, what 
stands out in particular was the glaring omission of concrete proposals for private-govemment 
cooperative management and the gap between the tonnage levels. It should be added that though 
the processes of position formulation for government and business were concomitant and were, 
in principle, separate, businessmen did sit on the government investigative committee.
However, given the thrust of the committee’s report and the difference from the private sector 
position, it is arguable that it was still a separate process. It is clear that government was not 
interested in combining private sector interests with its own iron and steel making enterprises. 
Encouragement for the industry meant to the government large, well-established sites, while the 
Japan Industry Club, representing the industry as a whole, sought to promote equally all 
producers almost regardless o f size. As we shall see, these observations reappeared in the Lower 
and Upper House debates where their eventual resolution was found.
Thus, though the formal institutions through which business was to make its case were 
in the two Houses of the Diet, the process whereby business and government established their 
positions and let it then be known to others occurred outside these institutions, and was
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concurrent to the initial Lower House committee meetings. These committee meetings were
councils of deliberation or shingikai whose members were appointed by government. In the case
of the Lower House council meetings, its members were drawn from this House, as well as from
academe, business, the bureaucracy and politicians, some of whom held cabinet positions. The
composition of the Upper House council meetings was similar to that of the Lower House
except that representatives from the bicameral Diet were from the Upper House By looking
at the debates themselves, the way the issues were resolved can be seen and the importance
which the interlocutors attached to their contending positions will be drawn out. As the
discussions progressed over a period of 18 months, they moved from general inquiry into more
focused and increasingly heated debates. The list of committee meetings is provided below. 
Table 2.3 Committee Meetings
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai Meeting
January 22 
to
February 
24, 1916
Record of the Committee of the 37“* to 38*** Imperial Diet House of
Representatives
- Proposal Concerning the Promotion and Future of the Iron and Steel
Industry
June 29 
to 
9 July, 
1917
Record of the Committee of the 39"^  Imperial Diet House of Representatives 
Proposal Concerning the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law
July 11"“  
to 
12 July, 
1917
Record of the Special Committee of the 39*” Imperial Diet House of Peers 
Proposal Concerning the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law
^^ *It is uncertain what powers the shingikai of the Taisho period were given. In the post-war period the 
shingikai, in the main, do not have the power to make decisions but only to recommend. For further 
details see Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Consultation in Japan, or Ogita Tamotsu, 
"Shingikai No Jittai," 93.
The committee meeting is recorded as having occurred on 12 July, however comments by committee 
members indicate that meetings did occur on the previous day.
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July 13, Record of the Committee of the 39 Imperial Diet House of Peers Joint 
1917 House Committee on the Proposed Law for the Future of the Iron and Steel 
____________________________ Industry____________________________
3. The Lower House Debates
3.1 Committee on the Proposal Concerning the Promotion and Future of the Iron and Steel ' 
Industry
The Committee on the Proposal Concerning the Promotion and Future of the Iron and 
Steel Industry sat as the 37* Diet debated the plan and budget for Yawata’s expansion, and the 
Rengo Danwa Kai formed the Teismai Jikyü Toron Kai mentioned above. The first meeting of 
this Lower House committee was on 22 January 1916 and it was convened in total five times, 
with the final sitting on 24 February. Though reference is made to the issue of Yawata’s 
expansion, the majority of the discussions of the Committee revolved around a limited number 
of issues that were also concurrently raised in the Toron Kai and later addressed in Imaizumi 
Kaichiro’s report.
The questions of whether Japan could find domestically sufficient raw material for the 
production of pig iron, and if not, from where it would be secured, were debated throughout the 
five sittings of the committee. Yoshikawa Yüsuke, a government committee member, explained 
that the largest amount of iron ore consumed was from the Ta Yeh Mine in Manchuria and the
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next largest from Korea, adding that the amount from Japanese sites was minimal.^^® The 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Kono Hironaka, stated that there was no plan to make 
Japan independent with regards to steel, thereby acknowledging the lack of domestic sources 
and government intent to pursue the plan of foreign procurement.^^* It was generally recognised 
that Japan had limited sources of iron ore and that reliance on foreign supplies was critical for 
the expansion of the industry.
At the outset of the first meeting, on the 22"** of January, Kato Kotaro, a member of the 
Lower House and president of numerous companies, immediately raised several critical issues 
including the scarcity of iron as well as the problem of supply. Kono Hironaka explained that it 
was of prime concern to ensure that the raw material needed for the construction of steel at the 
government run sites be sufficient, perhaps thereby, inadvertently or otherwise, from the outset 
confirming fears among the private sector over the government’s priority concem.^^^ At the start 
of the final sitting of the committee, the Minister reiterated that the fundamental problem with 
providing assistance for the private sector was attributable to an insufficient amount of raw 
material for the industry, which, despite whatever assistance might be extended, would not 
allow for the expansion of the private sector. He added that, hypothetically, were this problem
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai, ed., Seitetsu Jigyô Sokushin Oyobi Shôrei Ni Kan Suru Kengyôan linkai 
Giroku (Hikki) Dai Ichi~Go Kai, Dai 37 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1916), vol. 11, Teikoku Gikai ShUgiin linkai 
Giroku - Dai 37 Kai (4)~38 Kai Gikai (1915^1917) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 265.
2^* Ibid, 254.
^^^/W.,248.
138
to be overcome, then he felt expansion could be achieved. In short, the government did little to 
help assuage private sector fears that measures would be taken to ensure adequate supply for all 
but the largest sites. The ‘steel famine’ in general and the fears among of the private sector 
fuelled by the anticipated increase in demand as a result of Yawata’s proposed enlargement, 
raised the stakes in finding secure sources of supply, preferably domestically, but, if not, then 
from abroad.
A similarly negative stance was also taken by government with regards to the proposal 
for government and private sector cooperative management of steel mills. A considerable gap 
existed between the two positions over the feasibility of implementing this idea. Nishimura 
Tanjiro, a member of the Lower House, apparently having sat on a number of different though 
related committees, observed that from the perspective of the government the Japanese industry 
was still in an early stage of development.^^^ However, from the point of view of the private 
sector businessmen, the industry had already reached a more advanced level. Their argument 
was that as the private sector was functioning independent of government support, then by 
definition it was competitive.^^'* Moreover, continuing to explain the businessmen’s perspective, 
Nishimura added that if only the government would“slightly open the doors”^^  ^then the 
industry would develop more rapidly. Though he did not elaborate on what he meant by the
Ibid.,265. 
Ibid.
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term “doors”, presumably he was referring to either an adjustment in import tariffs to facilitate 
growth or a little assistance in general. He went on to urge that in order to address the difference 
between the two sides, they should meet and work out a mutual understanding, underscoring the 
point that research on the industry must be done together and in a formalised manner.
Nishimura’s observations were echoed in the explanation by Machida Chûji, a 
government committee member who later held a number of ministerial positions, on the non­
feasibility of government and private sector cooperative management. Reflecting a greater depth 
of knowledge of the industry than seen among most other participants, he explained that the 
projected cost of the third expansion of Yawata was 35,000,000 yen, and that it was estimated to 
take 40 years to complete. The payment scheme was a long term one, and the burden, even if it 
were shared by government, would be too great for the private sector. He tried to give some 
consolation by adding that once this expansion had been completed, the proposal for 
cooperative management could be considered.^^^
Regardless of this offer, there is an underlying sense of fatalism in the discussion over 
cooperative management. Though the budget for the expansion had not yet been approved, 
reading the words of Machida one has the sense that there was little chance, certainly at this late 
stage, of modifying Yawata’s submission to include private sector wishes. Moreover, far from
Ibid., 262.
140
being a debate between competing sectoral interests, the overwhelming tenor of the five sittings 
of this committee was one of tame inquiry and exploration of issues. Perhaps because this was 
the first ever Committee meeting on the steel industry, arguments were restrained, but there was 
also a general lack of knowledge among many of the participants, certainly among those whose 
comments have been recorded. In one instance when discussing the quantity of iron ore output 
in Manchuria, not having firm figures at hand, the discussion proceeded on the basis of 
rumours.^’* The Minister of Agriculture and Commerce was asked whether he had made contact 
with representatives of the relevant department handling Manchuria, to which he claimed he had 
not spoken with them.^^^ Moriya Koresuke, an elderly committee member who held a variety of 
positions in the iron and steel industry as well as having been re-elected to the Lower House 8 
times between 1906 and 1919, summed up the situation by mentioning that when he had studied 
at school the academic curriculum had not included matters relating to steel production and now 
Japan was a producer of iron and steel; in other words, the pace of the development of the iron 
and steel industry was so fast that it was difficult to keep abreast of the change and have 
sufficient understanding of the technology used in making steel to make the judgements 
required by the shingikai?^^
The last of the major issues discussed in the first series of committee meetings was
Ibid., 264. 
Ibid.
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tariff reduction. The basic line of argument by the private sector was that the rate of protection 
was too high, thus unduly hindering the entry of iron ore into the country. Instead of being an 
aid by keeping out cheap foreign produce and in turn encouraging domestic production, it was 
exacerbating the problem of the lack of iron ore. As the businessman Nishimura summarised it: 
it was an extreme position to say that tariffs did not have any effect on the domestic market, as 
had been argued by some other committee members.^** The Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce followed by stating that he was receptive to the reduction or elimination of tariffs as 
voiced by the industrialists, however he maintained that the fundamental obstacle was the lack 
of raw m a t e r i a l D r .  Kobayashi Ushisaburô^*^, the chairman, continued in the same vein by 
reiterating that the main problem was of raw material. He felt that inevitably Japan would have 
to continue relying to some degree on an external supply, but he pointed out that this was also 
not a unique situation, as in England and Germany one third to one quarter of the supply was 
found from without the country.^*^ He added that there should also be no worry about the 
reliance on the import of iron ore given appropriate contracts with suppliers in China and 
Manchuria.^*^ He concluded by stating that regardless of whatever solution was found and from
2*' Ibid., 273.
Ushijiro has written in English on various aspects of Japan’s military including Military Industries o f 
Japan, War and Armament Loans o f Japan and War and Armament Taxes o f Japan.
Teikoku Gikai ShOgiin linkai, ed., Seitetsu Jigyo Sokushin Oyobi Shôrei Ni Kan Suru Kengyoan linkai 
Giroku (Hikki) Dai Ichi~Go Kai, Dai 37Kai Teikoku Gikai (1916), 273.
^  Ibid.
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wherever the material was imported, it would be better that there be no tariff.^*^ Essentially, 
committee members were sounding their opinions but without the appropriate research only 
tentative conclusions could be reached.
This tentative exploratory nature can perhaps more clearly be seen in the case of 
Machida, the government nominee, who started off by stating that if tariffs did have a major 
effect then this should be investigated. He pointed out that the rate had already been reduced 
once and wondered whether it would be beneficial to do so a second time. He then expounded 
on a number of possible scenarios, admitting at each step that he did not have any answers.^*^ 
The upshot was that the question of whether reduction or elimination of tariffs would be 
beneficial to the private sector was left open to debate, and further investigation required.
Thus, the first of the Lower House committee meetings is perhaps best characterised 
as exploratory. Both private sector and government were still in the process of establishing their 
positions, though attitudes to some of the fundamental issues could already be seen. To the 
entrepreneurs concerned over the supply of iron ore, this series of meetings gave sufficient 
grounds to feel uneasy about what specific measures government might advocate in the coming 
months.
273-74.
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3.2 Committee for the Proposed Iron and Steel Promotion Law
With the submission of the government-formed Seitetsugyo Chosakai at the end of 
1916 and the Japan Industry Club’s report on 10 June, the five sittings between 29 June and 9 
July 1917 of the Committee for the Proposed Iron and Steel Promotion Law reveal a greater 
depth of knowledge than previously seen. Whereas the previous committee meeting was 
exploratory, this one is differentiated by a draft of the Law having been submitted to this 
Committee. In turn, we find that the debates were more focused and linked with the articles of 
the proposal.
At the outset o f the first o f the series of discussions of this committee, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, Nakakôji Ren^ ®* set the tone for the position of government on the 
proposed measures for the encouragement of the iron and steel industry. He stated that since the 
beginning o f the ‘steel famine’, considerable debate had been devoted to the issue of the 
demand for steel. Here, he emphasised, the focus would be on the emergency measures needed 
to address this situation. As a first step, he pointed out, the third expansion of Yawata had 
already been approved, and given the current dire straits, all efforts should be directed at
Note that in the records of these committee sittings, he is identified as both Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce (Nôshômu Day in) and Minister of State (Kokumu Daijin).
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benefiting the country, even if in the process, private sector welfare was sacrificed.^*® In order 
for this to be achieved, he continued, it was critical that a steady development of the industry be 
maintained. To this end, he outlined that iron and steel mills (seitetsujo) having a production 
capacity above 35,000 tons per annum should be given encouragement in order to achieve a 
solid base for steel manufacturing. If, in the pursuit of expansion, additional land was required, 
measures had been included for the necessary expropriation. Firms would be exempted from 
income, business and local taxes, and tax levied on the import of equipment would be waived. 
In conclusion, he urged that given the circumstances these proposed measures be debated and 
passed into law as soon as possible.^®® Thus, the position of government was clear from the 
outset: the aim of the Law was not to create a protective umbrella for the industry as a whole, 
fostering the development of sites regardless of size or need, but rather, in the words of the 
Minister, to promote the expansion of the largest mills for the national cause.
As for how national benefit was defined, Inoue Kakugoro, a prominent businessman 
and member of the Lower House^®\ posed the question of whether the development of sites
*^® Teikoku Gikai ShOgiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyo Shôrei Hôan linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ichi~Go Kai,
Dai 39 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1917), vol. 13, Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai Kaigiroku - Dai 39 Kai Gikai (2) 
(1917) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 289. During the third sitting of the committee, Nakakôji offered 
encouragement to the private sector that if the current high demand for steel carried on, then both small 
and large sites would continue to grow. Nonetheless, the position of government remained clearly in 
favour of promoting large scale mills. Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyo Shôrei Hôan linkai 
Giroku (Spkki) Dai lchi~Go Kai, Dai 39 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1917), 301.
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôrei Hôan linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ichi~Go Kai,
Dai 39 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1917), 289.
^^ ‘He was director of Japan Gas Company, director of Japan Steel Foundry, president of Kyoto Electric 
Railway Company and president Hokkaido Coal & Steamship Company in 1910, He was vice-president
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below the 35,000 ton limit would not also be of benefit to the country. He offered the scenario 
of instituting measures to create greater unity among producers and the systematic harnessing of 
the production capacity of the smaller sites, suggesting that this too would achieve the goals of 
the Minister.^^^ In response the Minister observed that it was not only a matter of co-ordinating 
the smaller sites but also one of raw material. He feared there would not be enough for the 
various sites, not to mention the inadequacy of their facilities and transportation.^^^
Closer to the nub of what irritated the private sector were the reasons for the 
governmental position of 35,000 tons. As Kawasaki Saishirô, a government committee member, 
admitted, there had been no investigations conducted as to the failure rate of small scale 
manufacturers, which undermined the arguments suggesting that they were an investment 
risk.^ '^* Usawa Uhachi, a member of the Lower House, then pointed out that given this situation, 
the rationale for this high bench mark seemed rather weak.^^  ^Throughout the series of 
committee meetings, a number of explanations were posited in support of the favour afforded to 
the larger sites, one of which was managerial ef f ic iencyHowever,  in terms of the rationale 
for this numerical value, it rested purely on research showing that sites that had an output of less
of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce between 1890-1915 and a member of the Lower House. He was also 
known for sarcastic wit during diet sessions.
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyo Shôrei Hôan linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai lchi~Go Kai,
Dai 39 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1917), 298-99.
^^^Ibid,, 299.
^'^Ubid.,3\l.
Ibid.
^^Ibid.
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than 100 tons per day were inefficient, a standard that had been accepted in other countries.^^^ 
Again, how efficiency was defined was not explained. Though not certain of the numbers, 
Kawasaki guessed that approximately 167 sites would fall under the 35,000 ton limit and not be 
eligible for the support offered by the proposed Law.^’* There is a clear feeling among members 
of the committee that were the law to be passed as submitted by the Minister the future of many 
smaller sites would be uncertain, and indeed they speculated on their failure.^^^
In the final stage of the fifth meeting on 9 July, the proposed Law was brought to a 
vote. Nakakôji, in a final effort to persuade members of the necessity of accepting the barrier of 
35,000 tons, tried to rally support for the government position on the argument of national 
welfare.^ ®® Two other positions were advanced, one calling for a reduction of the limit to 3,500 
tons and the second to 1,500 tons. Voting details are not provided but the outcome was in favour 
of the 3,500 ton position.^”’ With this vote the Lower House debates drew to a close. In contrast 
to the first series of meetings, participants had gone beyond exploration and begun a serious 
debate on the proposed measures. Nakakôji, representing the government, had from his 
entrenched position strongly urged members to rally around his call for the national interest.
Ibid.  ^292.; Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôrei Hôan linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai 
Ichi~Go Kai, Dai 39 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1917), 296-98.
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôrei Hôan linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ichi~Go Kai, 
Dai 39 Kai Teikoku Gikai (1917), 290.
^^Ibid.
Ibid., 324-25.
Ibid., 325.
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However, the vote was a clear sign of private sector sentiment.
4. The Upper House Debates
4.1 Special Committee on the Proposed Iron and Steel Industry Law
Following shortly on the heels of the last Lower House committee meeting on 9 July,
the first of the final two committees, the Special Committee on the Proposed Iron and Steel
Industry Law of the Upper House sat on 11 and 12 July 1917. On the first day, the proposed
Law was submitted, and then certain parts of the Law were revised which, according to the
records, was done by the committee and submitted the following morning. As the records
reflect, debate did not commence until the afternoon of 12 July. There were a number of
proposed changes made to the 11 July submission which directly affected the smaller sites and
have been the focus of our examination thus far, namely the 35,000 ton -  3,500 ton capacity
issue. The pertinent revised articles of the law are presented here:
The Proposed Iron and Steel Promotion Law
Article II -  With regards to steel enterprises with facilities that have the steel capacity and pig 
iron capacity of 3.500 (35,000)^“  tons per annum, they are exempt for a 10 year period from
In the record, written in vertical format, there is a line to the left of the figure 3,500 and to the right the 
revised 35,000 inserted. The first figure is the amount that was proposed by the Lower House and the 
second figure is the amount that was proposed by the Upper House (Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai, ed., 
Seitetsugyô Shôrei Hôan Tokubetsu linkai - 1917, vol. 7, Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai Kaigiroku - Dai
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additional business tax assigned to the enterprise and the income tax that is levied against the 
income arising from the business . The extent of the steel enterprise that should receive the 
exemption from income tax and business tax is determined by Imperial Edict.
Article III -In the event of the expansion of facilities of sites restricted to one location, that have 
both an iron and steel production capacity above 3.500 (35.0001^ °^  in the year of increase and 
starting from the following year for the next 10 years the measures outlined in Article II 
apply.'""
Shortly into the meeting of the Committee in the afternoon of 12 July, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, Nakakôji Ren, again explained at considerable length the 
government position. As we have seen before, he argued that given the current dearth of steel in 
Japan, an appropriate policy must be implemented. To that end, he explicitly stated the need for 
a law that would target sites of 35,000 tons capacity or a daily rate of 100 tons, the rationale 
being that directing the country’s resources, financial and otherwise, to such sites would 
maximise the output of iron and steel in the name of national interest. Kamata Katsutaro, 
president of Kamata Industrial Company and director of various other companies, challenged 
him by stating that the Minister’s reasons were insufficient, and that“the aim of the proposal 
was to protect large sites’’.'"  ^The Minister defended himself with the argument that the prime 
issue was not what was best for the private sector but what was best for the country, and by
38-39 Kai Gikai (1916-1917) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 475.)
Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôrei Hôan Tokubetsu linkai Giji Sokkiroku Dai Ichi 
Gô - 1917 Dai 39 Kai Gikai, vol. 6, Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai Giji Sokkiroku - Dai 39 Kai Gikai 
(1917) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 589.
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reducing the limit to the lower level, there was a possibility of jeopardising the success of the 
large sites/°^
4.2 Joint House Committee on the Proposed Law for the Future of the Iron and Steel Industry
In contrast to the previous committees, the Joint House Committee on the Proposed 
Law for the Future of the Iron and Steel Industry sat on 13 July 1917 and was composed of 
members from both houses. The range of topics discussed was limited, and with regards to the 
issue of tonnage, the exchanges do not reveal greater insights into the rationale for the 
government or the private sector positions. What is to be highlighted, though, is the tone of the 
discussions. This was the final day of meetings on the issue and it was, presumably, understood 
that were no compromise position reached during the talks, a deciding vote would be necessary. 
The meeting commenced with Motoda Hajime, the Lower House Speaker, stating his preference 
for the reduced tormage position, followed by Viscount Inoue Tadashiro, the Deputy Speaker of 
the Upper House, defending the government stance on the grounds that the fastest path to 
redressing the iron and steel dearth was through the larger sites. Motoda made it clear that if the 
object of the law was to encourage the existence of large volume producers, then quite naturally
Ibid.
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the smaller ones would gradually d i s a p p e a r T h e  exchange between the Speakers continued in 
this vein until Suzuki Umeshirô of the Lower House entered the discussion, challenging the 
government on the rationale for its figure of 35,000 tons. Inoue answered, but not to the 
satisfaction of Suzuki, and he continued to press the issue. Tension mounted and finally Suzuki,
perhaps by way of veiled threat, pointed out the result if a compromise position was not found:
this problem of 35,000 tons is the most important problem of all, however, unfortunately, if the 
Lower House and the Upper House do not reach an agreement, then the proposed Law will 
collapse,^ ®*
Ichiki Kitokurô, a professor of Tokyo Imperial University, former government minister and 
later member of the Upper House, stepped in with a more conciliatory tone, emphasising that
the aim of this committee was to achieve an understanding:
of course this Joint House committee will work to find an agreement. Since the outset of this 
committee the wish for this has been shared by all members of the Upper House and all 
members the Lower House.^ ®’
The discussion proceeded without apparent compromise any closer, eventually leading to an 
agreement to create a subcommittee which would sit and continue the discussions. At 2:17 p.m., 
Matsuoka Yasutake, former Minister of Agriculture and Commerce in 1906, on behalf of the 
Upper House selected three members, while Motoda chose three from the Lower House. With
Ibid., 446.
Ibid., 448.
'^  ^Ibid., 449.
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the committee reduced from 20 to 8 appointees, the discussions proceeded for about three hours. 
The records do not contain the contents of these talks. At 5:12 p.m. the full committee resumed, 
and the results of the closed talks were disclosed. Motoda announced that the compromise 
position of Article number II was 5,250 tons, reduced from 35,000 tons; the 3,500 tons specified 
in Article III had been modified to 5,250 tons.^*° A number of interlocutors, including Nakakôji, 
not formally a member of the committee, expressed their satisfaction with the results and the 
proposed Law was passed by a vote.^'*
5. Why 5250 tons and to whose benefit?
On initial consideration, it would seem that, though the agreed figure was not 3000 
tons as sought by the Lower House members, 5250 tons was quite close and it follows that the 
private sector had reason to be pleased with the outcome. Certainly those firms whose annual 
capacity was equivalent to or exceeded the compromise tonnage would have been happy, but 
their numbers were relatively few. In 1913 there were 21 iron and steel firms and by 1918 war 
time expansion had seen an increase to 208 firms. The majority of these newly arisen enterprises 
had seen the war boom as an opportunity to enter the market, however their viability was in
310 Ibid., 450. There were other revisions but these two are germane to our purposes.
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question were this egregious level of demand to fall, and indeed the post-war economic decline 
witnessed a serious contraction; of the 208 firms operating in 1918, only 60 remained in 1923. 
More importantly for our purposes here, of the 187 new firms that sprang up, 166 were under 
5000 tons capacity. Thus, in terms of the question of who benefited from the Promotion Law, 
the vast majority of the firms fell below the cut offline, including a number that were zaibatsu 
owned. So, the question arises, who were the 8 committee members who made the final 
decision, and did they represent the interests of big business to the exclusion of the remaining 
private sector firms?
6. The Background of Committee Members
Given the absence of records, ultimately we are not able to go beyond speculation in assessing 
the rationale for the sub-committee’s decision to select 5250 tons as the break-off point. In light 
of the preponderance of small sites that fell below the 5250 ton mark, perhaps the immediate 
question that arises is who were the winners and losers. The following table provides the break 
down of the industry according to market shares in iron and steel in 1918.
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Table 2.4: Market Shares in Iron and Steel in 1918 (tons; %)
Pig
Iron
Tons/
Annum
% Crude Steel Tons/
Annum
% Finished
Steel
Tons/
Annum
%
Yawata 271
578
46.6 Yawata 444
735
54.7 Yawata 306
419
56.8
Kamaishi 67 946 11.7 Kamaishi 21 881 2.7 Kamaishi 17 414 3.2
Wanishi 82 866 14.2 NKK"*" 69 689 8.6 NKK 49 788 9.2
Sites using 
charcoaP*
34 246 5.9 Nihon
Seiko-sho
82 341 10.1 Nihon
Seiko-sho
26 763 5.0
Sumidagawà
Seitetsujo*
12,550 2.2 Sumitomo
Copper
21 778 2.7 Sumitomo
Copper
14 968 2.8
Tobata
Imono
5,783 1.0 Sumitomo
Steel
Casting
5 678 0.7 Sumitomo
Steel
Casting
18 777 3.5
Pig iron
Reclamation
(scrap)
80,230 16.9 Kobe Steel 
Works
27 503 3.4 Kobe Steel 
Works
21923 4.1
Others 27 559 4.7 Kawasaki 
Hyogo Steel 
Works
28 711 3.5 Kawasaki 
Hyogo Steel 
Works
22 450 4.2
Kawasaki
Shipbuilding
Fukiai
Works*
12,912 1.6 Kawasaki
Shipbuilding
Fukiai
Works*
5,939 1.1
Asano
Kokura
Steel*
5,831 0.7 Asano
Kokura
Steel*
12,118 2.2
Tokyo
Kozai
Company*
7,576 0.9 Tokyo
Kozai
Company*
5,265 1.0
Nihon
Chükô*
5,346 0.7
Osaka
Steel*
10,945 1.3 Osaka
Steel*
8,030 1.5
Others 68,293 8.4 Others 29,783 5.5
Total 582
758
Total 813
219
Total 539
637
Source: Tsûshô Sangyôshô, Shoko seisaku, vol. 17 Tekkogyo (Tokyo: Shôkôseisakushi kankokai, 1970), pp. 199-200. 
Note: were sites formed during World War I.
Also known as Japan Steel-Tube, Inc.
Charcoal (mokutan), the carbon remains from wood, has similar burning properties to coal. Charcoal 
was superseded by coal as the preferred energy source in the production of iron and steel.
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Of the 15 private sector production sites listed individually above, six were not affiliated with 
zaibatsu or government ministries: Osaka Steel, Nihon Chükô, Tokyo Kozai Company, 
Sumidagawa Seitetsujo, Tobata Imono, and Kamaishi, The remaining ones were affiliated with 
zaibatsu: NKK, Sumitomo Copper and Sumitomo Steel Casting, Asano Kokura Steel, the two 
Kawasaki sites and Wanishi. NKK was owned by Imaizumi Kaichiro and Shiraishi Motojiro, 
however, and Shiraishi was the son-in-law of Asano Soichiro, the founder of Asano zaibatsu. 
Wanishi was owned by the Hokkaido Coal and Shipping Company (HCSC) and in 1913 became 
affiliated with Mitsui zaibatsu. Of the remaining companies that were to receive subsidisation, 
Kamaishi was owned by Tanaka Chobei, an entrepreneur, though it was purchased by Mitsui 
zaibatsu after the war, and Nihon Seiko-sho was owned by HCSC and Armstrong and Vickers. 
Sumitomo Copper, Kobe Steel, Kawasaki Hyogo, and Nihon Seiko-sho “all had strong ties with 
the Navy and the NRB [National Railway Bureau], developing to supply their special needs.” *^'* 
Though there were a significant number of sites which would receive the benefit of the law that 
were zaibatsu affiliated or had close connections with government, six of the 15 did not. Among 
the crude steel producers, the non-affiliated held 12% of the market share, when factoring out 
Yawata's contribution, and finished steel producers held 13%. Independent pig iron producers 
held 28% of the total leaving aside Yawata’s contribution. Thus, the market share of non-
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 65.
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affiliated independent producers was low, and much lower if Yawata were included, and if 
influence in the decision making process is judged in terms of market share, then it stands to 
reason that the limit should have been higher. When considering that the economic clout of the 
zaibatsu, which figured large in the production of Japan’s steel either through direct ownership 
or otherwise, stemmed from their panoply of holding companies, one imagines that they would 
have had a considerable say in the tonnage limit. Further, given that the government position 
was rooted in the argument of efficiency and that such small producers as Tokyo Kozai 
Company, Nihon Chükô and Osaka Steel would benefit from the proposed law, it seems likely 
that other factors were at play in the tonnage decision beyond big business influence. The 
selected tonnage figure does not seem, therefore, to have been specifically chosen according to 
any zaibatsu or big business versus small business delineation.
Understanding the background of committee members, in particular the more vocal 
ones who took leading roles in the discussions, is an important component in the process of 
evaluating how decisions are reached. It may be contended that the positions they held were a 
function of the particular interests that oriented their attitudes and views; a simple delineation 
would have bureaucrats adopt a stance close to the position outlined by the leading government 
speaker, normally of the ministerial level or higher, at the outset of the committee meeting. 
Businessmen, on the other hand, would be concerned with seeing their personal financial best
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interests realised, while politicians would normally toe the party line.
This delineation is too neat to adequately describe the situation in Japan during the 
first decades of this century and, indeed, is perhaps the case for almost any developing country. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the twenty members who made up this Joint House 
Committee is that in almost all cases their career paths at some point traversed the boundaries 
between politics, the civil service or business. It would not be uncommon for a civil servant to 
rise through the hierarchy and later either move into business and assume a leading role in a 
company, or follow a political path. Equally, businessmen sought election and, wearing two 
hats, pursued a political career. These observations are applicable in the case of the sub­
committee as well.
Rather than examining the background of the entire cast of the committee, a close look 
of the makeup of the final 8-member sub-committee may serve to underscore these points and 
may help us interpret the proceedings of the crucial final stage. The following table provides the 
background of the sub-committee as of 1917. The completeness of the table is limited by the 
sources used and, in particular, with regards to the category on business connections, most 
members had a more extensive network of contacts than shown here. Certainly non-official but 
close business affiliations, as important as they may have been, do not appear in this table.
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Table 2.5: House of Peers Members on the Sub-committee
Name Prim ary
Occupation
Cabinet
Appointment
Business
Connection
Academe Other
Baron
Matsuoka
Yasutake
(1864-
1923)
Lawyer Minister of 
Agriculture 
and
Commerce
1906-1908
President 
of Nihon 
University 
1920
Privy 
Councilor 
Baron in 
1917
Viscount
Inoue
Tadashiro
(1876-
1954)
Businessman President of 
Anshan Iron 
and Steel 
Works and 
Fushu Colliery
Professor
Tokyo
Imperial
University
Ichiki
Kitokurô
(1867-
1944)
Bureaucrat/
politician
Minister of 
various 
departments 
including 
Home Affairs 
1915-16 and 
Education 
1914-15
Professor 
at Tokyo 
Imperial 
University 
1894
Privy
Councillor
1917
Fujita
Shirô
Businessman Director- 
general of 
Agriculture 
and
Commerce
1900
Business 
appointments^*^ 
but not related 
to the iron and 
steel industry
Tokyo
Imperial
University
Alma
Mater
Table 2.6 House of Representatives Members on the Sub-committee
Name Prim ary
Occupation
Cabinet
Appointment
Business
Connection
Academe Other
Motoda
Hajime
(1858-
1938)
Political
figure
Minister of 
Communications 
in 1913-14 and 
Railways 1920- 
22
Graduated 
in 1880 
from 
Kaiseijo
Privy
Councilor
Tokonami
Takejiro
(1867-
1935)
Bureaucrat/
politician
Home Minister 
1918-22
Graduated
from
Imperial
Tokyo
University
Pres, of 
Imp.Govt. 
Railways 
in 1913
Suzuki
Umeshirô
(1862-
Mitsui Bank 
and Oji Paper 
Manufacturing
Graduated 
from Keio 
Gijuku
editor of 
Jiji Shimpo
 ^ President of Nihon Kasai Hoken Kabushiki Kaisha ( 0 > insurance
company); Director of a sugar company in Taiwan Consultant to a
spinning company Director of a Taiwanese company
Auditor of a Taiwanese company
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1940) Company 1887
Furuya
Hisatsuna
(1874-
1919)
Professor at
Tokyo
Higher
Commercial
School
Imperial 
Household 
Department 
in 1909
Information extracted from the following reference works: 1) Japan Biographical Encyclopaedia and 
Who’s Who 1964-65; 2) The Who’s Who in Japan; 3) The Japan Year Book 1916-1918; 4) Nihon 
Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten; 5) Seijika Jinmei Jiten; 6) Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten.
Through the various positions that most of the committee members held, they would 
have established close connections in the upper circles of government, furthermore, four 
members had at some point held one or more ministerial positions. The members of this 
committee were senior figures in their respective fields, and their careers, which commenced in 
the early formative period after the Meiji Restoration, were varied. In terms of their education, 
almost half of both the Lower and Upper House members were graduates of the Tokyo Imperial 
University, most having studied law. Though not necessarily classmates, their early institutional 
development was a shared one. Moreover, given the zigzagged paths that their careers followed, 
there would have been few members whose personal views were not to some degree a 
composite of their rich backgrounds. In this sense, it is perhaps more useful to speak in terms of 
homogeneity o f background. When interests and careers are sufficiently intertwined and 
overlapping, the distinctions that can be made are less useful in expressing characteristics than 
their common points.
Specifically, in trying to draw links between membership and the decision of 5250 tons.
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two factors are to be considered: 1) who represented the state and 2) who represented big 
business. We know the sub-committee was numerically equally divided between Upper and 
Lower Houses. However, it should not be taken as a given that all Upper House members voted 
for a figure that was in accordance with the government position. One factor that might have 
influenced Upper House members from not voting in line with the government position was 
their business connection(s). Viscount Inoue Tadashiro, a high ranking member of Japan’s 
nobility appointed by the emperor, was president of the Anshan Iron and Steel Works. This was 
part of the South Manchuria Railway Company, a semi-public company whose stocks were 
largely owned by government, and also the Anshan Works were linked to Yawata through its 
technological support.^^*  ^Fujita Shirô had numerous connections with business, however none of 
them were directly linked with the iron and steel industry. Based on business connections, then, 
neither Inoue nor Fujita had reason to vote against the government position. The other two 
Upper House members, Baron Matsuoka Yasutake and Ichiki Kitokurô, were both members of 
the Privy Council, which may give further reason to believe that their vote was in line with the 
government position. The remaining member with business connections was Suzuki Umeshirô, 
a member of the House of Representatives. He was linked to Mitsui zaibatsu which did have 
interest in the iron and steel industry through Wanishi. Assuming that all four members of the
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 72,
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House of Peers voted in accordance with government position, were Suzuki, given his 
connection with Mitsui, to have voted similarly, then regardless of the sentiments of the 
remaining Lower House members, the government position would have held sway. This does 
not, however, specifically explain the choice of the figure 5250.
Given their close associations and overlapping backgrounds, one might argue then that 
the positions in the debates should have been quite close and not as heated as they were. 
However, as we have seen, this was not the case. One contributing element is that the 
composition of the subcommittee was split between the Houses, a determining factor in shaping 
the argument; two leading voices in the debates were Motoda of the Lower House, who argued 
for the reduction o f the tonnage figure, and Inoue of the Upper House who pushed for the 
government position. In this sense, the debate was shaped not specifically by the personal 
interests of the members, though this factor can not be eliminated, but more by which half of the 
bicameral structure they occupied. The implication of this is that house members sat before the 
outset of the shingikai meetings and established an agreed position which they were bound to 
during the meetings. Though the findings here suggest that this may have occurred, it is difficult 
to make this claim. The members from the House of Representatives represented the interests of 
the steel and iron industry as a whole, which ran counter to the government aim, represented by 
the House of Peers, of fostering the development of the larger sites.
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7. Conclusion
Given the dramatic results of the vote and the peculiar tonnage adopted, it is natural to 
ask why there was this outcome. In fact, how the compromise figure of 5,250 tons was arrived 
at remains unanswered. However, what is more critical to mention here is that the result was 
achieved through a formal procedure. The process of position formulation transpired over the 18 
months during which investigations were conducted and committees met. As the positions of 
government and the private sector became clearer through the proposal of measures and the 
debates approached the final days, arguments became increasingly heated. For both sides the 
stakes were high. Government had a vested interest in seeing that national resources be directed 
to the largest sites, including its own Yawata, while the private sector feared that the small 
capacity iron and steel mills would disappear without appropriate measures in place. Naturally 
the adoption of a low capacity tonnage would not jeopardise the larger sites, however 
government did firmly believe that this was not in the interest of Japan as a whole. Arguably so, 
many of the smaller sites had only just appeared and their viability, particularly once the 
egregious demand created by the War disappeared, was questionable. Furthermore, given that 
the passage of bills required the approval of both the Upper and Lower Houses, pressure was 
placed on committee members to work out their differences in the relatively favourable setting
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offered by a committee rather than risk the proposal becoming ensnared and stalled in House 
debates, which could potentially mean either collapse or that it would be altered in a way 
disadvantageous to one of the sides. In this sense, in terms of the steps in the formulation and 
passage of bills, it was this committee setting where the critical compromise occurred. Once 
agreed upon, passage through the Houses could be expected largely to be a perfunctory process.
With regards to the specific question of to what degree did business influence the 
outcome of the Promotion Law, there are at least two ways of judging this; one is an approach 
based on results and a second focuses on the process. In terms of the first, given that the bulk of 
the sites were below 5000 tons then one might argue that only a small percentage benefited and 
therefore the aim of promoting the industry as a whole failed. Strictly speaking this is true. The 
Industry Club of Japan sought a result that would promote the industry as a whole and through 
this law help foster the fledgling private sector. That there were under one third of the sites left 
by 1923 does not necessarily mean that if the law had been more generous a greater number 
would have survived, as post-war economic contraction was severe.
The second process-based approach draws attention to the fact that the position of the 
industry was so fervently argued by its representatives that it was only through the 8 member 
committee that an agreement could be reached. The fervour with which both sides defended 
their positions suggests that the process was not an orchestrated facade with a predetermined
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outcome arranged through informal channels. This is not to say that such means were not 
exercised, but that even if they were, the arrival at the critical compromise position was 
achieved in the context of the committee. It is accepted that this position was reached by 
convening a provisional sub-committee and their debates are not on record, and thus it can be 
argued that in the final analysis it was ‘back-room dealing’ that resolved the issue. However, it 
was only because the outcome had not been concluded elsewhere, and because members 
tenaciously held to their positions, which they had been granted a right to express and defend 
through the institutionalisation of the formal committee process, that such a measure was 
resorted to.
It would be dangerous to push this position too far. A network of elite businessmen and 
politicians did exist and it would be incredible if informal discussions had not occurred. But, the 
evidence of the previous pages is sufficient to argue that business did effectively use the formal 
channel to exercise its influence in arriving at a position that it sought.
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Chapter 3 : Coping With The Immediate Post-war Economic Chaos 1919-1921
With the compromise reached between the select members of the Upper and Lower Houses, the 
Promotion Law of 1917 was to create a new footing for the future of the iron and steel industry. 
It was intended that this Law would provide the necessary industrial guidance to weather the 
economic turmoil of the war years and foster the industry’s development. As we have seen, the 
principal benefactors of the final compromise tonnage of 5250 were the large companies and the 
government owned and operated Yawata Works. Though the larger capacity sites were favoured 
by the Promotion Law, it was not only this advantage but also the prevailing economic 
circumstances that characterised the 1920s that led to a further marked bifurcation in the 
development of the industry, witnessing the expansion of the large sites apace with domestic 
economic groAvth and the smaller sites lagging behind with bankruptcies not uncommon.
As with many other countries, the immediate post-war period and through the 1920s 
was a period of considerable difficulty. Driven by the initiatives of both government and 
business, a lengthy deliberative process was embarked upon to address the deepening troubles 
experienced by the iron and steel industry. Commencing with the promulgation of opinions by 
actors in the industry, not least of which was the Industrial Club of Japan, we see the outline and 
tenets of the measures deemed necessary to redress the situation. In the ensuing years, between
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the implementation of the Promotion Law in 1917 and the conclusion in 1921 of the revisions of 
the tariff schedule and the Promotion Law, a number of related issues were debated within the 
framework of the shingikai and Lower and Upper House sittings.
The salient feature in these discussions was their overall harmoniousness.^’’ The 
argument has been made that the difference in the tonnage levels and its implication for the 
protection of small producers divided members at the meetings over the Promotion Law. As we 
have seen, friction was quite evident, strongly suggesting that business believed that the 
shingikai provided a forum where gains could be had. In contrast to these turbulent debates 
stand the talks that spanned the period of 1919-1921. This is not to say that there were not 
differing opinions but rather the issues over which differences were aired were oriented around 
individuals and not representative groups or private sector versus government. Moreover, 
discussions were less about staking out and defending one’s position, and more about the 
expression of opinion in the general discourse of exploring different aspects of an issue. In 
short, there was a marked lack of a divisive issue that ran though the variety of talks that would 
have cleaved the members into dissenting camps. The importance of this harmoniousness is 
that, despite the relative uncontentiousness of the debated issues, high ranking government and
As has been discussed elsewhere, the records of the shingikai meetings that occurred during the time 
period examined in this chapter were summarizations of discussions and, as such, do not avail the reader 
with as clear a picture of the meetings as seen elsewhere in this thesis. Given this limitation, revisiting 
these documents may be useful in the future.
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prominent business leaders spent hours at a time, spanning in some cases weeks, sitting in the 
meetings. This suggests that business members believed that something was to be gained by 
participating in the forum, even if it was only to agree.
Given the length of the discussions and the number of issues handled it is remarkable to 
find so little contention. It will be posited here that this arose fundamentally for two reasons: 1) 
the nature of the issues discussed and the level of detail at which they were handled were such 
that actors, for themselves and for those whom they represented, did not feel that their 
fundamental interests were threatened by the discussions and 2) as opposed to the buoyancy of 
the war time economy, the severity of the post-war economy was such that business and 
government were drawn together to seek solutions for an industry which was recognised as
important for the actors and for Japan as a whole. The situation is summed up by Yonekura:
The economic depression that followed the First World War hit the expanding economy 
severely. The general wholesale price index, which had increased 2.7 times between 1914 and 
1920, suddenly declined 20 per cent in 1920, and aggregated capital investment, which had 
expanded 20 times by 1919, shrank by one quarter by 1924. The impact on the iron and steel 
industry, which had expanded its capacity during the war, was severe. The government felt 
compelled to do what it could for the industry, and the industry, for its part, was eager for any 
possible government aid.^ **
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 109-10.
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1. Historical Background
While the armistice brought a conclusion to World War I, the war’s economic impact 
was long lasting, drawing into relief fundamental weaknesses that challenged the viability of, 
among others, the iron and steel industry not only in Japan but also in more industrially 
advanced western nations. Post-war economic contraction left few untouched. In March of 
1920 commodity prices began to spiral downward and within one year had dropped by 
approximately 20%.^^  ^On the 15* of March 1920, the Tokyo stock market crashed, followed 
on April 7* by the failure of the Osaka Masuda Bill-Broker Bank. This was followed by 
further dramatic drops in the Tokyo and Osaka stock markets, then repeated in the collapse of 
all the commodity markets.
Dramatic shifts were likewise experienced by the former belligerents whose 
industries were forced to shift back production to peacetime needs. This was not simply a 
matter of returning to antebellum status but learning to deal with a significantly different 
economic world. In Japan and among Western producing nations, policy makers grappled 
with the twin problems of the need to protect industry and to address industrial structural 
problems which was reflected in the “increasingly defensive and protective attitudes of
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 212,
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governments towards their domestic steel industries.... The heightened concern of 
governments for the health of their national steel industries was a direct result of the 
importance of steel in the war effort.”^^® Trading practices of foreign nations such as dumping 
were increasingly perceived as something “that could potentially weaken a national steel 
industry’s ability to support a renewed war effort [and] were viewed as a real threat to 
national security.
Whereas Britain and Germany had long-standing, well-established iron and steel 
production facilities, comparatively speaking, Japan was new to the industry, albeit rapidly 
developing. Moreover, much of its recent expansion was achieved “during World War I [which] 
was in effect a greenhouse, contributing to rapid growth and a closing of the technological 
gap.”^^  ^Capitalising on the war driven buoyancy, entrepreneurs were attracted by the high 
demand and in turn handsome profit margin. They invested heavily in capital and relied on 
sustained favourable conditions to remain operative. With the conclusion of the war, demand 
dropped dramatically, former competitors re-entered the market and, given their greater 
efficiency, quickly regained much of their erstwhile business. Imports from Germany and
Kent Jones, Politics Vs Economics in World Steel Trade, ed. Ingo Walter, World Industry Studies 
(London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1986), 20.
Ibid., 20-21.
Tetsuji Okazaki, "Import Substitution and Competitiveness in the Prewar Japanese Iron and Steel 
Industry," in Changing Patterns ofInternational Rivalry Some Lessons from the Steel Industry: The 17th 
International Conference on Business History (Proceedings of the Fuji Conference), ed. Yoshitaka Suzuki 
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1991), 175.
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Britain quickly increased and pushed the United States from its dominant position: in 1920, 
Japan imported from Britain 14% of its steel imports, 2% from Germany and 84% from the 
United S t a t e s T h e  price of rolled steel products moved from 416.49 yen per ton in 1918 to 
220 yen per ton in 1920. The same trend can be seen in the price descent of steel ingots which 
plummeted from 313.18 yen per ton in 1918 to 160.13 yen two years later.^ "^*
As for iron, domestic producers fared little better. The unit price per ton of pig iron 
dropped from 209.86 yen in 1918 to 100.25 yen in 1920.^^  ^The story of pig iron, though, was 
more complicated. The structure of the private sector pig iron market was divided between 
domestic produce and imports. Yawata was an integrated producer but, as we have seen, in 
principle did not sell its pig iron on the domestic market.^^^ In 1920,43.2% of domestic demand 
for pig iron was met through imports from colonies and foreign countries, of which 5.3% was 
from India. Though by 1926 the share of imports in total demand had declined to 38.5%, the 
share of Indian pig iron in imports, excluding that from the Japanese Empire, had risen from 
12.3% in 1920 to 45.2%.^^^ Thus, for domestic iron and steel producers, the post-war years 
brought serious hardship and challenged their operating viability.
As for iron, the principle driving force that determined the price and volume of
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 90. 
Shinohara Miyohei, ed., Kôkôgyô, vol. 10, Choki Keizai Tokei (Tokyo: Tôyô Keizai Shinpo Sha, 
1972), 232.
Nagashima Osamu, Senzen Nihon Tekkôgyô No Kôzô Bunseki, 150.
Ibid., 152-53.
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domestic production was imports from India and to a lesser extent from Manchuria. In 1920 and 
1921, and indeed beyond, the price of Indian iron was always below average market price.^ ^® A 
further consequence of the competition in the iron market was that private sector steel 
producers, facing competition from Yawata Works and imported products, began to turn to 
cheap imported iron, compounding the domestic iron producer’s woes. As a result, Indian iron 
was capable of forcing the market price down, reducing the profitability of domestic producers 
and at the same time sufficient to divert domestic producers’ demand such that the domestic 
production level did not increase.
Following the above narrative, the question arises as to what impact the changed 
environment experienced by the industry had on the negotiating positions of government and 
the private sector. As has been seen, the change in demand forced the demise of the weak and 
the reorganisation of the remaining. For those firms that were faltering, there was a tendency to 
seek economic stability under the wing of the zaibatsu in order to gain financial support. Also, 
by 1923, given the recession, “only nine iron producers, 22 crude steel producers and 21 
finished steel producers remained in the industry. Even larger firms, like Mitsubishi Steel and 
NKK, were forced to carry out a capital reduction.”^^  ^Thus, this reorganisation of the industry 
implied a diminution in the number of actors and in turn an increase in the concentration of
lida Kenichi, Ohashi Shûji, and Kuroiwa Toshiro, eds., Tekko, vol. IV, Gendai Nihon Sangyô Hattatsu 
Shi (Tokyo: Kojunsha, 1969), 210.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 86-88.
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influence in the hands of fewer firms. Table 3.1 shows the zaibatsu affiliates: 
Table 3.1 Zaibatsu Affiliates as of 1926
Zaibatsu Affiliates
Mitsui Nihon Seiko-sho (Wanishi), Kamaishi Mining
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Steel (Kenjiho), Tokyo Kozai
Sumitomo Sumitomo Copper, Sumitomo Steel Casting
Yasuda and Asano^^" NKK, Fuji Steel, Tokai Steel, Asano Kokura, Asano Shipbuilding's 
Steel Division, Oshima Steel
Okura Ben Xi Hua Coal and Iron Company
Source: lida Kenichi et.al. (eds.), Gendai nihon sangyô hattatsu ski, IV, Tekko, p. 203
In the case of the bid for assistance made in the Iron and Steel Promotion Law in 1917, 
government was in a comparatively strong position to negotiate as the Yawata Works remained 
by far the largest iron and steel producer and the principle integrated one in Japan. However, in 
terms of percentage of total domestic production, given the expansion of the private sector, the 
war years saw the relative strength of private sector and government shift away from Yawata. 
As Table 3.2 indicates, in 1913 Yawata's share of pig iron production was 73%, which 
diminished to 47% in 1919. Similarly, in 1913 Yawata's share of steel production was 85% but 
by 1919 was 51%.
Yasuda zaibatsu's main activity was banking and by the turn of the century it rivalled its competitors 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Upon Yasuda’s decision to diversify into the industrial sector, it turned to Asano 
which had an established presence rather tiian venturing alone. This is why Yasuda and Asano are 
grouped together.
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Table 3.2 The Production of Domestic Iron and Steel During the First World War (1000 tons)
Pig
Iron
Steel
Materials
Year Yawata Private
Sector
Total Yawata’s 
Share %
Yawata Private
Sector
Total Yawata’s 
Share %
1913 176 64 240 73 217 38 255 85
1914 211 89 300 70 221 62 283 78
1915 244 74 318 77 262 81 343 76
1916 286 103 389 74 286 95 381 75
1917 305 146 451 68 341 193 534 64
1918 272 311 583 47 306 229 537 57
1919 281 315 596 47 281 272 553 51
1920 243 278 521 47 281 256 537 52
1921 307 165 472 65 311 251 562 55
Source: \9\3-\9\9'. Shôkô SeisakushU\o\. 17, p. 195; 1920-1921: Gendai Nihon Sangyô Hattatsu Shh 
vol. 4,204
However, by 1921, Yawata had regained some its lost market share of both pig iron and 
steel production which is attributable, in part, to the wide spread closure of small-scale private 
sector production sites. In terms of total domestic pig iron production, Yawata’s share had 
returned in 1921 to 65% against the aggregate production of the private sector at 35%. As for 
steel materials, by 1921 Yawata’s market share had risen to 55% and the aggregate production 
of the private sector was 45%. Despite the period during which Yawata experienced a loss in 
market share, through the period 1913 -1921 it maintained its position as the single largest 
domestic producer in both iron and steel manufacture. In comparison to its pre-war strength, 
though, its production share of both pig iron and steel diminished between 1918 and 1920. 
These years correspond to the period during which the bulk of the deliberations that figure in 
this chapter occurred. The aggregate production of all private sector manufacturers approached 
half of domestic output. Moreover, in terms of the number of actors, this gain in sway was
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focused in the hands o f fewer firms than the number seen in the negotiations over the Promotion 
Law of 1917. Expressed in terms of impact on the negotiation position of the private sector,
though the firms were eager for government aid, they were not without strength.
the output of the private sector was contributing significantly to both iron and steel production 
(almost 50 per cent), and the government could not ignore its requests. It must be noted, 
however, that even though the private sector gained significant influence with government on 
the one hand, it still needed governmental protection on the other. This mutual relationship 
between the government and the industry would be the basis for the Japanese government’s 
post-First World War industrial policy.” ^
In the period 1919-1921 examined here, Imaizumi KaichirO, who was mentioned in 
the previous chapter, figured prominently in the promotion of the industry. The Industrial Club 
o f Japan as well used its influence to seek its ends through informal discussions with 
government, participation in shingikai discussions and the reporting of its views in written form. 
At the formal institutional level, the industry’s interests were also taken up by the Temporary 
Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy which ran from September 1919 to 
February 1921. Later in March of 1921 the Committee on the Proposal for the Revision of 
Tariff Rate Law and the Proposal for the Revision of the Iron and Steel Business Promotion 
Law combined the tariff issue and the revision of the Promotion Law of 1917 in its discussions.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steellndustry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity^ 85.
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2. Necessity and Reasons for Tariff Protection in Japan’s Iron and Steel Industry
The report entitled ‘Necessity and Reasons for Tariff Protection in Japan’s Iron and 
Steel Industry’ was written by Imaizumi Kaichiro. Though Imaizumi was Chief Engineer of 
NKK and a founder of the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan, it cannot be assumed that the report 
was written under the auspices of either organisation. Typically, the position and institution to 
which an author was affiliated was stated at the end of a document. Contrary to convention, in 
this report, neither of these were provided and so the report is dealt with here as a personal 
assessment. Although the document did not specify Imaizumi’s institutional affiliation, his 
name alone carried sufficient weight to ensure that his opinion, written or otherwise, would 
have received due consideration. Also, it should be noted that this document is not dated and 
thus its accurate placement in the chain of events that led to the final report of the Temporary 
Investigation Committee is not possible. That having been said, the subject matter and tone 
strongly suggest that it was written after the implementation of the Promotion Law of 1917. 
Given its reference to the war and the economic upheaval that followed in its wake, it is likely 
that it was written during the early 1920s. Though the document does not have a distribution 
list, given that it was located in the documents storage room of the Industrial Club of Japan, one
Imaizumi Kaichiro, "Ware Seitetsu Jigyo Wa Kanzei Hogo O Hitsuyo Ukubeki Shikaku Am RiyO," 
(Located at Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, Tokyo, Date unknown).
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may assume that the Club’s executive members were aware of its contents, though the degree to 
which they might have been influenced by it is impossible to assess. As we will see, Imaizumi’s 
position was in line with, in the main, the thinking of industry and thus may have lent support to 
prevailing views at the time.
It would appear that the reputation of Imaizumi was beyond that typically associated 
with the importance of his institutional positions, which in themselves were already significant. 
The entry for Imaizumi in the Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten states that “his best known achievement is 
that, by founding the method of making steel using an electropositive converter, he became a 
pioneer of today’s iron and steel production technological revolution.”^^  ^Yonekura Seiichiro 
describes Imaizumi as a “legend in the industry”^^ ,^ ascribing to him perspicacity and the 
courage to challenge conventional thinking in the industry. Okazaki Tetsuji cites Imaizumi as a 
leading proponent and driving force behind the movement towards the amalgamation of the iron 
and steel industry. He identifies three areas where Imaizumi “vigorously pursued his activities”: 
1) journalism; 2) shingikai', and 3) political party(ies) and took every opportunity to express his 
opinion in “each kind of magazine”^^  ^on the issue of the industry’s amalgamation and similarly 
was vocal in the important councils in which he sat. With respect to political participation, he
Koizumi Tetsushi, ed., Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten (Tokyo; Asashi Shinbunsha, 1990), 210,
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 183.
Okazaki Tetsuji, Nihon No Kogyôka to Tekko Sangyo: Keizai Hatten No Hikaku Seido Bunseki (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1993), 61.
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was elected to the House of Representatives for the Seiyükai in 1920 and participated in the 
SeiyQkai’s Political Affairs Investigation Committee, participating in party policy planning on 
iron and steel amalgamation. Also, as will be seen later, Takahashi Korekiyo shared Imaizumi’s 
enthusiasm for amalgamation, spearheading this drive at both the formal and informal levels. 
Okazaki asserted that “Takahashi’s amalgamation argument was not only his individual pet 
theory but also the party’s formal aims were based on the participation of I m a i z u m i . H i s  
position in the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan, as well, afforded him an influential position in 
advancing his opinion. At the end of 1915 the institute’s membership was 896, and by the end 
of 1918 its ranks had reached 1500. Its membership list reflected the participation of members 
from “important iron and steel firms including Yawata, the military arsenals, and influential 
universities”.^ ^^
Imaizumi outlined in the introduction of his report the recent rapid development of the 
iron and steel industry, citing Japan’s success in achieving in a few years that which had taken 
much longer in the west. This observation was seen in reports by the Club and elsewhere and 
was used as a lead-in to outlining the principal difficulty at hand, to wit, the issue of self- 
sufficiency. Imaizumi acknowledged that in the production of some goods, self-sufficiency had 
already been achieved. Nevertheless, he urged that “all of these things in the near future should
Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 30.
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achieve self-sufficiency.”^^ *
As opposed to some of the arguments made in previous debates over the Promotion 
Law, in which self-sufficiency was seen as akin to economic autarky, domestic production 
would be based on natural resources located within the empire and allocated through the 
domestic market system. This perspective was not often voiced nor seemingly shared by many 
committee members. Sceptics of the viability of the plan pointed out the limitation imposed by 
Japan’s lack of iron ore, in particular that which was of both high quality and easily extractable. 
In this regard, self-sufficiency was seen as a production system based on the import o f raw 
resources or semi-processed goods from Manchuria. This perceived sense of Japan’s 
vulnerability to the inherent vagaries of foreign supply, seen elsewhere, was further reinforced 
by the fear over the inundation of the domestic market by cheap foreign produce. Though not 
explicitly stated, the implied rationale was that former munitions driven economies would 
reorient their large production scales to the manufacture of commercial goods and flood foreign 
markets.^^^ Thus, Imaizumi’s report, which emphasised the need to reduce Japan’s dependency 
on foreign supply, would have found considerable appeal given the situation of the post-war 
Japanese economy. The counter measure advocated in Imaizumi’s report was the 
implementation of tariffs. He provided figures to back his assertion that government
Imaizumi Kaichiro, "Ware Seitetsu Jigyo Wa Kanzei Hogo O Hitsuyo Ukubeki Shikaku Am Riyû," 1. 
Ibid., 2.
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intervention to protect the industry was needed. Based on the examination of a number of 
countries, he deemed that Japan had “already achieved suitable development, [and] ... ought to 
receive tariff protection.” '^*®
Imaizumi’s report stands as a pointed effort to draw attention to the vulnerability of 
the industry to international competition and urge the authorities to consider protective 
measures. Domestic producers were perceived as vulnerable and not a match for foreign 
competition. The urgency of responding to the dramatic change in the economic climate was 
keenly felt at least in the industry. Though chief engineer of NKK, Imaizumi’s advocacy of 
protective measures did not differentiate between pig iron producers and steel producers. 
Perhaps because of his association with the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan, he may have felt it 
inappropriate to favour one sector of production over the other.
3. Recommendations Concerning the Promotion and Protection of the Iron and Steel
Industry '^**
The Industrial Club of Japan has already been seen to figure large in govemment-
Ibid.
341 This document is not paginated and page numbers have been assigned commencing with the page that 
starts with title of the document followed by This document was located in the storage
room of the Industrial Club of Japan.
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business relations and continued to do so through the 1920s. Hardly was the Promotion Law of 
1917 in place when major shifts in the demand and supply of steel and iron were in play. In the 
face of dramatic change in the international market, it was perceived by the Club that the issue 
of self-sufficiency was essential to the industry’s welfare and on 21 December 1918, the 
Industrial Club formed a committee with the aim of considering measures to be proposed to 
government in aid of the iron and steel i n d us t r yA f t e r  a number of meetings, Baron Nakajima 
Kumakichi, noted among other things as an intermediary of the business world, took up writing 
the report, which was initially entitled ‘The Relationship Between the Iron^ "*^  and Steel Industry 
and Protective Tariffs’. On 6 February 1919, the report was taken up by the full board of 
directors, who produced the final version o f the report entitled “Recommendations Concerning 
the Promotion and Protection of the Iron and Steel Industry”.^ ^^  Signed by Dan Takuma, the 
president of the Club, the report is notable for its detailed recommendations. According to 
accounts of both the 25 year and 50 year histories of the Industrial Club of Japan, on 7 February 
Wada Toyoji, managing director of the Club, and Barons GO and Nakajima presented in private 
the report to Prime Minister Kara Kei with the aim of impressing on him the need to adopt the 
‘emergency measures’ outlined in the report. This was followed-up by similar meetings with
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu Nijûgo Nen Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu NijUgo Men Shi, 112. 
# #  is translated here as ‘iron and steel’ rather than ‘iron’ as the issue at hand is “iron and steel self- 
sufficiency” ( # # #  ê  Ip PpIM).
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu Nijügo Nen Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu Nijügo Nen Shi, 112.
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Yamamoto, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, on 8 February and with Takahashi, the 
Minister of Finance, on 11 February/^^ Club records relate that the report was ignored. Despite 
the weight o f the Industrial Club and its efforts to represent the industry’s interests in a 
succession of private sessions with the Prime Minister and two of his ministers, their “zealous 
efforts” '^*^ were in vain. In the end, the subsequent economic hardships suffered by the industry, 
steel as well as pig iron producers, was viewed by the Club as, at least in part, due to the
government’s decision not to implement the emergency policies.
With regards to the emergency measures of the Club’s proposal, the government did not 
implement any of the points and there followed successive bankruptcies and failures in the iron 
and steel world, especially the crisis of the pig iron companies was severe. The only remaining 
companies that survived were Kamaishi Works, Wanishi Iron Works, Kenjiho, Ben Xi Hua,
Anshan and Tôyô Seitetsu.^ '*^
In similar words to those in Imaizumi’s report, the Club’s proposal commenced on an 
upbeat tone, reminding the reader that Japan had achieved a remarkable expansion of the 
industry and, in comparison to its western counterparts, much more quickly. This observation 
having been made, there was a down-shift and the reality of the industry’s current situation was 
outlined. This remained the tone of the ensuing pages. The argument was that given the rapid 
expansion of the industry during the war, the post-war slump, exacerbated by high labour costs, 
threatened the existence of the plethora of new sites which had ploughed their gains into
Ibid., 112-13.
^^Ibid., 121.
Ibid.
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expansion. Lest these tentative gains be lost and by implication a swath of the private sector 
disappear, measures were needed to address this looming situation. It followed then, the Club 
argued, that “from the perspective of industrial policy, our country should establish a 
fundamental solution for the protection and promotion o f the iron and steel industry” ,^ '*® The 
Club drew support from a report produced in Britain in 1918 - ‘Final Report of the Committee 
on Commercial and Industrial Policy after the War*. The Committee on Commercial and 
Industrial Policy identified that in the post-war economic circumstances various key industries 
in the United Kingdom, among them that of iron and steel, were in need of protection. In rather 
dire tones, this UK Committee advocated tariff measures and proactive government
involvement which were echoed in the Club’s recommendations.
Those industries which we have already described as “key” or “pivotal” should be 
maintained in this country at all hazards and at any expense. No ordinary economic rules apply 
to the situation of these minor but important industries. They must be kept alive either by loans, 
by subsidy, by tariff, by Government contracts, or in the last event by Government manufacture. 
They will necessarily be subject to Government supervision.^ ^®
In similar dire tones as the UK Committee’s report, the Club cautioned that the small 
producers’ viability was being threatened by the recent dramatic increase in imports. The 
introductory section closed on the dour note that unless this situation be addressed “the
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, "Seitetsu Jigyô Hogo Shôrei Ni Kan Sum Kengisho," 2.
Ibid.
Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy BPP, "Final Report of the Committee on Commercial 
and Industrial Policy after the War," no. Cd: 9035 (1918): 52.
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influence of this calamity will not stop merely with the iron and steel industry but reach the
financial world as a whole”.^ ’^
The content of the report was divided between proposed measures to be implemented 
immediately, entitled ‘emergency measures’, and long term recommendations entitled 
‘fundamental measures’, to be dealt with later. Long extracts from the former are provided here 
for two reasons: 1) because of the importance that the Club placed on the measures and that 
specifically it was the ‘emergency measures’ which were rejected by government during the 
Club’s private talks and, 2) arguments are made in the literature that the report favoured the 
interests of pig iron producers. In order to evaluate this view, it behoves us to provide a
translation of the relevant sections.
Emergency Measures: The nation should decide on the establishment of fundamental facilities 
for iron and steel self-sufficiency ...
Number 1 : The management and limitation of imports on iron and steel 
The government seeks to implement various methods to manage and limit imports on iron and 
steel. From the point of view of national peacetime policy, these methods should be dealt with 
in a peaceful way.... Government should plan for the continuation of the iron and steel industry 
employing the lowest price levels....
.. .with regards to the domestic situation, there should be a decision on import limits on the 
production items based on the iron and steel levels that can be produced....
i) The Committee on the Investigation of the Iron and Steel Industry^ ^  ^should decide on 
the price of the items that are permitted for import. These prices will be compared to the 
standard rate price....
Number 2: The government will establish a suitable investigative organ (Committee on the
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, "Seitetsu Jigyô Hogo Shôrei Ni Kan Sum Kengisho," 2-3.
This was an ad hoc committee established to examine import limits on iron and steel, among other 
matters.
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Investigation of the Iron and Steel Industry). The government will plan for the establishment of 
various facilities that relate to the future development and protection of the iron and steel 
industry
... in the case of the establishment of the limitation on iron and steel... this organ (the Club) 
will handle the matter or another organ like the previously stated one that investigated the 
standard price.
Number 3; Within the permitted limits^ ^^ , domestic pig iron, steel and other products should be 
used by government enterprises.
Number 4: The transportation of domestic iron ore on national rail lines, should be at the 
present lowest transportation rates and enjoy special reductions^^^
As was indicated earlier, the structure of the industry was such that the implementation of tariffs 
on the import of pig iron would be to the detriment of domestic steel producers. As Yawata did 
not sell its pig iron and domestic production was limited, steel producers had to look abroad for 
sourcing. To the benefit o f steel producers, Indian iron was cheap. However, for domestic 
producers of pig iron, Indian iron was the leading competitor and the main reason for low iron 
prices. Thus, protection of domestic iron producers through tariffs was at odds with the interests 
of steel producers. Though this structurally based conflict existed, in terms of emergency 
measures, apart from the final recommendation, all those recommended applied to the iron as 
well as steel industries. At several points the report referred to the “foreign threat” but, without 
reference to the product, or to which sector(s) of the industry might be at risk. In short, the 
suggestion of limiting imports was not product specific and without preference given to iron or
These limits are not explained.
Nihon Kôgyô Kurabu, "Seitetsu Jigyô Hogo Shôrei Ni Kan Sum Kengisho," 3-5.
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Steel producers.
The remaining pages of the Club’s report deal with ‘fundamental measures’ that were 
of the long term perspective. Under the three points elaborated, the first was an argument for the 
amalgamation of Yawata and the private sector. The rationale for this was sub-optimal capital 
usage given the fragmented nature of the i n d u s t r y T h e  report did not specify to which side of 
the industry this observation applied but did indicate that the situation was due to the plethora of 
small producers. It was seen that amalgamation would reduce the cost of production and 
increase the industry’s competitiveness.^^^ The subsequent recommendation dealt with the 
establishment of a long term policy for the supply of coal and iron ore. Specifically, China was 
eyed as a suitable source and cooperative management with the Chinese should be 
considered.^^^ The third and final recommendation was entitled ‘the implementation of 
protective tariff policies’. The recommendations for protection were to apply to both pig iron 
and steel producers.
In Japan’s iron and steel industry, with respect to pig iron and steel production and finished 
products capacity, there has already been development. Based on suitable protection, that 
overall capacity can be utilised and based on that, iron and steel self-sufficiency can be 
attained.^ ^*
Rationale was provided for the tariff recommendation based on international trends into which
Ibid., 6.
6-7.
Ibid., 7-9.
Ibid., 8.
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Japan was drawn.
With regards to the protection and encouragement of Japan’s iron and steel industry as it 
concerns the implementation of tariff policy measures, a few global arguments should be 
considered. As for promotion and encouragement policy, the gradually unfolding unavoidable 
reality is that the iron and steel industries of the United States, England, Germany today are 
effecting their fortunes through the power of tariff protection.^^^
It would thus appear that the international trend towards the implementation of tariffs influenced 
Club members’ thinking. It is hard to judge, though, whether this was through fear of being 
caught out in an ever tightening world-wide trend of post-war protectionism, or enlightenment 
by foreign example. In either case, taking the document at face value, with regards to the issue 
of bias to pig iron producers, two points are clear: 1) committee members were sensitive to 
international trends in tariff implementation for iron and steel producers and; 2) apart from one 
recommendation found in the emergency measures, all others were to be applicable to both the 
iron and steel sides of the industry.
It is instructive to consider this from the perhaps somewhat cynical perspective that 
the Club’s industry-wide representational stance might be a façade and that the interests of 
select members were behind the recommendations. After all, the establishment o f the Industrial 
Club of Japan had been in equal parts funded by Mitsui (who had a financial interest in pig iron 
producing Kamaishi Works and Wanishi Iron and Steel Works) and Mitsubishi (who owned
^^Ubid.
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Kenjiho Works which produced pig iron) and, given their economic weight, it was not 
inconceivable that they might have been in a position to seek preferential treatment. This 
argument would run along the lines that the Club operated for the benefit of a handful of large 
actors in the industry, but that it was deemed inappropriate to present itself as such. Another 
interpretation might be that having been only recently established, the Club had decided to take 
up the mantle of defender and promoter of the industry, regardless of the size or viability of the 
sites. A further perspective might be that the large actors in the Club, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, 
perceived that in the long term it was necessary to foster the development of the private sector 
in order to reduce the dominant position of Yawata. In so doing, the bargaining position of not 
only the private sector but in particular the handful of large sites, often affiliated with zaibatsu, 
would be enhanced. It is difficult to assess which of these scenarios is most applicable, but it is 
unlikely that any of them was entirely false, and in reality the Club’s position was a composite 
of all three.
Two major works challenge the assertion that the Club was working to represent the 
industry as a whole. The position expressed in the later Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry’s edited multi-volume work on commercial policy points out that though the Club’s 
report was drafted by Nakajima, other leading industrial figures, whose names we have already 
seen, were also associated with the contents of the Club’s report.
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This proposal was drafted by Nakajima Kumakichi. However, the members of 
investigation committee, Go (director, Toyo Iron Company), Harada (Kenjiho Works,
Mitsubishi Steel’s site in Korea), Kadono (Okura’s Ben Xi Hua Coal and Iron Company),
Isomura (Hokkaido Iron Company), Komura (Tanaka’s Kamaishi Works) and others, either 
representatives of influential pig iron manufacturers or related persons, were at the centre of the 
drafting process.^^
Yonekura sees self-interest at the heart of the report. The Club’s call for protection was not 
driven by concern for the industry as a whole, he charges, but for the welfare of the iron 
producers who sat on the committee, who saw that the provisions of the proposal favour their 
interests.
Looking at the list of members, it is not difficult to see that the report strongly reflected the 
opinion of the iron producers (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Toyo Iron, and Okura).... the firms most 
damaged by the post-war depression were iron producers, not steel producers. It was inevitable 
that the companies most enthusiastic about protectionism were iron producers like Mitsui’s 
Kamaishi and Wanishi, Mitsubishi’s Kenjiho, Toyo Iron, and Okura’s Ben Xi Hua in China.
This report thus strongly recommended protective measures.^®'
Based on the content o f the Club’s measures, though, it is difficult to identify evidence that the 
representatives of Mitsui, Wanishi, Mitsubishi, Tôyô Iron and Okura operated with personal 
interests in mind. Given that protectionism was a principle component of the report, it follows 
that the iron producers who sat in the committee would have directly gained from the 
implementation of such recommendations. That much is clear. It is more difficult, though, to 
sustain the argument that recommendations that would have benefited pig iron producers (and in
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 207.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 111-12.
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most cases, steel producers as well) were advanced because 5 “enthusiastic” members of the 15 
operated purely out o f self-interest. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Okura were zaibatsu and the word 
of their representatives carried weight. Their interests were at stake and the outcome of 
discussions was in their favour, hence the causality link is easily made. However, a potential 
weakness in the argument is that the report dealt with the concerns of both the iron and steel 
industry in relation to the implementation of tariffs.
In sum, the argument that iron was favoured over steel remains open to debate. As it is 
understood, this argument is based on the structure of the industry. Judging the intent behind the 
decision to implement tariffs is problematic and, by implication, it is difficult to infer that 
favouritism was at play. That the implementation of pig iron tariffs would have had a negative 
impact on steel producers is apparent. The international trend was for the protection of domestic 
markets through tariffs which the committee members had investigated and, it would appear, 
they had been influenced by Britain’s research and recommendations. Thus, the choice of tariff 
implementation was not ‘out of the blue’. Similarly, with regards to judging intent based on 
outcome, the fact that the situation was such that the protection of one item was to the benefit of 
one set of producers, but to the disadvantage of the other, was driven by domestic and 
international factors and less to do with the interests of the drafters themselves. Moreover, it 
should be noted that iron producers were in a weaker position than steel producers because of
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international competition, and if disadvantaging one side over the other was unavoidable, then 
drafters would have been presented with the choice between either extending assistance to those 
most in need, namely the iron producers, or, because they were weak, ignoring them. So, the 
argument that the report reflected the self-interest of iron producers is difficult to sustain though 
not necessarily completely untrue. Without analysis or documentation that better addresses the 
causality link, this issue remains contentious. If one accepts that the recommendations were 
intended for the promotion of the industry as a whole, then the Club maintained its stance set in 
the Promotion Law as the industry’s representative.
Setting aside issues pertaining to bias, calls for the preferential treatment of pig iron 
producers was not a case of false alarm, as in short order a large swath of the pig iron producers 
disappeared. Whatever concern for pig iron producers did exist would not have been misplaced, 
and it was not the larger firms but the small scale producers who were in the direst straits. From 
this perspective, the Club’s call for government help was, at the centre, a call for help for the 
most vulnerable -  the small scale producer.
By the Club’s account, the demise of the pig iron firms was something that could have been 
prevented had government heeded its recommendations. One function of the writing of the in- 
house published histories of trade associations is to provide an opportunity for associations to 
make a case for their point of view on how events transpired regarding matters seen as
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important. In this sense, it may be argued that the Club wished to ensure for the record that it 
had carried out to the best of its ability its charge of representing the industry. From the 
perspective of the Club’s relationship with government, though in the end the report was 
ignored, the fact that cabinet members took the time to listen to business in private indicates the 
depth of the ties that its members had with at least the ruling party. Also, this suggests that in 
terms of the position of the Club in the unstated hierarchy of govemment-business relationships, 
the Club perceived itself as more than an outlying trade association in the scheme of 
government policy making.
The failure of the Club to shape government decisions is one of the few documented 
instances that demonstrates the limitations of the use of informal lines of communication. As 
was argued previously, during the Taishô and Showa periods, there was a shift from the exercise 
of these informal lines to a situation where formal lines (shingikai) were also being used. The 
degree to which private communication was used to achieve business ends is hard to pin down, 
as few records exist. In terms of efficacy, as little is concretely known and speculation easy, it is 
difficult to appraise claims that big business could dictate its own terms. Given the financial 
support provided by Mitsui and Mitsubishi for the two main political parties, their financial 
contribution to the Club, not to mention their vested interest in the industry, it is natural to 
assume that private discussions might have been, to some degree, effective. Perhaps the claim
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that big business could exact terms is a bit farfetched but it is reasonable to assume that due 
consideration would have been given by government to big business requests or suggestions. 
Hence, in this light, it is particularly striking that the emergency measures were ignored. This is 
an isolated incident and it would be dangerous to draw overarching conclusions from it, but it 
does call into question the assumption that big business, zaibatsu among others, could get what 
they wanted by simply walking into the offices of political friends, even when the stakes were 
high.
4. Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy^62
The Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy was set up 
in the post war upheaval. Economic turmoil brought government and business together to seek a 
solution to their mutual problems. Their concerns were both regarding the immediate economic 
situation but also because “[government] sought to establishment medium and long term policy 
in the post war period.”^^  ^Imperial Edict number 331, which outlined the regulations governing 
the Temporary Investigation Committee, was promulgated on 9 July 1919. This was followed 
by the first plenary session on 18 July 1919 and then ensued a nineteen-month period of
Note that documents used in the section “Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the 
Economy” are not paginated; page numbers have been assigned by me.
Yasui Kunio, Senkanki Nihon Tekkôgyô to Keizai Seisaku (Kyoto: Minerva, 1994), 63.
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discussions resulting in a detailed report on the iron and steel industry in February of 1921,
though the final report was not completed until 22 March 1924. The outline of committee
meetings and events pertinent to the iron and steel industry is as shown in Table 3.3:
Table 3.4 : Outline of Temporary Investigation Committee Meetings
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai Meeting
9 July 1919"” Establishment of the Temporary Investigation Committee
18 July 1919""" Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the 
Economy -  Plenary Session
10 Nov 1919 Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the 
Economy -  Consultation Number 3
29 Nov 1919
i
8 Nov 1920
Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the 
Economy -  Record of Special Committee, Consultation Numbers
3 & 4
14 Feb 1921 Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the 
Economy -  Consultation Numbers 3 & 4
Feb 1921 Report on Recommendations of Committee
22 Mar 1924""" Promulgation of final report
The list o f investigated topics reflects a broad agenda but those items that concern us 
here, are 1) Consultation Number 3 -  ‘What is the fundamental policy concerning the promotion 
of the iron and steel industry?’ and 2) Consultation Number 4 -  ‘What is the fundamental policy 
concerning the maintenance and development of the ship building industry’.
An important issue to draw out at this point is the place and function of the Temporary 
Investigation Committee in the chain of events that led to the promulgation of legislation. The 
title of this shingikai -  investigation -  suggests that the intention of this lengthy series of 
meetings was to fulfil a supplementary task in the overall policy making process; this, as we 
have seen, was in accordance with the legislated provisions of the shingikai. These meetings
^^Ibid., 59.
The start date of this session is not clear from the record, but Yasui gives this date.
Yasui Kunio, Senkanki Nihon Tekkôgyô to Keizai Seisaku, 59.
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were one of the first steps in the chain of events which suggests the shingikaVs function was 
preliminary exploration of the matters at hand. It is posited here that its early exploratory nature 
helps explain its relative absence of friction. If we recall similar meetings in the early stages of 
the process that led to the Promotion Law, friction only became evident as we approached the 
final house debates in June of 1917. In terms of its function as a forum for debate, the 
Temporary Investigation Committee, as we shall see, still provided that function but it was 
largely unexercised. Also, given the lack of expertise among committee members to adequately 
deliberate on many of the technical issues, subcommittees were formed to investigate such 
matters. Their reports were then presented as considered opinions to the Temporary 
Investigation Committee and carried weight as such. Though these reports were still subject to 
scrutiny, we may assume that where there is an acknowledged absence of understanding on a 
matter, “expert” opinion may tend to attenuate potential conflict between varying views.
A further observation relates to the notation of the meetings. The general charge 
levelled at the institution of the shingikai, as has been seen, is that it was an orchestrated façade. 
The shortcomings in the recording of these meetings helps support this position. As discussed in 
the introductory chapter, a large part of the records of the shingikai have been typeset, bound 
and are available in libraries. Though the records do not state where the meetings occurred, we 
can presume that they transpired in the formal setting of a committee room. In the case of the 
Temporary Investigation Committee, most of the records remain in their original form -  written 
with a brush -  and are held at the National Archives (Kokuritsu Kobun Shokan) in Takebashi, 
Tokyo. There do not exist stenographic notes of the Temporary Investigation Committee
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meeting o f the kind provided for the Lower and Upper House debates, as found in the case of 
the Promotion Law of 1917.^ *^ ’ In some instances the records provide what would appear to be 
verbatim accounts of discussions, but in the main, the records are limited to summaries of each 
speaker’s words. The records indicate that some of the meetings of the Temporary Investigation 
Committee were held in the official residence of the Prime Minister. Specifically, the records of 
the meetings of the Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy -  
Consultation Numbers 2 ,3 & 4 do not state where these meetings were held but they may have 
occurred at the Prime Minister’s official residence as well. If this is so, then this implied 
informality could be seen as underscoring the investigative nature implied by the title of the 
shingikai and further, possibly, suggest that it had limited aims.
Membership of the Committee was selected in September of 1919. It was composed, 
to a large degree, of the same members who deliberated over the Industrial Club’s 
recommendations.^^* The background of all committee members cannot be identified, however a 
sufficient portion are provided here in order to form preliminary conclusions. There were 28 
standing members, headed by Prime Minister Kara Kei as chairman and Takahashi Korekiyo 
and Yamamoto Tatsuo as vice-chairmen. There were also 29 temporary members who were 
called up on an individual basis to participate in discussions if their presence was required. 
Secretaries were drawn from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Home Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance (Tax Bureau chief and Finance Bureau chief) and the cabinet secretary.
This was confirmed to me by Okazaki Tetsuji.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 113.
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Table 3.5 Background of Leading Members of the Temporary Investigation Committee on
Name Prim ary
Occupation^^’
Background
Kara Kei 
Chairman
Politician 1895 Deputy Foreign Minister 
1897 President of Osaka Mainichi Company 
1900-1901 Minister of Communications 
1902-1921 Diet member
1906-1908,1911-1912,1913-1914, Home Minister 
1918 Prime Minister
Takahashi
Korekiyo
Vice-chairman
Banker
Financier
Politician
1905 Entered House of Peers (1924 resigned)
1906 President of Yokohama Specie Bank 
1911 President of Bank of Japan 
1913-1914,1918-1921 Finance Minister 
1921-1922 Prime Minister
1924-1925 Agriculture and Commerce Minister 
1927, 1931-1934, 1934-1936, Finance Minister
Yamamoto
Tatsuo
Vice-chairman
Financier
Politician
Employed by Mitsui 
1898-1903 president of Bank of Japan 
1903 Entered House of Peers 
1911 Finance Minister
1913-1914,1921 -22, Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce
Takahashi
Mitsutake
Committee
Member
Studied law and economics at the University of 
Cambridge
Commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce to do research 
Chief editor of Osaka Shinbun 
Chief secretary of Hara cabinet 
1908 elected to House of Representatives (re­
elected 8 times)
Kushida Manzo
Committee
Member
Banker 1894 Entered 119*** Bank 
1921 Chairman of the board of directors of 109* 
Bank
Numerous leading positions in Mitsubishi and 
Mitsui
Hashimoto
Keizaburô
Committee
Member
Businessman
Bureaucrat
1890-1913 Held number of prominent positions, 
among them head of Yokohama Customs, Vice- 
minister of Finance and. Agriculture and 
Commerce 
1912 Entered House of Peers 
1916-21 President of Takarada Oil 
1921 Vice-president of Japan Oil
Baron Go 
Seinosuke 
Committee
Businessman
Financier
1911 Chairman of Tokyo Stock Exchange 
1917 Managing Director Industrial Club of Japan 
1931 President of National Federation of Industrial
Category allocation was made according that assigned in the Asahi Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten and 
Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten. Those names that seemed most important have been included. Those not found 
above are: 1) Inutsuka Katsutaro, 2) Koga RenzS, 3) Hata Toyosuke, 4) Matsumoto Koichi, 5) Kamino 
Katsunosuke, and 6) Maeda Toshisada.
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Member Organisations 
1932 President of Japan Economic Federation
Count Hayashi 
Hirotarô 
Committee 
Member
1919 Professor at the University of Tokyo 
1914-1947 Member of House of Peers, 
participating in numerous committees 
1932-1935 President of the South Manchurian 
Railway Company
Baron Dan 
Takuma 
Committee 
Member
Manager 1888 Director of Mitsui owned Miike Coal Mine 
1914-1932 General Manager of Mitsui 
1916-1932 Director Industrial Club of Japan 
1928-1932 President of Japan Economic Federation
Suzuki
Umeshirô
Committee
Member
Mitsui Bank and Oji Paper Manufacturing 
Company 
Editor of Jiji Shimpo
Koyama Kenzo
Committee
Member
Businessman 1920 Entered House of Peers
Hamaguchi
Osachi
Committee
Member
Politician Elected to Diet in 1915 
1924-1926 Finance Minister 
1926-1927 Home Minister 
1927 President of Minseito 
1929 Formed own cabinet
Kajiwara Nakaji
Committee
Member
1922 (Oct.)-1927 (Oct.) President of Japan 
Industrial Bank
Yamaoka
Juntaro
Committee
Member
1914(Mar.)-1926 (Jan.)
President of Hitachi Shipbuilding
Yamazaki
Kakutaro
Committee
Member
Academic Dean of the Department of Economics, Tokyo 
Imperial University
Yokota
Sennosuke
Committee
Member
Politician 1913 Central role in the 2"  ^Movement for the 
Protection of the Constitution 
1918 Selected by Hara Kei as Director-General of 
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
1924(11 J u n e ) -1925 (5 Feb.)
Minister of Justice
Fujiyama Raita
Committee
Member
Businessman 1892 Entered Mitsui Bank 
Held managerial positions in various companies 
Formed the Fujiyama business group 
Entered House of Peers
Baron Den 
Kenjirô 
Committee 
Member
Bureaucrat
Politician
1903 Vice-minister of Communcations
1906 Entered House of Peers
1916 Minister of Communications
1919 Governor of Taiwan
1923 Minister of Agriculture and Commerce,
1926 Privy Councillor
Inoue Junnosuke Financier 1913 President of Yokohama Specie Bank
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Committee
Member
Politician 1919-1923,1927 Governor of Bank of Japan 
1923-1924,1929-1931 Minister of Finance
Okazaki
Kunisuke
Committee
Member
Politician 1891 Elected to House of Representative (10 times) 
1925 Minister of Agriculture 
1928 Entered House of Peers
Kataoka Naoteru Businessman Held various leading positions in Osaka located 
businesses, by Taishô period considered 
influential member of Osaka financial world. 
1918-1922 Osaka Industrial Committee chairman 
Entered House of Peers
Baron
Shibusawa
Eiichi
Committee
Member
Businessman 1873 founded First National Bank 
Noted promoter of industrial and commercial 
enterprises
Major role in introducing Western industries and 
Western techniques to Japan 
Maintained advisory role in the business world 
until his death in 1931
Sources: 1) Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Asahi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1994); 2) Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten 
(Asahi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1990); 3) Hunter, Concise Dictionary o f Modem Japanese History 
(University of California Press, London, 1984)
Though the table is incomplete, some observations can be made about the backgrounds of 
committee members. It is noteworthy that three members were at the time or would later in their 
careers become prime ministers. Seven participants had been or would later be cabinet 
ministers, and in several cases occupied ministerial posts a number of times. Similarly, if the 
categories o f ‘financier’, ‘businessmen’, ‘banker’ and ‘manager’ were drawn together, we would 
see that at least eight had or would hold executive level positions in major companies. In terms 
o f balancing membership between the two sides of the bicameral system, we see rough parity in 
terms of numbers: Hara Kei, Hamaguchi Osachi and Okazaki Kunisuke from the Lower House, 
and Takahashi Korekiyo, Yamamoto Tatsuo, Hashimoto Keizaburô, and Den Kenjirô from the 
Upper House, were representatives at the time of the deliberations.^^® The selection of 
committee membership suggests that importance was assigned to drawing together participants
370 Koyama Kenzo was appointed to the House of Peers during the deliberations in 1920.
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who were leading figures in their fields and to providing some balance between government and 
business representation in the broad sense. As was argued previously, there was a tendency for 
leading figures to have career paths that criss-crossed over the lines that delineated government 
and business. This observation would apply to these committee members as well and it would 
be difficult to make the case that the categories assigned above imply that other allegiances did 
not exist. However, the delineation between upper and lower house members, based on the role 
played in the debates on the Promotion Law, suggests that this distinction may be of 
significance.
It is notable that the Prime Minister headed this committee. His presence and 
participation in discussions suggests that his appointment was not merely symbolic. In turn, this 
lends credence to the claim that this shingikai was considered important and that the 
proceedings were less likely to be an orchestrated façade. If the outcome had been a foregone 
conclusion at the outset o f deliberations, it is unlikely that the Prime Minister would have 
juggled his schedule to sit on a committee where the talks made no difference. It is plausible 
that his name was on the list for publicity reasons, to suggest that the government was taking an 
active concern in the welfare of the various industries under consideration. However, it does not 
necessarily imply that his presence at the meetings was merely for form’s sake. The two are not 
mutually incompatible. Moreover, his active participation in the deliberations and the fact that at 
least some of the talks were held in his official residence suggests that whatever the public gain 
achieved by his presence, this shingikai was important and the discussions were also important. 
Also, the existence of a link between the informality of the setting, the reliance on summaries of
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exchanges, and the idea that this series of meetings was not viewed as important by its 
organizers, cannot be substantiated. On the contrary, the fact that business and government elites 
agreed to spend a considerable amount of their time deliberating also suggests that its members 
believed that they were engaging in something that was important and that their contribution 
was serving a larger end.
The Committee’s February 1921 report is conspicuous for its detail, outlined in its 5
points of recommendation relating to the iron and steel industry summarised below:
(1) The management and organisation of the iron and steel industry: It is recognized that there 
is a necessity for the administrative consolidation of the iron and steel industry.... it should 
be based on the aim of cooperation in e.g. the distribution of raw materials, income and 
production. It is possible to organise syndicates.
(2) i) The protection of the iron and steel industry: for pig iron, a 10% ad valorem tariff 
should be levied and on steel products a 15% ad valorem tariff should be levied. For steel 
materials that are used for ship construction, there should be an exemption from import tax. 
ii) Other forms of protection: With regards to the revision of the Iron and Steel Business 
Promotion Law, based on the provisions of the existing law, there should be an extension 
for 10 years on the exemption from business tax and income tax for present iron and steel 
producers. As for iron and steel producers which use electricity and low phosphorus pig 
iron producers, the protection of the Iron and Steel Business Promotion Law should be 
extended to them as well. As for the steel materials that are used by government sites, 
these sites should, in principle, use domestic produce. There should be protection for the 
transportation of products and raw materials over land and sea.
(3) Securing the supply of raw materials : For the securing of the supply of raw materials, we 
should plan for the promotion of the production of raw materials, conducting research into 
improving the transportation and effective use of raw materials ...
(4) Promotion of the development of iron and steel production technology: We should plan for 
uniform standards of products, training of engineers and workers, and to liase with research 
centres,
(5) Japanese participation in the iron and steel industry in Manchuria and elsewhere: Protection
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should also be granted to firms managed by Japanese in Manchuria and other places 
abroad, provided these firms do not impede the development of the industry in Japan 
itself/^'
The Committee’s proposed tariff schedule, of a 10% ad valorem tariff on pig iron and 15% ad
valorem on steel, was to supersede the current duties set by the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation between Great Britain and Japan. Established on 17 July 1911, and due to remain in
force for a period of 12 years until 16 July 1923, the treaty provided for tariffs to be levied on a
wide range of goods. In the case of pig iron and steel, the following specific duties applied.^’  ^
Table 3.6 Tariff rates under the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty
Item
Number
Description: Iron^ '^* Rate of Duty Under 
New Japanese 
Statutory Tariff 
(per 100 kin)
Rate of Duty Under 
New Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty 
Tariff (per 100 kin, 
est. 1911)
1 Pig Iron: In lumps, ingots, blooms, 
billets, and slabs
0.10 yen 0.083 yen
2 Plates and Sheets, not coated with 
metals, not exceeding 0.7 millimetres in 
thickness
0.40 yen 0.30 yen
3 Coated with base metals, tinned (tinned 
iron sheets and tinned steel sheets), 
ordinary
0.90 yen 0.70 yen
4 Coated with base metals, galvanized 
(corrugated or not)
2.00 yen 1.20 yen
Source: Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan together with a Prefactory 
Note and Appendices, p. 13.
The Treaty “provided for reductions of duty as compared with the rates of the new Japanese 
Tariff on certain important classes of manufactured articles, mainly textile and iron and steel
Tsüshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 208-09.
BPP, "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan Together with a Prefatory 
Note and Appendices," vol. Ciii, no. Cd. 5556 (1911): iv.
According to the Treaty, the term ‘iron’ is meant to include both pig iron and steel. Ibid.: 10. We can 
assume, however, that the items listed under points 2,3, and 4 referred to steel.
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goods, o f special interest to British trade on importation into Japan.” ’^'* The reduction on the 
tariff rates varied according to the product: in the case of pig iron, the new rate was 
approximately 20% lower and in the case of steel, it varied between 29% and 67%. This 
commercial treaty was the “result of negotiations between Great Britain and Japan consequent 
upon the denunciation on the 16* July, 1910, by Japan of the existing Treaty of 1894 (Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan) between the two countries.”^^  ^
Furthermore, given that duties were calculated on a specific weight basis and that pig iron and 
steel prices had increased significantly since 1911, the protection of the industry afforded by 
that rate had diminished. It was thus that “The purpose of this [Temporary Investigation 
Committee proposal] was to change the specific duty tax, that had largely lost its effectiveness 
given the sudden price increase during the war, to ad valorem tax, and in so doing increase its 
real level.”^^ ^
Given this price inflation based reduction in tariff protection, we may assume that a 
move to an ad valorem tariff base would have been welcomed by both pig iron and steel 
producers. As we will see later, in the case o f  pig iron, the government ignored the Committee’s 
recommendations and remained with a weight-based tariff. Though pig iron producers were in
Ibid.: iv.
Ibid.
Nagura Bunji, "Seitetsu Gôdô Seisaku to Sono Kiketsu," in Rydtaisenkan No Nihon Shihon Shugi, ed. 
Ando Yoshio (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1986), 482.
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tighter economic straits than steel producers in the 1920s, nonetheless there is little evidence in 
the debates, as we will see in the ensuing pages, to suggest pig iron discontent. The question 
may be raised as to whether the records reflected a sense of bias in favour of steel producers on 
the part of pig iron producers given the differential in the proposed tariff rates. If this sentiment 
did exist, it cannot be observed in the records. It is thus instructive to consider the difference as 
of 1922 in the level o f protection provided by a 10% ad valorem rate on pig iron versus the 
1911 specific duty o f 0.083 yen per 100 kin. The following two tables. Tables 3.8 and 3.9, deal 
with this comparison. The following calculations are based on Indian pig iron prices as India 
was the prime foreign competitor in Japan’s domestic pig iron market during the period under 
question. This comparison, though, is problematic as the available data on Indian pig iron 
prices, for example those figures provided in Gendai Nihon Sangyô Hattatsu Shi or Estimates o f 
Long-Term Economic Statistics o f  Japan Since 1868, would appear to include total delivery 
price. As Japanese tariff rates would have been assessed on Indian pig iron prices exclusive of 
the cost of transportation, it is necessary to differentiate the Indian production price from the 
price of India pig iron upon arrival in Japanese ports. For the year 1922, the total delivery cost 
of pig iron from India to Japan was located and is provided in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Detailed Comparison of Cost in 1922 of Indian and Japanese Pig Iron as Calculated
Production
Site
Production 
Price excl. 
ta riff price
Production
Price
including
Specific
Duty
Production
Price
including
Ad
Valorem
Duty
Total 
Delivery 
Cost of 
Pig Iron 
from 
India to 
Japan
Total Cost 
inc.
Specfic
Duty
Total 
Cost inc. 
Ad
Valorem
Duty
Tata (India) 33.11 34.49 36.42 19.15 53.64 55.57
Yawata (Production
Cost)
47.40
Kamaishi 56.21
Wanishi 53.44
Source: taken from Tsüshô Sangyôshô, Vol. 17, p.222
Notes: total delivery cost break down (yen per metric ton): 1) transport: 10.84 yen; 2) insurance: .40 yen; 
3) unloading cost: 3.50 yen; 4) transaction fee: 2.00 yen; 5) various expenses: 1.00 yen; tariff rate: 
specific duty of 1.38 yen per metric ton; ad valorem rate of 10%
Using the total delivery cost of 19.15 yen per metric ton as a constant, Indian pig iron 
production price is calculated in Table 3.8. The data set used for the construction of this table 
did not provide figures for 1919.
Table 3.8: Comparison of Average Price of Indian Pig Iron as Calculated by Specific Duty and
Year Indian
Production Price 
excl. ta riff price *
Price of Indian 
Pig Iron including 
Specific Duty of 
1.38 yen
Price of Indian Pig Iron 
including A d  Valorem 
rate of 10%
Japanese 
Price *
1920 (111)91.85 93.24 101.04 100.25
1921 (80) 60.85 62.23 66.94 74.85
1922 (56) 36.85 38.23 40.54 57.21
1923 (48) 28.85 30.23 31.74 53.47
1924 (52) 32.85 34.23 36.14 50.79
1925 (55)35.85 37.23 39.44 48.38
Source: (1) Gendai Nihon Sangyô Hattatsu Shi, Vol. 4 Tekkô, p. 210;
(2) Estimates o f Long-Term Economic Statistics o f Japan Since 1868, p. 232 
Note: The figures in parentheses are the non-adjusted prices for India pig iron which include total 
delivery costs. Indian production price of pig iron is calculated by subtracting delivery cost from the 
figure in parentheses: undifferentiated production cost -19.15 yen (delivery cost, see Table 3.7). The 
Indian production price of pig iron exclusive of tariff and delivery costs are those figures which follow 
the parentheses.
Though the figures for the year 1919, when the recommendations of the Temporary
Investigation Committee were released, are not available, it can be assumed that given the
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inflated price of pig iron due to the war, members of the committee anticipated a decline in 
prices over the years. In this sense, whatever arguments made by members regarding the 
appropriateness of the proposed tariff schedule, they would have been based on the assumption 
of at least a several year projection of declining pig iron prices. As we see in Table 3.8, the price 
of Indian pig iron when adjusted for both the 1911 specific weight based tariff rate, the ad 
valorem rate and the cost o f delivery was less than our upper and lower levels of domestic pig 
iron prices through out the entire 1920 -  1925 period. Therefore, neither of the two tariff rates 
were high enough to deter steel producers from purchasing Indian pig iron throughout the 
period. However, from the perspective of pig iron producers, it is questionable whether this 
difference would have been sufficient to make steel producers choose domestic pig iron. From 
the perspective of government, the difference was important in terms of revenue and the reasons 
why government did not implement the ad valorem rate are examined later. From the point of 
view of overall national benefit, the more expensive pig iron became the more the price o f steel 
products increased as well. As Imaizumi pointed out, “if cheap pig iron is used, then [its 
products] will be cheap.” ’^  ^More to the point, though, the relative absence of pig iron 
discontent may be, at least in part, attributed to the fact that neither o f the tariff rates were 
adequate. It is hardly likely that pig iron producers had resigned themselves at the outset o f the
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Shimon Dai San Oyobi Dai Yon Go," (Located at Kokuritsu Kobun 
Shokan, Tokyo (reference number 2A 36 286), 1921), 40.
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meetings to the probability that they would not receive the protection that they needed. Given 
the financial stakes at hand, such apathy on the part of pig iron producers is improbable. 
However, given that the secondary literature suggests that the recommendation of a 10% ad 
valorem tariff rate on pig iron was a significant improvement to make up for the eroded level of 
protection provided by the specific duty rate, we remain unable to adequately explain the 
relative absence of obvious pig iron discontent in the records of the Temporary Investigation 
Committee.
It may be argued, though, that the results of Table 3.8 are misleading in that what is 
being compared is the cost of Japanese pig iron and the production cost of India pig iron plus 
the tariff rate without adding to the price of Indian pig (including the tariff rate) the cost of 
transportation from India to Japan. Unless there were specific measures provided by 
government to carry this cost, which the records do not indicate, then it is reasonable to assume 
that steel producers would have included the transportation cost in determining calculations. 
Table 3.9 adds the cost of transportation of Indian pig iron at the rate cited in Table 3.7 to both 
the “Cost of Indian Pig Iron including Specific Duty” and the “Cost of Indian Pig Iron including 
Ad Valorem” taken from Table 3.8.
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Table 3.9 Comparison of Cost of Indian Pig Iron Including Tariff Rate and Cost of 
Transportation (yen per metric ton)
Year Cost of Indian Pig 
Iron including 
Specific Duty of 
1.38 yen and Cost of 
Transportation
Cost of Indian Pig 
Iron including A d  
Valorem rate of 
10% and Cost of 
Transportation
Japanese Price
1920 112.39 120.19 100.25
1921 81.38 86.09 74.85
1922 57.38 59.69 57.21
1923 49.38 50.89 53.47
1924 53.38 55.29 50.79
1925 56.38 58.59 48.38
Sources: (1) Tsüshô Sangyôshô^ Vol. 17, p.222;
(2) Gendai Nihon Sangyô Hattatsu shi. Vol. 4 Tekkô, p. 210;
(3) Estimates o f Long-Term Economic Statistics o f Japan Since 1868, p. 232.
According to calculations of Table 3.9, apart from 1923, the cost to Japanese steel producers of 
using Indian pig iron when the transportation cost was included was consistently higher than the 
price of domestically produced pig iron. This suggests that Indian pig iron would not necessarily 
have posed a threat to domestic producers. It is argued here, however, that these results should 
be treated with caution. The above calculations are not based on a broad range of sources. It is 
also conspicuous that the results conflict with the arguments located in the secondary literature 
and the contents of shingikai discussions, which will be examined shortly. A further potential 
source of error to these figures relates to the cost of transportation. The figure used is based on 
one source, and that only for 1922. What is clear is that the records of the shingikai meetings 
indicate a concern for the threat posed by Indian pig iron -  a threat that was based on both
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private sector and government perceptions that Indian pig iron was cheaper than domestic 
produce. The upshot of the results here suggest that Indian pig iron was not necessarily always 
cheaper than that produced in Japan.
5. Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy -  Plenary 
Session
At this plenary meeting on 18 July 1919 draft proposals in relation to items for 
Consultation Number 3 -  ‘What is the fundamental policy concerning the promotion of the iron 
and steel industry?’ and Consultation Number 4 -  ‘What is the fundamental policy concerning 
the maintenance and development of the ship building industry’ were distributed. Following this 
the chairman selected the names for a 13 member special committee^^* to investigate the above 
issues number 3 and 4. Subsequent to the break up of the plenary meeting, these members met 
and chose among themselves a committee chairman. The ensuing details of the records 
consulted here outline the dates of the meetings and the issues that were dealt with which will 
be handled in the following section.
The transparency of whatever decision making process may have occurred within this
It is not clear in the documents what is the significance of the term “special members”. It is presumed 
that these members were selected fi"om the general assembly. Also, it is not clear who drafted the 
proposals. It is presumed that this was drafted by bureaucrats.
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investigative forum is difficult to discern. By contrast, the proceedings of the Promotion Law, 
commencing in the early days with business and government establishing their respective 
positions, right through to the final hours of debate, can be seen, in historical perspective, to 
have culminated in the ad hoc subcommittee decisions. This Investigative Committee was 
decidedly less obvious in whatever decision making path it may have followed. It is possible 
that to the participants at the time, there was an overarching direction in their discussion and 
that the exchange of ideas was part of a decision making process that was reflected in the final 
recommendations, but the records, such as they are, reflect very little o f this. Given that the bulk 
of the documents are summaries, it is frequently difficult to follow how one idea flowed into the 
next and see any progression. Furthermore, the discernment of friction, our litmus test of 
expectation, is all the more difficult to identify. We need to bring together disparate evidence in 
the absence of clearly focussed debates. Discussions sometimes revealed the lack of expertise 
among participants to deal with the issues. Given the lack of records of these meetings, if indeed 
the deliberations had been recorded, the proceedings of these meetings are not particularly 
helpful in providing valuable insight into what considerations were taken into account in the 
decisions, and in helping us make sense of the subsequent discussions.
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6. Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy -  Consultation 
Number 3
On 10 November 1919, the committee^^^ met and opening remarks were provided by
Yamamoto Tatsuo, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, who presided as vice chairman.
Falling in line with the pattern of earlier meetings, the first words dealt with delimiting the topic
of discussion which in this case was “the promotion of the iron and steel industry” and
“maintenance and development of the shipping industry”.^ *® He announced that there were to
have been 24 participants in this committee but one additional member, Shirani Takeshi, had
joined. The membership list for this committee was not provided and hence it is difficult to
assess, in terms of membership, the relationship between this committee and that of the 13
member special committee.
The concern in this meeting, which consisted of the preliminary raising of a number of
issues, was the need to find ways of securing and protecting industry. Though the protection of
industry was the topic of discussion, the contents of the exchanges between members was not
drawn together by a common theme or argument. Differing points of view were raised but they
did not develop into sustained focal points of discussion. A matter would be raised and, without
The documents do not state the relationship between the membership of this committee and that of the 
full committee. It is assumed that the 25 members for Consultation Number 3 are also members of the full
committee.
380 Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Giji Sokki Roku - Dai Ni Go," (Located at Kokuritsu Kobun Shokan, 
Tokyo (reference number 2A 36 278), 1919), 5.
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apparently any conclusion to the discussion, members would move on to another topic. In 
consequence, the following section is limited to relating the essence of the discussions and 
gleaning from that whatever relevance it may have had for our purposes here. Discussions 
commenced with the important issue of pig iron. One of the secretaries of the committee, 
Sakikawa^*\ provided a summary of the increase in demand for iron and steel in 1918 and the 
consequent shortages:
Table 3.10:] Demand for Iron and Steel in 1918
Pig Iron Steel materials Iron Ore
Demand 832,000 tons (including raw 
materials for steel production)
1,173,000 tons 997,000 tons
Domestic
Production
606,000 tons 540,000 tons 398,000 tons
Imports 226,000 tons 633,000 tons 237.000 tons from 
Korea
362.000 tons from 
China
Source: Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai “Giji Sokki Roku -  Dai Ni Go (Located at Kokuritsu Kobun Shokan, 
Tokyo, 1919, pp. 12-14)
The upshot of Sakikawa’s exposé was that the level of the import of iron ore was very high. 
Furthermore, he anticipated that this would increase and consequently there was a need for a 
secure supply of iron ore to be established.^*^ Given this, he asserted, it was necessary for 
government to closely examine access to foreign raw materials for iron production, steel and 
coal. To this end, an investigation was underway to examine the possibilities offered overseas. 
In total, 13 countries were to be considered, among them were Siberia, China, Sakhalin, and the
The record does not provide his first name.
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Giji Sokki Roku - Dai Ni Go," 16.
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South Pacific area.^*  ^Sakikawa’s emphasis on establishing secure sources of raw materials was 
reiterated again by Go Seinosuke, He asserted that this was the most important issue, and 
followed by raising the point that it was necessary “also to consider the problem of planning the 
amalgamation of the iron and steel industry... because these problems are fundamental 
problems.” *^'^  Go’s suggestion to expand the remit of discussion met with disapproval from 
Yamamoto, who maintained that amalgamation was not to be handled here.^*^
At this point then we see perception that it was necessary to establish secure sources of 
raw material. Go, a leading representative of the iron and steel industry and a sewanin of the 
zaikai, echoed these sentiments and raised the topic of amalgamation. Though the topic was not 
pursued because Yamamoto did not want to expand the scope of discussion, this does not 
necessarily mean that amalgamation was viewed negatively by government. At this point, 
Wakamiya^ ®*^ , another secretary of the committee, opened the discussion on the other topic of 
this committee, namely the shipping industry. Economic considerations were also of prime 
concern in this sector. Through the war related strains on the iron and steel industry, ship 
building too was experiencing a shortage of steel. An argument was made that, comparatively 
speaking, the demands on capital were higher and this was compounded by the fact that
19.
^^Ubid., 28.
29-30.
First name not known.
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domestic interest rates were high and domestic production skills weak; however, he added, 
wages were also low.^*  ^This pressing nature of the economic situation, provided the 
wherewithal to sustain discussion, but here we see to an even greater degree the movement 
between topics and inconclusiveness of discussion on any one issue.
Suzuki Umeshirô, an editor of Jiji Shinpô and associated with Mitsui Bank and Oji 
Paper Manufacturing Company, pointed out the ambiguity in the term ‘ship building materials’, 
as it covered both steel and ship fittings, the point being that the resources needed for both 
overlap. Thus, the distinction made by Wakamiya was facile, the upshot being that “it is 
difficult to have tariffs that apply only to the production of large war ships.” ®^* Wakamiya 
provided a seeming non sequitur response by shifting the focus to the revival of the ship 
building industry and Ship Building Encouragement Law. Suzuki responded by expressing 
doubts about whether tax exemption on ship building materials and ship fittings would be 
sufficient for the industry to compete with the United States and various European countries. 
Something else was needed, he claimed, and added that “my impression is that the government 
is thinking in this way. Is this so?” *^^  At this point Yamamoto announced that the issues raised 
thus far would be addressed in a special subcommittee composed of 13 members which he
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Giji Sokki Roku - Dai Ni Go," 40-41. 
^^Ubid., 76.
389 Ibid., 80-81.
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“would like to select” at that time.
Thus, in this initial discussion of the steel and ship building industries, it is clear that, 
though still at the preliminary stages, thus business was receptive to the government’s interest in 
implementing protection and that the iron and steel, and shipbuilding industries were seen as 
being closely linked. Also, as has been seen a number of times, there remained great concern 
over the precariousness of Japan’s dependency on the foreign supply of resources. The 
establishment of secure sourcing from a country near Japan was seen as preferable to reliance 
on Western suppliers. The economic difficulties experienced by the private sector at the time, 
echoed in the words above, and their expressed interest in tariff protection and amalgamation 
suggest a strategic approach of accommodation in dealing with government.
7. Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy -  Record of the 
Special Committee on Consultation Numbers 3 & 4
Following Yamamoto’s closing remarks, the committee chairman^^^ of the Special
Ibid., 89. As a 13 member committee was also selected on 18 July, it raises the question what is the 
relationship between that committee and Yamamoto’s committee. As Yamamoto stated that he “would like 
to select” the 13 members, this implies that the two committees are different. However, this argument 
hinges on the accuracy of the records which perhaps should not be assumed.
The chairman’s name is not mentioned but Hara Kei was listed chairman at the outset of the first 
meeting.
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Committee on Consultation Number 3& 4 selected 13 persons^^^ to form a special committee, 
who then broke off and selected among themselves a committee chairman. The record does not 
indicate how the 13 members were selected. It appears that though there was a chairman of the 
committee under which the steel and ship building issues were handled, Okazaki Kunisuke was 
in charge of the iron and steel industry issue (Consultation Number 3) and Inutsuka Katsutarô of 
the ship building industry (Consultation Number 4). The following week on Wednesday, 19 
November 1919, the 13 member special committee met for the first time and subsequently held 
meetings on a weekly basis. On 3 December, the 3"* meeting of the 13 member special 
committee, the ihotion was made to form a subcommittee and its 7 members were selected by 
the chairman. On December 10* this 7 member subcommittee considered two plans, the 
author(s) of which were not stated. On the 17* of December the results were presented to the 13 
member special committee which made a decision^^^ upon the 7 member subcommittee’s 
comments. The results of this were in turn returned to the 7 member subcommittee and they met 
10 times in 1920 between January 15* and October 6*. The conclusions of their deliberations 
were thereafter presented to the 13 member special committee, which considered the results 
during six meetings between 13 October and 8 November 1920.^ ^^ * Some minor amendments
The records are not in agreement on the issues of by whom and when this 13 member special 
committee was selected. As implied above by Yamamoto’s intention to select the committee, membership 
would have been determined by himself. However, according to the record of the special committee itself, 
committee membership was selected by the committee chairman of the special committee. The 
documents do not provide sufficient detail to clarify this ambiguity.
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Sokai," (Located at Kokuritsu Kobun Shokan, Tokyo (reference number 
2A 36 294), 1919), 3. The record indicates ‘decision’ (^Æ ) which suggests the subcommittee’s remit 
extended beyond its deliberative role normally assigned to it. Perhaps a less literal interpretation is 
required here and the word ‘decision’ would be better understood to be that the subcommittee deliberated 
on the agenda and then formulated their opinion.
The details of these six meetings are not provided in the record.
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were made and a proposal was eventually adopted.
Deliberations of the Special Committee and its subcommittee thus took place over 
approximately one year. Their remit was to carefully consider the issues at hand and make 
proposals. In other words, deliberations were still at the exploratory stage and these were fora 
providing the opportunity for participating members to express an opinion. Given the prolonged 
period during which members met, frequently meetings began with a reading of a prepared 
summary of the previous deliberation. Whether it be a résumé or otherwise, the norm was to 
commence discussions with a prepared point of departure. The ensuing discussions would 
revolve around particular elements of what had been said without a clear agenda forming the 
structure of the talks. Though the recapitulations were provided in a condensed form in the 
records, the proposals were not. Moreover, as previously stated, the documents are not a 
verbatim record of what was said. Hence, we are left with a clerk’s interpretation of the 
highlights of a discussion that moved, indeed at times would appear to have roamed, from topic 
to topic. During the roughly two hours before tea, for example, a discussion might start with a 
statement on the iron and steel industry, then shift to the shipping industry and conclude on 
amalgamation, all falling within the parameters of what the committee had been charged to 
examine. However, the records in themselves do not provide a detailed understanding of any 
one issue. This differs from the case of the Iron and Steel Promotion Law for, in the main, its 
documents provide a much closer record of what was actually said, and various versions of the 
Law are still available. In other words, the historian is afforded a more complete picture.
Be that as it may, records of the Special committee and subcommittee do allow insight into
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what was perceived as important by members. In this light, three predominant issues of the 
year-long talks will be considered: 1) secure source of raw materials; 2) relationship of the iron 
and steel industry and the shipping industry; and 3) tariffs and amalgamation. These points fall 
under the rubric of the welfare of the iron and steel industry. Similar to the final report of the 
British Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy after the War, discussions here reflected 
a concern for the larger question of what could be done to protect and encourage the industry as 
a whole in the economic upheaval of the post-war period. Though in the end, the Temporary 
Investigation Committee recommended specific and detailed changes, ostensibly at least, their 
aims were not to promote one sector of the industry over another. It is suggested that the relative 
lack of friction observed in these discussions, beyond simply the fact that they were 
investigative in nature, may have been a result of the perception that solutions had to be found 
to problems that transcended specific sectoral concerns. This stands in contrast to the Promotion 
Law and this difference was reflected in the debates themselves. Though the Law aimed at 
promoting the industry as a whole, the tonnage issue was about who was going to win and who 
was going to lose. This in turn cleaved the industry representatives. These three issues noted 
above, however, were less about sectoral concern and more about finding the best way forward 
for the industry - whether the firms be big or small, or privately or government owned - and the 
country as a whole. Certainly the economics of the industry provided sufficiently divisive 
arguments for pig iron producers to have fomented heated discussions, but the fact that such 
discussions were largely absent suggests that either pig iron interests were being addressed 
elsewhere, in an informal manner or otherwise. Alternatively, the collective voice of pig iron
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interests in these shingikai meetings was weak. In either case, despite the relative absence of 
friction in this case did not result in pig iron producers being overlooked in the 
recommendations.
1) Secure source of resources^^^
The need to establish links with sites that would provide the raw materials for the 
manufacture of pig iron and steel has been seen in the debates of the Promotion Law. It was 
seen that “From the perspective of national defence, the promotion of the iron and steel industry 
is extremely important. This is a fundamental policy.” Later, Ôkôchi Masatoshi raised the 
question of whether Korea or China could be relied upon during times of war or national 
emergency. In oblique fashion, the committee chairman indicated that every effort would be 
made to defend Japan’s home waters. Imaoka Junichiro followed by indicating that the defence 
of Japan’s industrial interests must be researched.^^^ Notwithstanding these economic and 
military strategic ramifications, little time was devoted to this issue. It was raised only once 
during the duration of the talks, implying that other matters were seen as more pressing.
2) The iron and steel and shipping industries
The point of departure for discussions on the shipping industry was the impending 
expiry of the Ship Building Promotion Law. The Law was first introduced in March of
For details on measures considered for the establishment of secure resources in China, see Nagura 
Bunji, Nihon Tekkôgyô Shi No Kenkyü, 15-46.
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Shimon Dai San Go Oyobi Dai Yon Go Tokubetsu linkai Gijiroku," 
(Located at Kokuritsu Kobun Shokan, Tokyo (reference number 2A 36 268), 1919), 27-29.
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1896 and was to be in effect for a 15 year period. However, in March of 1909 it was revised 
and extended for 10 years starting in 1910. It was to have lapsed on the last day in 
December of 1919, but an emergency imperial order extended it until January of the next 
year, i.e. one month later.^^^
Discussion was devoted to clarifying factual and fundamental matters pertaining 
to the shipping industry. With regards to the comparative cost of shipping in Japan, for 
example, a separate committee had been formed to investigate the matter. Though the 
results of the investigation were available, the associated figures were apparently not. From 
the perspective of shipping, Imaizumi inquired about the availability of figures related to 
the cost of steel. Inuzuka Katsutarô, a committee member, followed by questioning the pros 
and cons with regards to the maintenance of shipping and shipbuilding in Japan and in 
comparison to other countries. Still along the lines of clarification, Imaoka drew out the 
point that there was a need for greater understanding of the relationship between the price 
of steel for shipping and the impact on the steel industry as a whole.^^® At a different point, 
Inuzuka raised the issue of establishing a mechanism for providing funding for the ship 
building industry. In short, discussion was still at the exploratory stage with concern for 
clarification of points. Talk could move quickly from one issue to the next without debate
6.
32-33.
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lodging over particular sticking points.
By late 1919 the fillip to the industry afforded by the war was on the wane, and the 
long term growth of the industry was in question. Chida and Davies make clear in their 
assessment that the Shipbuilding Promotion Law was ineffective in developing the industry, 
suggesting that given the poor performance of the law, once the main stimulus for growth, 
namely the war, had largely disappeared, the future of the industry was decidedly unclear. The 
committee record is insufficient to allow us to know how it judged the efficacy of the law, 
stating that “the question of whether the gradual growth over the years of the industry can be 
attributed to the law can wait... [but what can be claimed is that] remarkable development was 
based on the impact of World War The overall aim of the inquiry into the shipping 
industry was to ensure a long term plan be brought in to provide for continued growth, in 
particular given the broader ramifications that touched on national defence, trade and the 
general welfare of the nation.'*®*
3) Tariffs and amalgamation
With regards to the issue of tariffs, as seen also in the above selections, many of the 
exchanges dealt with understanding the mechanics of tariff implementation and, the associated
Tomohei Chida and Peter N. Davies, The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries (London: 
Athlone, 1990), 17, 26, 34.
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Shimon Dai San Go Oyobi Dai Yon Go Tokubetsu linkai Gijiroku," 6. 
Ibid, 6-7.
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implications, and were also marked by an apparent relative harmoniousness of discussions. This 
harmony suggests that there was a tacit agreement or consensus regarding the appropriateness of 
tariff implementation and what remained to be discussed was the detail. As we have seen, the 
Industrial Club of Japan was in favour of protection. Furthermore, its president, Dan Takuma, 
personally held the opinion that “the establishment of a protective policy of increasing tariffs 
and lowering transportation charges etc. was necessary.” °^^  According to the interpretation of 
Okazaki Tetsuji, Shirani Takeshi, the director of Yawata, held the opinion regarding tariff 
implementation that since the cost of domestic steel was higher than that from abroad, it would 
be better to focus on rationalization to reduce production costs.^ ®^  Okazaki’s assessment is based 
on Shirani’s report “Opinion on Japan’s Iron and Steel Industry”, published in November of 
1922. However, Okazaki further mentions that in the previous year, Shirani had already 
opposed the increase in tariffs.^®  ^The degree to which Shirani’s views had influence over 
participating members is difficult to assess, but it can be pointed out that he was not a member 
of the Temporary Investigation Committee, while Dan was. The records, though, do not reflect 
Dan’s opinion on the matter. It is equally difficult to assess whether Dan sought to influence 
opinion, and if so, the degree to which he was successful, during unrecorded exchanges between
Okazaki Tetsuji, "1920 Nendai No Tekkôgyô Seisaku to Nihon Tekkôgyô - Seitetsu Gôdô Mondai G 
Chüshin Toshite," Tochi Seido Shigaku 103 (1984): 2.
5.
^Ib id .
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sessions, during meals or other informal moments.
It is clear from the records that specific proposals existed, but the contents of these 
proposals are unknown. In the early days of the discussions many of the talks revolved around 
stating what was the state of the iron and steel industry, in particular the situation with regards 
to Yawata. Sakikawa, one of the secretaries, indicated that the proposal stated that the protective 
tariff should be raised to 25%. Hata asked about the details of protecting steel manufacture."*®^
Regarding the impact of the implementation of protection measures. Go argued that it 
was dangerous for the national economic situation to be importing steel. Though the export of 
silk provided a compensatory effect, such imports were dangerous for the trade balance.^®  ^
Counter arguments based on the need for protection and the fact that Japan was in a crisis 
situation were made by OkOchi.^ ®^  Though limited, the difference of opinion points to the 
obvious, namely that this was not a homogeneous group. The records, such as they are, reflect a 
general agreement on how to deal with the economic situation but this does not imply that 
variations in views did not exist. Thus, though sectoral concerns were raised in some of the 
exchanges on these three issues, in the main their scope and implications transcended this level. 
National defence, the strategic aspects of ensuring secure lines of communication to maintain
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Shimon Dai San Go Oyobi Dai Yon Go Tokubetsu linkai Gijiroku," 19-
21 .
^ /W .,4 6 .
Ibid., 47.
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industrial production and the rationalization of an industry which, as will be shown, was seen to 
suffer from inefficiencies, were at the forefront of discussions.
Clear limitations on the role of the shingikai, resulting in particular from the 
constraints imposed by prevailing economic conditions, can be seen over the issue of 
amalgamation. The importance of this issue is underscored by the fact that it warranted the 
lobbying of government by business members. Government approval was also necessary for its 
implementation. At the outset o f discussions there was little mention o f amalgamation; only 
near the end of the talks did Imaoka ask Imaizumi about what he knew of government opinion 
regarding the matter. Imaizumi replied that "it is a matter requiring the approval o f the Minister 
of Finance, and also Shibusawa [Eiichi] will talk with Prime Minister Hara and the Minister of 
Finance.”"”^ * Discussion became more specific once members turned to the issue of 
amalgamation. They had before them a number of proposals, and debate revolved around the 
relative merits of these proposals. There were queries regarding Yawata’s ability to adapt to 
war-related demands. Imaizumi stated that in his opinion, Yawata would be able to modify 
output to match demand shifts. He also raised two main points that he believed deserved 
consideration: 1) when would amalgamation be most convenient, as the optimal timing for 
companies to amalgamate would not all be the same; and 2) securing the supply of resources,
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which was a problem for Japanese sites, was an important first step in the amalgamation
409process.
8. Temporary Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy -  Consultation 
Numbers 3 & 4
On 14 February 1921 the Committee sat for the last time and at its conclusion a report 
was produced delivering a number of recommendations. As in previous meetings, there was a 
range of agenda items. Among them was the investigation of possible solutions to the 
difficulties experienced by the iron and steel industry and the shipping industry. For the most 
part, exchanges again revolved around the clarification of particular points, and the issues raised 
do not seem to have been particularly divisive. Members had before them drafts of the 
recommendations that were to be delivered. Opportunity was given to members to take the 
floor. Judging by the limited number of speakers on record, not all availed themselves of this 
opportunity. There were a few instances where a point raised by one person was followed up by 
the next, but in most instances, it would appear that the tendency was rather that when given the 
opportunity to speak, a member would have already prepared his comments on a point or two
^  Ibid., 55-56.
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taken from the draft and would then make his case. Following this, the next point would be 
raised, the focus of which often appeared to be independent of what came before. In other 
words, the questions raised or points made did not follow an obvious pattern.
The two principle issues at the meeting were again tariffs and amalgamation. In 
relation to tariffs, the questions were one-off statements of objection or points of clarification. 
One reason for this disjointed flow of questions may be attributed to the technical nature of the 
issues. Yamamoto, the vice chairman of the committee, opened the session, which was followed 
by a summary of the preceding meetings that had produced the drafts of the two plans that were 
now before them, namely those dealing with the iron and steel industry and the shipping 
industry respectively. Yamamoto indicated that there were a number of problems experienced in 
the subcommittee meetings'**® in which he had participated. The principle problem was that the 
issues required specialist knowledge for competent discussion and Yamamoto admitted that “he 
did not at all have the knowledge to deal with either of the plans.” *^* Later in his introductory 
briefing, he indicated that the “plans were extremely technical.” *^^  It may well be that part of the 
reason for the absence of debate was that members lacked the knowledge fully to comprehend 
the issues and hence often limited themselves to points of clarification.
A further reason for the lack of debate was that it was understood that this forum was
'**® The contents of these subcommittee discussions are not included in the records. 
Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Shimon Dai San Oyobi Dai Yon Go," 5.
28.
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divided into two sections, the first of which was designated for questions, while at a later point, 
time would be given to the raising of objections. In cases where the speaker had crossed the line 
between question and objection, he was reminded to restrain himself. One example where Prime 
Minister Hara intervened was when Asano^* ,^ a committee member, raised objections to a 
previous discussion regarding am alg^ation. Prime Minister Hara followed Asano’s remarks by
reminding him that this was not the time to enter into debates.
We still have not entered into arguments. This is the question period,,.
[followed by Asano]
I have stated what I wanted to say.'**'*
The delineation between the question period and that which was designated for objections to be 
raised is also seen later in Uchida’s response to Imaoka’s comments on the development of the 
shipping industry. Uchida stated that he was not satisfied with his explanation but would wait 
until later to raise the matter again."**’ Self-restraint was exercised by the committee members in 
the points that they made and where ‘transgressions’ occurred they were reminded of the 
inappropriateness of their comments.
Thus, the contents of the final meeting of the Temporary Investigation Committee was 
similar to those of the previous subcommittee records examined, in that members were 
presented with draft proposals and questions were raised regarding the contents. The principle
'**’ The record does not provide his first name.
'**'* Rinji zaisei keizai chosakai, "Shimon Dai San Oyobi Dai Yon Go," 112. 
135.
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aim of this long deliberation process was to explore particular issues and produce 
recommendations; though differing opinions may have existed regarding how best to solve a 
particular problem, the records rather reflect the investigative aspect of the discussions. For 
reasons of the technical nature of the issues or otherwise, much of the exchanges were about 
clarification and when objections were raised, they were not sustained by other members 
coming along side. Hence, there was no discernible interest grouping of members as seen in the 
case of the Promotion Law of 1917, which clearly demarcated Lower and Upper House 
participants.
In terms of furthering our understanding of government and business relations and the 
associated role played by the shingikai, the fact that leading government and business figures 
debated and sat through a lengthy 19 month period of meetings must be significant. As with 
most leading figures in such circles, demands on time were considerable and these individuals 
would be unlikely to commit to activities perceived to be ineffective and wasteful of time. 
Though obligation and honour may have accounted for the presence of businessmen in the short 
run, this argument is more difficult to sustain when meetings carried on over many months. The 
upshot is that their presence suggests that they believed there was something to be gained 
through the exchanges made in meetings of the Temporary Investigation Committee. Though 
the records reflect limited friction in the discussions, something identified in the meetings of the
227
Promotion Law of 1917 to indicate business expectations, this does not necessarily mean that 
the relatively limited conflict here indicated the opposite, that is, that business entered the 
meetings believing that there was nothing to be gained. A further point is that the most heated 
debates that emerged in the series o f Promotion Law meetings only did so in the very final 
stages, when reaching a compromise position had become a matter of urgency. Prior to this 
point, during the investigative stages, debate was much less pronounced, and the same was true 
of the Temporary Investigative Committee. It seems that, as might be expected, participants in 
preliminary discussions may have felt that regardless o f whatever stake they may have had in 
the matter it was wiser to take a stand only later when discussions had developed. The fact that 
prominent actors sat through 19 months of discussions in which friction was limited reinforces 
the point that they believed the shingikai forum to be more than an arena to hammer out 
compromises. Even though only investigative in nature, the time sacrificed to exchange views 
strongly suggests that the shingikai was viewed as a valuable forum for business in contributing 
to the policy formulation process.
In contrast to the divisive nature of the tonnage issue in the Promotion Law, the tariff 
issue, which will be discussed in the next section, was a different matter. The case for protection 
of both iron and steel producers had been advanced by Imaizumi and then later by the Club, 
without substantial preference being expressed for one side over the other. Similarly, during the
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Temporary Investigation Committee meetings, there is little evidence to suggest that protection 
was an issue that divided pig iron producers from those of steel, or private sector from 
government. Underscoring this point is the fact that it was only at the end of the discussions that 
specific tariff figures emerged, and these would have afforded protection to both pig iron and 
steel producers.
9. Proposal for the Revision of the T ariff Rate Law and the Proposal for the Revision of 
the Iron and Steel Business Promotion Law
In March 1921, the committee of the House of Representatives of the 44* Diet session 
was composed to deliberate on two basic provisions, which were the “Proposed Revision of the 
Tariff Rate Law” and “Proposed Revision of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law”. 
Subsequently, the House of Peers received and deliberated on the revision of the Iron and Steel 
Industry Promotion Law. Table 3.11 outlines the sequence of meetings.
Table 3.11 : Outline of Meetings on the Tariff Rate Law and the Iron and Steel Industry 
Promotion Law
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai Meeting
T ariff Rate Law
March Ig"", 
1921
Record of the Committee of the 44* (4*) of Imperial Diet House of 
Representatives: Committee Records of the Proposed Revision of the Tariff
The record of this shingikai (19 March 1921) indicates that on the previous day, 18 March, the 
Committee chairman had been selected.
229
to
March 22. 
1921
Rate Law (Proposed Revision of the Tariff Rate Law and the Proposed 
Revision of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law)
Iron and Steel Business Promotion Law
March 23, 
1921 
to
March 25, 
1921
Records of the Committee of the 44*“ (2"“) Imperial Diet House of Peers: The 
Special Committee for the Proposed Revision of the Iron and Steel Business
Promotion Law
March 24, 
1921 
to
March 25, 
1921
Stenographic Records of Proceedings of the Committee of the 44*^  (3***) of 
the Imperial Diet House of Peers: Stenographic Notes of the Proceedings of 
the Special Committee for Proposed Revision of the Iron and Steel Business
Promotion Law
As a general observation, it is with the start of the lower and upper house debates that 
the investigation phase of the proceedings ended. However, the process by which the lower and 
upper house debates arrived at a final position on the revision of the pig iron and steel tariff 
rates, and on the revision of the Promotion Law, is not clear. We know that though the 
recommendation of the Temporary Investigation Committee for the revision of the steel tariff 
rate was accepted, the recommended tariff protection was not extended to pig iron producers.
Yet, despite what would appear to be reasonable grounds for pig iron producers to 
express discontent, the overall tenor of the debates was still one of harmony. Matters pertaining 
to the revision of the Promotion Law were discussed alongside tariff rate issues and the 
meetings handled the topics in parallel fashion. This administrative procedure underscores the 
relatedness of the two issues and perhaps also indicates that it was foreseen that little debate 
would arise. This was at least true in the matter of the Promotion Law, which received
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comparatively little attention in the lower house, while greater attention was extended to the 
revision of the tariff schedule.
9.1 The Lower House Debate
The lower house discussions were spread over a two day period. Early in the talks 
during the first day, the issue of the Promotion Law was raised. In response to the request by 
Sashida Yoshio, the committee chairman, for an explanation of the proposal for the revision of 
the Promotion Law, Sakikawa Saishirô, the bureau chief of the mining section of Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce, outlined that the Promotion Law could be broken down into two 
parts (article number 4). The first part dealt with an extension of the existing law to cover those 
sites which were powered by electricity and the second part dealt with assisting steel makers 
who provided materials for shipbuilding and the repair of ships.'**^  Though these issues were to 
be re-visited in the upper house debates, here in the ensuing hours of the lower house meetings 
they received little further attention. Judging by the amount of time devoted to discussion, the 
topic of the tariff revision was perceived to be of greater importance.
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kanzei Teiritsuhôchû Kaisei Hôritsuan Gai Ichi Ken (Kanzei Teirituhôchü 
Kaisei Houritsuan, Seitetsugyo Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan) linkai Giroku (Hikki, Sokki) Dai Ichi 
Kai~Ni Kai - Dai 44 Kai Teikoku Gikai, vol. 30, Teikoku Shugi Shûgiin linkai Giroku - Dai 44 Kai Gikai 
(4) (1920-1921) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 138.
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Kômuchi Tsunetaka, a secretary of the Ministry of Finance, began the discussions 
outlining the government position on the proposed tariff rate revision. Though its position on 
steel is quite clear, the reasons for its acceptance of the recommendation on the steel tariff rate 
were not.
In these talks, the issue at hand is the revision of the tariff schedule and with regards to this steel 
is the most important point.'*** Considering the significance of steel tariff in the promotion of 
Japan’s iron and steel industry, we must concern ourselves with developing the industry.... 
Government is considering the matter but there is the Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy 
and the Economy and recently we have received an answer.... With regards to tariffs, an ad 
valorem tariff rate of 15 % will be levied... this was the answer. Therefore, in general, we will 
not interfere with this. Roughly, this level of tariff rate is fine.'**’
It should be noted that Imaizumi *s opinion differed on the adequacy o f Ae protection afforded
by a 15% ad valorem rate on steel. He claimed that “Many foreign countries do not use an ad 
valorem tax base, many countries use weight specific tariffs. Only the United States uses ad 
valorem.... however with regards to 15% [on steel], for Japan I think this is insufficient 
protection.”'*^® His opinion was not shared by Kômuchi. In the end, whatever sway Imazumi’s 
opinion may have carried, it was insufficient to alter the government position.
'*** The Japanese character #  when used alone, as is the case in this passage, means “iron” {kurogane). 
This, strictly speaking, does not mean pig iron or steel which are products of iron. In this passage, 
kurogane is interpreted to mean “steel” as the ensuing lines indicate that the speaker is referring to the 
steel tariff rate of 15%.
'**’ Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kanzei Teiritsuhôchû Kaisei Hôritsuan Gai Ichi Ken (Kanzei Teirituhôchü 
Kaisei Houritsuan, Seitetsugyô Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan) linkai Giroku (Hikki, Sokki) Dai Ichi 
Kai~Ni Kai - Dai 44 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 136-37.
'*^® Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchû Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai 
Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, vol. 48, Teikoku Gikai 
Shûgiin linkai Giroku - Dai 51 Kai Gikai (3) (I925~1926) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 141.
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Given that Kômuchi was the first speaker on the first day, one can surmise that the 
government position of accepting the Temporary Investigation Committee’s recommendation 
on the steel tariff rate had been decided previously. Herein we see that government had sat and 
considered its position on the recommendations, and at least one decision had been made. It is 
difficult to assess whether these were informal discussions. In order to make that judgement, a 
complete set of the records of all formal government meetings pertaining to the issue would be 
necessary. These we do not have. In any event, government decision making on the 
recommendations certainly occurred outside the forum of the shingikai and before the start of 
the meetings. In the normal course of events, it would not come as a surprise if non-government 
participants had not as well established in their own minds their positions on matters, possibly 
in consultation with others. Government would appear to have been content, and overall, steel 
producers would appear to have been content as well. Hence there was little friction over the 
steel tariff matter. On the other hand, pig iron was a different matter. As we know, the 
recommendation for a 10 % valorem tariff rate to be levied on pig iron did not emerge as 
law.
However, with regards to pig iron there is a tariff schedule agreement in the Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement..,. This is what we are in the process of revising. With respect to what in reality can 
be applied, England, and the other countries as well, in general equally share the most favoured 
nation clause and this is something that we do not touch. However, one country to which this 
most favoured nation clause does not apply is China,... As you know, most of the pig iron from
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China is taken by Yawata'*^ *... if a high tariff is applied to the pig iron of other countries like 
India, ...we would receive unprofitable discriminatory treatment. That is not good. There are a 
few other arguments regarding the levying of tariff on pig iron, however at this time we will not 
touch pig iron.'‘“
The position of the government on pig iron is clear from the outset. Regardless of whatever 
goodwill may have been felt by government toward these producers and concern for their 
economic straits, the pig iron tariff rate would not be altered for fear of retaliatory action on the 
part o f foreign countries, in particular from India. This opinion was restated by Imaizumi at a 
later stage though he did not specify pig iron producers alone: “The fear for the future for 
Japan’s iron and steel industry is India”. He then added that “as India is a colony of England, 
India equally shares England’s preferential treatment afforded by t r e a t y . N a g u r a  Bunji, a 
scholar of Japan’s iron and steel industry, states that “it is said that the reason for this decision 
[by government not to accept the Temporary Investigation Committee’s recommendation on pig 
iron] was in consideration of the import of pig iron from India. Also, the absence of any tax on 
scrap iron coupled with protection of the steel producers strengthened this effect. This fulfilled 
the role of strengthening an industrial structure divided between iron and steel producers.”'*^  ^At 
the outset of the second day of discussions, 22 March, Kômuchi entered early in the discussions.
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kanzei Teiritsuhôchû Kaisei Hôritsuan Gai Ichi Ken (Kanzei Teirituhôchü 
Kaisei Houritsuan, Seitetsugyô Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan) linkai Giroku (Hikki, Sokki) Dai Ichi 
Kai~Ni Kai - Dai 44 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 137.
Ibid., 140.
Nagura Bunji, "Seitetsu Gôdô Seisaku to Sono Kiketsu," 482.
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in which he essentially reiterated the government position which he himself had established on 
19 March. Now he stated that though the government was concerned for pig iron producers, the 
alteration of the existing tariff rate was not the government’s preferred solution. What that 
would be, was not disclosed, if indeed it was known at that time."*^ ^
A further facet o f the pig iron tariff rate revision was the issue of limitations imposed 
by the tariff schedule. Kômuchi stated that “While the tariff rate agreement was in effect, even 
though a national rate may be agreed upon, the levying of any import tariff would continue to be 
based on the tariff rate agreement.”^^  ^Imaizumi rejoined by pointing out that pig iron also 
would fall under this listing, and that nothing could be done to alter the pig iron tariff rate as 
long as the agreement was in place, which would be for another two years.^^’ This then helps 
explain the predicament that pig iron producers found themselves in, to wit, not only were the 
prevailing economic circumstances against them, but they were also bound to a weight specific 
tariff rate which, at that time, did not afford adequate protection and appeared to be unalterable 
in the immediate future. This also helps explain as well the government position of not 
upholding the Temporary Investigation Committee’s recommendation for the revision of the pig
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kanzei Teiritsuhôchû Kaisei Hôritsuan Gai Ichi Ken (Kanzei Teirituhôchü 
Kaisei Houritsuan, Seitetsugyô Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan) linkai Giroku (Hikki, Sokki) Dai Ichi 
Kai'-Ni Kai - Dai 44 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 159.
*^^Ibid., 140.
Ibid.
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iron tariff/^* It is important, though, to point out that even if the pig iron tariff rate had not been 
bound by the agreement, it does not follow that government would necessarily have supported 
the Committee’s pig iron tariff recommendation. Other factors might well have come to the 
fore. There remained the issue of trade friction with India and its potentially deleterious impact 
on textile exports, over which Japan was very concerned.
The ensuing debates therefore by and large reflected harmony among discussants, 
despite what appears to be an a  priori decision by government not to support the pig iron 
recommendation advanced by the Temporary Investigation Committee. The central issue for us 
thus becomes the relative absence of dissent from pig iron representatives. One aspect o f the 
explanation may be the influence exerted by Imaizumi himself. As we have seen earlier, his 
view on the inadequacy of the new steel rate was not shared by government, which did not alter 
its position. Imaizumi’s view on pig iron, however, was in line with that of government and thus 
served to reinforce the government position. Early in the first day of discussions. Imaizumi 
asserted that "in regards to the overall view of the tariff schedule, the present level of tariff 
[protection] on pig iron should not be increased even a little, it should stay as it is.” '*^^
We thus need to ask whether Imaizumi’s apparent bias towards steel producers reflects 
a reversal of his previously held view that tariff protection was necessary for both pig iron and
Steel was not bound by this agreement, and thus could be freely altered.
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchû Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai 
Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 141.
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Steel producers, the view expressed in his report entitled ‘Necessity and Reasons for Tariff 
Protection in Japan’s Iron and Steel Industry’ discussed earlier in this chapter. Though the date 
of this report is not known, it is clear that pig iron producers experienced steep competition 
throughout the first half of the 1920s and, indeed, during the 1920s as a whole. Thus it is hard to 
sustain the argument that Imaizumi’s changed view on pig iron was due to this sector’s 
ameliorated economic condition. As Imaizumi did not state why he felt that the rate on pig iron 
“should not be increased even a little”, it is not clear whether this was because he did not accept 
the position of pig iron producers that they were in need of greater tariff protection, or whether 
there was another reason, such as fear of foreign country trade retaliation. Perhaps what we are 
observing here is Imaizumi’s use of the forum to pursue more specific aims. The fact that 
Imaizumi stood as an advocate of steel producers in this shingikai meeting may indicate less his 
lack of concern here for pig iron and more his perceived need to pursue greater financial gain 
through increased tariff protection for the steel tube and pipe producing NKK, the company of 
which he was chief engineer. In turn, this suggests that, the advocacy of both pig iron and steel 
producers in Imaizumi’s report stemmed from the fact that it was written wearing his hat as 
representative of the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan, an institute whose name suggests it could 
not favour one kind of producer over the other - overtly at least.
Perhaps most revealing in these talks of the government approach to decision making
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are the comments of Yamamoto Tatsuo, who poignantly reminded participants of the 
complexity of economic policy making. In the case of the tariff revision, as no doubt with other 
multi-faceted matters, there were, he said, a plethora of differing vantage points from which to 
judge efficacy. Accepting that this was a problem, he underlined that due care must be taken 
before a decision be taken. In so doing, the implication was that in the final analysis it rested
with government to take decisions, and what came before was investigation.
There is no agreement between those who use the steel (i.e. the consumer), those who 
make steel products and the mine operators as to gains and losses .... With respect to the these 
points of view, to what degree is there any loss? Should the loss be accepted? ... With regards 
to these losses, should they be accepted by the nation? At Ais level it is extremely difficult to 
decide. Because of this, government does not decide alone. Even though there is the Economic 
Investigation Council, Arough various means, knowledgeable people must be sought out. After 
that, based on this, then a decision can be made.'*^ ®
In the end, it is not possible to explain in definite terms why the recommendations of the 
Temporary Investigation Committee on the tariff revision for pig iron producers were not 
recognized by the lower house committee, while that of steel producers was. Furthermore, why 
greater dissent was not expressed by representatives of pig iron producers remains equally 
unclear. It would appear that government had established a priori its position vis-à-vis pig iron 
and steel tariff revision and, in combination with the support of Imaizumi, remained entrenched 
in its position. As perhaps suggested by the absence of tariff revision in the title of the upper
151.
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house committee and, as will be seen, by the greatly diminished attention given to tariff revision 
in these meetings, the close of the lower house talks was, effectively, the terminal point for 
discussion on tariff revision. The secondary literature provides little further guidance on this 
issue. Whether further talks, informal or otherwise, later occurred is not known.
9.2 The Upper House Debate
The upper house debates were spread over two days, 24 and 25 March, though 
committee membership was decided upon on the 23"* of March. It is not clear why this set of 
meetings was called tokubetsu iinkai. In the case of the Promotion Law of 1917, it was surmised 
that the ‘special’ nature of the meeting was due to the committee membership having been made 
up of both lower and upper house members. Here, the committee to consider the Proposed 
Revision of the Iron and Steel Business Promotion Law was composed of seven members, plus 
a committee chairman and vice-chairman, and the record does not provide any indication that 
they were not all members of the House of Peers. In the case of the lower house debates, 
considerably more time had been devoted to the tariff revision issue than to the amendment of 
the Promotion Law. In the upper house debates, although the title of the committee did not 
mention tariff revision, there was some discussion on the matter, but most discussion was on the
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revision of the Promotion Law.
Sakikawa Saishirô, a government committee member, indicated that there had been a 
recent gradual development in production sites using electricity which did not fall under the 
protection of the Promotion Law of 1917, and the proposal was made for an amendment to the 
bill to include these sites.'* ’^ Similarly, the discussions reflected the agreement that government 
subsidisation should be provided for steel materials that were used in ship repair or construction. 
Neither of these issues proved to be contentious, and discussions were not extensive. As in the 
lower house debates, no obvious decision making process was in evidence in the operation of 
the upper house. Though decisions were arrived at, the path taken was not obviously end-driven. 
Concerns were raised, counterpoints made and then the topic moved on. Differing opinions 
were raised but either the responses were sufficient to put the issue to rest or the opinions were 
not viewed as important enough to warrant further comment. In either case, the upshot was that 
the overall tenor of the talks was, again, one of harmony.
The meetings culminated in decisions taken in the morning and afternoon of 25 March 
on the revision of the Promotion Law. The various issues were not brought to a vote but rather it 
would appear that when discussion had been brought to the point where there were no more 
questions, Hotta Masatsune, the committee chairman, declared the resolution in favour of
Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan Tokubetsu linkai Giji 
Sokkiroku Dai Ichi ~ Ni Gou - Dai 44 Kai Teikoku Gikai, vol. 15, Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai Giji 
Sokkiroku - Dai 44 Kai Gikai (3) (1921) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 563.
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adopting the following revisions to the Promotion Law of 1917.
The revisions for the Iron and Steel Business Promotion Law are as follows:
Article 4... entitled “Producers of low phosphorus pig iron”, the following part would be 
added: “also electricity based pig iron and steel producers”
Article 7 Section 2: With regards to the repair or construction of ships or steel materials that are 
constructed within the Japanese empire, the government can subsidize producers of this steel 
material
Section 3: In the event of fraud by producers who receive the benefits extended in Section 2, 
they will be liable for the repayment of the subsidies. Also with regards to this repayment, this 
assessment will be based on the national tax regulations provision, however national taxation 
has prior rights in the order of repayment.^^^
Given that these amendments did not alter significantly the original Promotion Law, their 
overall impact on the iron and steel industry is likely to have been limited.
With regards to the tariff revision issue, Shiba Chûzaburô, a committee member, 
suggested that though the final decision on the revision of the pig iron and steel tariff rates had 
not yet been finalized, it appeared to him at that time that while the pig iron rate would not
increase, that on steel would.
[There was] a consultation conference last year called the Investigation Committee on Fiscal 
Policy and the Economy. While it focused on the protection of steel production, the most 
important point made in the Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy was the 
increase of the import tax on pig iron and steel products. Following from this was the aim for 
Japan’s self-sufficiency in iron and steel, however... [the tariff on] pig iron does not look like 
it is going to be increased. We know that only steel products are likely to increase.^ ^^
Teikoku Kizokuin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôan Tokubetsu linkai, vol. 13, Teikoku 
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The point to be made here is that the wording of this excerpt suggests that a decision on the 
tariff rate had still to be made on the 24* March, two days after the close of the final lower 
house committee meeting. This suggests that the matter was still awaiting the decision of a 
separate deciding body, but it remains unclear what that body was, whether or not it was a 
formal committee, and, when that decision would be made. Shiba further suggested that the 
reason why the tariff on pig iron was unlikely to be increased was the conflict with the tariff
schedule agreement which did not permit Japan to alter the pig iron tariff rate:
As for why the rate on pig iron was not increased, I think it may have been because of the 
relationship with the tariff schedule agreement. In the case that the tax not raised, possibly 
because of the tariff schedule agreement, despite the opinion and resolution'*^  ^expressed by the 
Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy and the Economy, according to my memory, 
protection would have then been based on this difference (i.e. the difference between the 
existing agreement and the proposed one)...
The wording here of “why pig iron was not increased” conflicts with the implication expressed 
by Shiba above that the decision was pending. As these records would appear to be virtually 
verbatim transcripts of what was said, it is perhaps important that we do not place too much 
weight on this passage as an indication of the status of the pig iron decision. As we know, the 
precision of carefully worded reports is not always found in speech. We also know that verb
Though is translated as decision or resolution, it should not be seen here to imply that the 
committee was vested with powers that extended beyond the prescribed remit of the shingikai to make 
recommendations.
Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôreihôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan Tokubetsu linkai Giji 
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242
tense in Japanese may permit imprecision. In any event, it would appear that Shiba’s idea that 
protection would be extended to pig iron producers through government subsidy was refuted as 
incorrect by Sakikawa. He agreed that the pig iron rate could not be changed because of the 
agreement but argued that subsidisation of the pig iron producers was not possible as it 
contravened the spirit of the agreement/^
As Shiba acknowledged, he was not certain of the details o f the 1911 agreement. In fact, it 
would appear that Shiba’s memory did not serve him well in this instance, as Article 8 of the 
Treaty o f Commerce and Navigation provided for modification of the tariff schedule, though 
unilateral alteration was not permitted. In the event that either Japan or the United Kingdom 
sought change to the tariff schedule, they would enter negotiation, and if this failed then the
notification of the intent to withdraw could be made.
If at any time after the expiration of one year from the date this Treaty takes effect either of the 
High Contracting Parties desires to make a modification in the Schedule it may notify its desire 
to the other High Contracting party, and thereupon negotiations for the purpose shall be entered 
into forthwith. If the negotiations are not brought to a satisfactory conclusion within six months 
from the date of notification, the High Contracting Party which gave the notification may, 
within one month, give six months’ notice to abrogate the present Article, and on the expiration 
of such notice the present Article shall cease to have effect, without prejudice to the other 
stipulations of this Treaty.
Thus, the treaty allowed for change of the tariff schedule “without prejudice to the other
437 BPP, "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan Together with a Prefatory 
Note and Appendices," 3.
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stipulations.” This then leads to speculation as to the degree of accurate knowledge participants 
had regarding constraints, diplomatic or otherwise, that impinged on the industry. Clarification 
of this point was not recorded but, given that the steel tariff rate was amended, we can assume 
that at one point this crucial issue was clarified. This then places emphasis on the argument that 
fear of trade friction with India was the driving reason for the decision not to uphold the 
recommendation for a 10% ad valorem tariff rate on pig iron.
10. Conclusion
An implicit question that runs throughout this chapter is, given the nature of the 
documentation of the Temporary Investigation Committee, how close we are to ‘seeing’ how 
the deliberations transpired. We commenced our analysis with some of the basic factors that 
shaped the positions of the producers, perhaps most important being the divergent interests of 
iron and steel producers. Subsequently, the views of Imaizumi and then those of the Industrial 
Club of Japan were examined, followed by analysis of the Temporary Investigation 
Committee’s proceedings. We know the recommendations that were submitted to government, 
and the fact that they were not fully endorsed, but we cannot ‘see’ how the discussions led to 
these recommendations. One immediate response as to why that is so, is that we do not have a
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complete set of records, and those records that we do have are largely summaries of what was 
said. To be sure, these factors have a definite limiting effect. Also, and of particular relevance to 
the larger theme of this thesis, is the role of whatever informal discussions may have occurred. 
Nevertheless, some consideration of the salient points may be fruitful.
The informal discussions of the Club members with government did not apparently 
change the government position, which challenges the assumption that major economic interests 
could always dictate outcomes. Also, given that they could not, it stands to reason that in pursuit 
of their aims, they would seek their ends through other means, for example, the formal setting of 
the shingikai, as was seen in the Promotion Law of 1917. So, prior to the start of the Temporary 
Committee’s discussions, business tried to influence government through informal means but 
had been rebuffed. Subsequently, leading business figures were invited to participate in the 
formal forum of the shingikai, ostensibly at least to express their views on how the current 
economic and industrial problems should be addressed. Knowing that informal channels had 
failed, they were presented with the opportunity to realize their aims through the deliberations. 
Coming to the discussion table headed by the prime minister and a number of other leading 
government actors, business had a second chance. Though the experience of the Promotion Law 
revealed that they still could not dictate the outcome, it did demonstrate that a fight could be 
made for their end. Following this line of argument, it is reasonable to assume that business
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approached the discussions seriously and with the intention of defending its stake.
That the records do not reveal heated debate as seen in the previous chapter does not 
mean that all was a façade. It should be first mentioned that the records on the Temporary 
Investigation Committee indicate that, as its title states, the raison d’être of this forum was for 
investigation. The ambit of discussions was determined at the outset and members considered 
the issues that were presented to them. In this case the deliberations were long and there were 
many subcommittees formed, one reason for which was the technical nature of the matters 
under discussion. As indicated by one speaker, though he participated in one of these 
subcommittees, he felt out of his depth in discussions. Thus, in the later plenary session where 
not all members were conversant with the intricacies of the tariff and amalgamation issues, it is 
reasonable to assume that this may have contributed to the absence of heated debates.
This also raises the question of whether, fundamentally, tariff implementation and 
amalgamation were contentious issues for participating members. In contrast to the buoyancy of 
the war years, when entrepreneurs saw great gains in the market, the post-war period saw the 
dramatic contraction of the industry. The number of iron and steel sites was reduced 
dramatically through bankruptcy and there was a general consolidation process under zaihatsu 
control. In the case of the Promotion Law, personal gain during the war was identified with 
opposition to the expansion of Yawata and the hammering out of a deal with government to
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promote private sector interests -  now they ran for government cover. This is not to say that 
government was passive and awaited their appeals, as it too sought measures to alleviate the 
economic crisis. The upshot was that both government and the private sector realised that it was 
in their best interests to work together; hence the underlying assumptions which drew both sides 
together engendered harmony.
Given the opaqueness of whatever decision making process may have occurred here, 
the applicability of our delineation between formal and informal discussions may be drawn into 
question. In general, we have said that behind-the-scenes ‘face to face’ communication between 
government and business is considered here as informal, and the discussions of the shingikai as 
formal. This characterization was more easily applied in the case of the Promotion Law of 1917, 
where the records are detailed and the process of decision making more apparent. Here, 
however, neither of these apply; at least in part, meetings were held in the private residence of 
the prime minister, and records are largely limited to summaries. Furthermore, the fact that as 
some of the meetings were held in the evening, during which members adjourned for supper, 
suggests that off-the-record discussion may have occurred during the meetings, breaks or during 
post-prandial libation. During these informal discussions differences may have been ironed out 
or amplification of points may have been made. The point is that the setting of this shingikai 
lends itself to a belief that what is a formal institution may serve both the ends of informal and
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formal discussion. This allows for the interpretation that, given the limited conflict revealed in 
the discussions, business may have approached the Temporary Committee as an opportunity to 
take up informal discussion. Certainly they would have recognized this possibility and it would 
be difficult to rule out the fact that periods of adjournment were used to continue talks, but it 
does not explain away the point that with respect to the tariff issue, the interests of government 
and business coincided. This correspondence, it is suggested here, was an important factor in 
explaining the relative absence of friction.
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Chapter 4 : The Long Road to Amalgamation 1921 -1934
With the conclusion of the Temporary Investigation Committee debates and the 
subsequent revisions of the Promotion Law and the tariff schedule in the first months of 1921, 
a sustained period of discussions was over. Government and business had demonstrated their 
mutually felt concerns over the worrying economic situation and tariffs were seen as a means 
to protect the iron and steel industry. As we have seen, though, the revised tariff schedule did 
not equally protect pig iron and steel producers. In the ensuing years, both pig iron and steel 
producers sought means to face foreign competition, through the revision of the tariff 
schedule, subsidisation and collective price agreements.
Notwithstanding whatever benefits were derived by these means, more fundamental 
issues remained. Tariffs helped shield the industry from international competition but, in 
themselves, could not address the inefficiencies of the industry. Similarly, as will be seen later, 
collective price agreements, though they proved to be successful in the short-term, could not 
promote integration, and subsidisation was ultimately a stop-gap measure. Hopes for the 
establishment of a competitive self-sufficient industry continued to elude government. For the 
private sector, integration remained a thorny issue. At various points during the period under 
question here, government attempted to realise the integration of the industry, however, research
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indicates that certain private sector producers were against amalgamation for economic 
reasons/^* It was only in 1934 that both the necessary market changes had occurred and 
sufficient political backing was found to pass through the legislation. Even then, the shingikai 
records reveal that certain vested private sector interests railed against the amalgamation plan, 
while other members of big business were non-committal, awaiting later government 
clarification of implementation details. This stance suggested caution on their part, but, more 
importantly here, pointed to their independence of action in dealing with government. Yet, 
whatever independence they may have wished to maintain, the records suggest that there 
remained, overall, a tacit acceptance of the need to restructure the industry along more efficient 
lines.
The issue of the industry’s restructuring revolved around its limited integration of the 
production process. Though by 1926 Kamaishi and Wanishi under Mitsui, Kenjiho under 
Mitsubishi and Asano Shipbuilding Steel had attained some degree of integration, the 
government-owned Yawata remained the only fully integrated producer. The principle foreign 
steel producing nations were, in general, more internationally competitive than the Japanese.^^^ 
The shingikai records reveal that the participants perceived that, in the main, their competitors’ 
superior economies of scale stemmed from their integrated production processes. The threat
'‘^ *See Okazaki Tetsuji, "1920 Nendai No Tekkôgyô Seisaku to Nihon Tekkôgyô - Seitetsu Gôdô Mondai 
G Chûshin Toshite,"
lida Kenichi, Shûji, and Toshirô, eds., Tekkô^  208.
250
posed by American, British and German manufacturers was a constant reminder to the Japanese 
of the need to draw together and streamline production. This change, though, implied painfiil 
decisions. This observation can be made not only of the private sector, but equally of Yawata 
itself. Yawata occupied a sheltered position in the market. Government bore the cost of 
Yawata’s production inefficiencies, though this was changed through the 1926 Accounting Law, 
which forced the rationalisation of Yamamoto’s product line.
Thus, the main issues relating to the iron and steel industry between 1921 and 1934, as 
they concern us here, were two fold: 1) the continued search for protection through tariffs and 
subsidisation and, 2) the developments that culminated in the industry’s amalgamation. Debates 
pertaining to these developments that ran in parallel fashion were again examined in the 
shingikai forum and subsequent lower and upper house debates. Collective price agreements, 
though important in understanding the developments that led to amalgamation, did not figure 
importantly in the shingikai discussions and therefore are not of direct concern to this analysis.
As has been argued, economic and other circumstances played a key role in shaping 
shingikai debates. The war years which bracketed the Promotion Law’s deliberations formed the 
context of the discussions. The recognized limited time frame of the conflict engendered a sense 
of urgency in the heated debates, and the large scale profits contributed to forming the crucible 
in which the debates were forged. In the years immediately following the cessation of the
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fighting, the iron and steel industry experienced dramatic shifts in demand. During this period, 
the Temporary Investigation Committee deliberated at length on dealing with the need mutually 
felt by government and the private sector for protection from foreign competition. Though 
prevailing tariff agreements made the task of revising the schedule in more favourable terms for 
Japan more difficult, the comparative absence of friction can largely be attributed to the 
diminution of actors in the industry and the common interests of both the government and the 
private sectors. Between the end o f the debates on the revision of the Promotion Law and the 
tariff schedule in 1921, and the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry in 1934, we also 
find the overall salient feature to be harmony. This is not to suggest that disagreements did not 
arise, but, rather, that they did not dominate or characterise the discussions. Economic and 
political factors played a role both in leading the industry towards amalgamation and in the 
shaping o f the debates. It is argued here that the comparative harmony in the shingikai debates 
was due, in part, to the sustained period of economic difficulty of the 1920s which provided the 
climate in which arguments for amalgamation could gain sway, and was in part because 
political considerations muted objections and facilitated harmony. The records reflect that some 
of these shingikai meetings took place at the same time as other related meetings. Importantly, 
the exchanges suggest that there was a hierarchy of discussions in which the shingikai meetings 
examined here were subordinate to higher level meetings which exercised decision making
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powers. The exchanges between speakers also suggest that some participants were members of 
these higher order meetings and that the function o f these participants was, in part, to pass on 
information. Also, it was known to government, and perhaps business as well, that sensitive 
trade talks contemporaneous to some of our shingikai discussions constrained the government 
position and contributed to preventing pig iron aspirations being realized. In terms of what this 
means for our argument regarding business views of the shingikai, it is that, despite the fact that 
business was aware that the talks were overshadowed by a higher decision making body and 
that there were overriding considerations that would prevent the full realisation of their aims, 
business still attended and participated. Conversely, one might argue that knowing that what 
was being said in the meetings was being passed on to a higher decision making body served to 
encourage business participation in the hope of influencing outcomes through indirect means. In 
either case, business was not passive in the discussions.
1. Historical Background
The first half of the 1920s proved to be for the iron and steel industry a period of considerable 
turmoil which was temporarily stabilised through cartels formed under the Iron and Steel 
Council established in 1925. On 1 September 1923 the Kanto plain was hit by a massive
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earthquake followed by fire which swept through Tokyo, Yokohama and the outlying regions, 
claiming an estimated 95,000 lives and causing 5,506,000,000 yen in physical damage.'*'*® 
Between 1924 and the following year, business project budgets fell by one fifth.'*'** Poignantly 
expressed by one account, “the winds of the post-war crisis went wild.” '^*^  For the iron and steel 
industry, demand for materials to rebuild the earthquake stricken area dramatically increased but 
could not be fully met by domestic production. The need to rebuild ravaged Tokyo as soon as 
possible was pressing, compelling government to eliminate taxes and tariffs on imported steel 
until March 1924. In turn, the market was flooded with steel and prices declined anew.
At the same time, the iron and steel industries of the former World War I nations were 
being shifted to a peace time footing. Germany, Great Britain and the United States, Japan’s 
fierce erstwhile competitors, re-emerged as strong exporting nations, outstripping Japan’s 
production capacity and at higher levels of efficiency. Imports from Germany and Britain 
quickly increased and pushed the United States from its dominant position: in 1920, Japan 
imported from Britain 14% of its steel imports, 2% from Germany and 84% from the United 
States; however, by 1926 Britain accounted for 22%, Germany 43% and the United States was
'*^® Nakamura Takafusa, Showa Shi 11926'1945,63. The estimate of human loss includes those reported 
missing. The figure for physical damage is comprised of buildings, household, goods, stock, factories, 
public facilities etc.
'*'** Tsflsho Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 212.
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Sôsetsu, vol. 1 Sôsetsu (Jô), Shôkô Seisakushi (Tokyo: 
Shôkô Seisakushi Kankô Kai, 1985), 112.
254
reduced to 21%T^ In turn, the impact on price was dramatic. The principle driving force that 
determined the price and volume of domestic pig iron production was imports from India and 
to a lesser extent from Manchuria. Between 1920 and 1926 the price of Indian iron was always 
below average market price.^ "*^  The price of rolled steel products moved from 416.49 yen per 
ton in 1918 to 220 yen per ton in 1920, and by 1926 was 105.83 yen per ton. The same trend 
can be seen in the price descent of steel ingots, which plummeted from 313.18 yen per ton in 
1918 to 160.13 yen two years later and 82.80 yen in 1926. As for iron, domestic producers fared 
little better. The unit price per ton of pig iron in 1918 dropped from 209.86 yen to 100.25 yen in 
1920, and by 1926 was 46.22 yen.**^ ^
International political factors as well had telling economic consequences. As we have 
seen, Yawata's 3^** expansion was in part aimed at meeting plans for naval expansion.'*'*® The 
intention was that by 1921, “nearly one-third of the entire budget expenditures of the Japanese 
Government” was to be allotted to the planned naval expansion and indeed the “Japanese 
Government, before the Washington Conference, was planning to spend as much money on its 
Navy as was being spent in the United States for that purpose.”'*^^
This massive naval expansion was not realized. At the Washington Conference (1921-
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 90.
^  lida Kenichi, Shûji, and Toshirô, eds., Tekko, 210.
Shinohara Miyohei, ed., Kôkôgyô, 232.
Nagashima Osamu, Semen Nihon Tekkôgyô No Kôzô Bunseki, 46.
Raymond Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Russell and Russell, 1922), 139.
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22) Japan agreed to the reduction of its fleet as stipulated in the Five Power Treaty signed in 
February of 1922, where naval expansion would be contained for a period of 10 years to a 
10:10:6:3.5:3.5 ratio for the tonnage of capital ships in the British, American, Japanese, French 
and Italian navies. Total work orders for Yawata in 1919 comprised of private and government 
sector requests, including navy and army, amounted to 20,346,000 yen, but by 1925, this had 
decreased to 3,369,000 yen.'*'** In 1919, Yawata received from the navy 16,095,000 yen worth of 
orders, or 79.1% of Yawata's total orders, which by 1922 had diminished to 2,931,000 yen 
(50.3%) and by 1925 had reached the decade low figure of 654,000 tons (19.4%).'^’
This economic pain was not restricted to Yawata alone, as during the war NKK, Nihon 
Seiko-sho, Kawasaki Shipbuilding and Sumitomo Copper as well had all invested in their 
production capacities in the areas of thick plate, large structural shapes and large cast steel in 
response to the increased demand in war related shipbuilding.^^® In an effort to respond to 
market forces, these large private firms and others, as well as Yawata, diverted their capacities 
to the production of smaller goods such as bars, wire rods, steel pipes and sheet to meet civilian 
demands.^^* Concomitantly, given the relatively limited start-up costs for these products and the
Nagura Bunji, Heiki Tekko Kaisha No Nichiei Kankeishi - Nihon Seikôjo to Eikokugawa Kabmushi: 
1907 - 52, 248.
Ibid.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 89.
It should be noted that helping offset this decline in naval requisitions was the increased demand for 
industrial machinery, electric wires, construction, and railways. As Yawata had a monopoly over rail 
production it diverted its production accordingly. Further countermeasures were taken in entering the 
civilian small products market such as bars, wire rods, steel, pipes and sheet. In 1919, Yawata’s
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increasing demand, small firms also moved into this market resulting in a sharp decline in 
profits. This then was further exacerbated by the presence of foreign manufactures to make for 
very fierce competition indeed.
Perhaps of greater importance than simply the price competition were the 
disproportionate shifts in demand for iron and steel. The rate of domestic production of steel, 
though level between 1919 and 1921, thereafter increased until 1924, while that of iron was flat 
throughout this period. As a result, by 1924 the ratio of iron to steel production was 1:1 
Kamaishi, which had expanded to achieve integrated production could not achieve its targets 
due to the unstable economic situation. Similarly, NKK withdrew from pig iron production 
because of unprofitability and hence Yawata remained as the only fully integrated producer in 
the domestic market. From the perspective of the development of the industry, “the imbalance 
between steel and iron firms [was such that it] impeded the proper development of integrated
works in Japan.”'*^  ^As Nagura says.
The Japanese iron and steel industry in the 1920s revealed a gradual structural entrenching of 
the so called special production structure of what is called ‘competition’ or ‘opposition’ based 
the ‘delineation between iron and steel [producers]’ and ‘delineation between government and 
private sectors’. This situation could also be described as a ‘structural depression’.
government sales (including munitions) were 156,000 tons while civilian sales totalled 112,000 tons. By 
1925, government sector sales roughly remained the same at 155,000 tons however those to the private 
sector had increased to 490,000 tons. Ibid, 89-90.
Murakami Katsuhiko, "Shihon Chikuseki (2): Jûkôgyô," in Nihon Teikoku Shugi Shi 1: Dai Ichiji 
Taisen Ki, ed. Oishi Kaiichiro (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1997), 217.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 92.
Nagura Bunji, "Seitetsu Gôdô Seisaku to Sono Kiketsu," 135.
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A prime explanation for why steel producers held an advantageous position over pig iron 
producers was that they purchased cheap Indian iron;
except for the government managed Yawata, the ... amalgamation of pig iron and steel 
management had not yet been established. Steel production relied on cheap pig iron from India 
and scrap. [In the face of competition], steel producers tended to lower the price of their 
products, [which, in turn] forced the lowering of profit rates.... For pig iron producers, in turn, 
this meant an increase in pressure because of the import of pig iron from India'*^ ^
Thus, in terms of seeking a means to alleviate pressure on the industry, the imposition of tariffs 
on imports was in the interest of domestic iron producers. However, their gain would reduce the 
profitability of steel manufacturers. Hence, the definition of best interests for iron producers was 
distinct from that of steel manufacturers.
In the context of this economic turmoil, arguments for amalgamation became more 
compelling. One such advocate was Takahashi Korekiyo, who led a sustained effort to 
reorganise the iron and steel industry. In each of the 1922 Tokai, west Honshu, and Osaka- 
Kyoto Seiyükai party meetings, Takahashi, as party president, “stated the necessity for the 
amalgamation of the iron and steel i n d u s t r y . I n  June of 1924, Takahashi became the Minister 
o f  Agriculture and Commerce and formed a committee to consider the matter. Though chaired 
by Takahashi, his hopes for amalgamation were not realized. Research indicates this failure was 
because of opposition from Mitsui and Mitsubishi. It has been argued that this was because the
Ibid., 135-36.
Okazaki Tetsuji, "1920 Nendai No Tekkôgyô Seisaku to Nihon Tekkôgyô - Seitetsu Gôdô Mondai G 
Chûshin Toshite," 4.
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financial position of these large combines was at that time such that it was not necessary for 
them to enter into cooperative management with Yawata and other members of the industry, 
thus underscoring the independence of the zaibatsu from direct government control/^^ In April 
of 1925, Takahashi retired and in so doing, amalgamation was placed on hold.
Government initiatives to address the iron and steel industry’s problems were not long 
in abeyance. In 1925, Kataoka Naoharu, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce under the 
second Kato Takaaki cabinet, recommended government financial support and cartelisation of 
the industry. This led to the formation of the Iron and Steel Council later that year, and under its 
aegis the Pig Iron Cooperative Association in 1926. Also, in January 1926, under Kataoka’s 
initiative, the proposal was made for an increase in the tariffs on pig iron and steel.^^* However, 
as will be seen, government concerns over trade friction with India stood in the way of the 
hopes of pig iron producers. In response, subsidisation of pig iron was introduced through the 
revision of the Iron and Steel Promotion Law in March 1926. In rather selective fashion, the 
outcome of the revised law defined eligibility for subsidisation as those companies which were 
integrated and had an annual production capacity of over 35,000 tons of iron and steel.'*^  ^This
subsidisation continued until the amalgamation of the industry under Japan Steel in 1934.
Under the control of the Pig Iron Cooperative Association, formed of Kamaishi,
Ibid., 17.
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 241.
^^ Ubid.,2AZ.
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Wanishi, Kenjiho, Ben Xi Hua and Anshan Works, the domestic price of pig iron was stabilised. 
The association’s aims were two fold: 1) stabilisation of the market price of pig iron and 2) 
setting o f the price below India pig iron.^ *^ ® The association was successful in its aims until the 
start o f the Showa Depression in 1930. Declining demand and increased competition, in 
particular from India, led to a decision to engage in price-fixing without concern to production 
costs in order to keep Indian pig iron out of Japan. This was possible because of the 
subsidisation given by government to pig iron producers. In addition, an agreement was reached 
between the Joint Purchase Association of Steelmakers and the Pig Iron Cooperative 
Association in 1927 whereby steel producers agreed to limit their purchases of India pig iron to 
one-third of their total purchases. In return, the Pig Iron Cooperative would, among other things, 
adjust the price of its product to that of steel in a ratio of 1: 2.2.^^' Under these conditions 
collective price agreements, in combination with the impact on demand of the depression, did 
reduce the market share of Indian pig iron from 21.9 percent to 10.6 percent between 1929 and 
1931. However, continued declining prices of steel made the position of the pig iron producers 
untenable under the agreement and so it was abandoned in 1931.^^  ^As for steel producers, there 
was not one encompassing cartel for this sector of the industry, but rather the industry was 
subdivided between product lines. In 1926, the Bar Segments Agreement was established, which 
subdivided production according to bar size between Yawata and private sector sites, controlling 
prices and achieving economies of scale. A similar understanding was achieved for producers of
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 126.
Ibid.
lida Kenichi, Shûji, and Toshiro, eds., Tekko, 276.
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round bars (1927), black plates (1930), wire rods (1930), plates (1931), medium plates (1930), 
small angles (1931) and medium angles (1931), Though achieving success at controlling prices 
to varying degrees, none of these associations survived the Showa Depression as overall market 
prices declined/^^ In the end, the maintenance of collective price agreements proved to be 
unsustainable for both pig iron and steel producers.
In July 1932, the issue of tariff increases on pig iron and steel reappeared under the 
initiative of the Saitô administration. As will be discussed later, prevailing conditions this time 
helped to facilitate the passage of the bill. Despite strong objections from the Diet, government 
succeeded in seeing through the legislation, but in the process the upper chamber strongly 
insisted that government implement measures for the rationalization of the industry which 
eventually led to the amalgamation of the industry in 1934.
While the amalgamation of the industry was directly related to the domestic issues of 
the industry’s unbalanced structural development, inefficiency and external competition, it was 
in a broader sense part o f the larger rationalisation process that developed in the latter half of the 
1920s. Industrial rationalisation was spearheaded by the Industry Deliberation Council set up by 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry on 23 May 1927. In part, the Council’s establishment 
was driven by a number of economic scares which “contributed to the radicalization of the 
whole society and brought forth demands that someone speak for the nation as a whole.”'*^  One
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 130,
^  Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f Industrial Policy, 1925-1975,102.
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of the first of these shocks occurred during the 52"** Diet which ran between December 1926 and 
March 1927, while government was addressing the matter of the so-called earthquake bills 
which had been issued to raise relief money. The government proposed legislation to convert 
the earthquake bills into 10-year government bonds. During the diet discussions, the Minister of 
Finance revealed the extent o f the domestic economy’s fragility which brought a run on banks. 
Fears not entirely assuaged, it was later revealed that the Suzuki Trading Company and the 
government-owned Taiwan Bank were in economic straights. As Suzuki owed the Bank over 
350 million yen and held approximately 100 million yen in earthquake bills, fears of the worst 
emerged. "Rumors spread that the real intent of the new laws was to save Suzuki and the 
Taiwan Bank, and when Suzuki’s competitors, beginning with the Mitsui Bank, began 
withdrawing their deposits from the Taiwan Bank, the public run on all banks revived.”^^  ^The 
upshot of the 1927 panic was that the government fell, including the collapse of approximately 
37 banks, and the Suzuki zaibatsu went under with Mitsui and Mitsubishi absorbing the 
remaining pieces. A "large number of competing banks and enterprises were weeded out, and 
the economy’s limited capital was concentrated in the strategic sectors ... [which promoted the] 
enrichment of the z a i b a t s u . . . Thus, the economic upheavals of the 1920s served several 
ends. At one level they formed the climate in which rationalisation rose to the fore. Their impact
Ibid., 101. 
^Ibid., 101-02.
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also played into the hands of the more financially stalwart zaibatsu, reducing the number of 
actors in the iron and steel industry, and in turn the number of varied interests represented in the 
related shingikai meetings. This, as has been discussed before, may have been a contributing 
factor to reducing friction in shingikai meetings.
In as far as the rationale for amalgamation was a matter of economies of scale and 
efficiency, the passage of an amalgamation bill was closely associated with prevailing political 
and diplomatic circumstances. The argument has been made that political rivalry between the 
Kenseikai and the Seiyükai had stood in the way of earlier amalgamation attempts and only 
under the Saitô cabinet (26 May 1932 to 8 July 1934), composed of members of both parties, 
were the necessary political conditions met in order to allow the bill to pass. Also of concern 
were diplomatic relations between Britain, India and Japan over the India-Japan cotton trading 
relationship. These concerns were rarely far from government thoughts in its approach to the re­
negotiation of the tariff schedule.
The ensuing shingikai debates indicate that government was particularly careful in the 
matter o f altering the existing tariff levels on pig iron and steel, in particular the former. As we 
have seen in the debates over the revision of pig iron rates during 1921, this issue was a sticking 
point for government. Notwithstanding the possibility that the same reasons continued 
throughout the 1920s to engender in government an a priori reluctance to entertain the revision
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of pig iron tariffs, what will be focussed on here is the limitations imposed by India-Japan 
cotton trading relations on the efforts to revise pig iron tariffs. At certain points, the records 
reveal the government’s expressed reluctance to alter the pig iron tariff rate for fear of Indian 
tariff retaliation and other economic considerations. By implication, government placed priority 
on Japan’s cotton exports to India over the protection of domestic pig iron from Indian 
competitors. Economic reasons, at least in part, underpinned this view. “At least until the late 
1930s the textile industry remained undoubtedly the most important industry in the economic 
life of Japan.” *^^  ^In the period under question here, and indeed for years after, cotton exports 
were an important source of foreign currency critical for Japan’s balance of payments, an issue
of prime concern to industrialising nations.
The rise of the Japanese cotton industry was spectacular. Centred on Osaka, it became in the 
inter-war period one of the country’s most important and financially powerful industries. In its 
dependence on world markets, the Japanese industry resembled that of Great Britain. In the 
years 1928-31, 51.3 per cent of its output was exported; in 1933-7 the proportion was 55.9 per 
cent. Cotton textiles accounted for around 20 percent of Japanese exports, surpassing silk as the 
country’s chief exporting industry in the 1930s. During the period of rapid advance in world 
markets initiated by the devaluation of the yen in December 1931, cotton became the spearhead 
of Japanese economic expansion."*®*
Though, strictly speaking, the cotton trade issue was a bilateral matter, the depth of the
Osamu Ishii, Cotton-Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain and the United States, 1930-1936 (New 
York; Amo Press, 1981), 33.
"*®* Clemens Wurm, Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and International Cartels 
in British Politics, 1924 - 1939, trans. Patrick Salmon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
199.
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tensions and its implications were closely linked with the decline of the Lancashire industry 
In essence, what occurred was Britain’s declining cotton exports to India in the post-war period 
were seen as the result o f Japan’s rapidly, increasing cotton exports. At the same time, India’s 
own industry had expanded rapidly shifting the balance of trade with Britain closer to parity. 
This perception is one that benefits from hindsight, as some leading British business leaders, 
among others, of the threat posed by the Japanese to the Lancashire industry suggest they were 
reluctant to think that Japan had the wherewithal to dominate the world cotton market. Certainly 
during Japan’s financial difficulties in late 1927 and early 1928, the view in Manchester was 
that “the bubble of Japanese competition was being well and truly deflated.”^^® In the ensuing 
years this perception was challenged as Japan’s continued growth of cotton exports 
accompanied Lancashire’s decline. At the larger strategic level, Japan’s growing exports to 
India were a sign of a developing nation that, as the Manchurian Incident of 1931 indicated, was 
also increasingly making its presence felt in China. Britain, poignantly aware of its weakened 
post-war economic strength, viewed with raised eyebrows the shifting balance of power in this 
area. “The Foreign Office placed the cotton industry’s demand in the overall context of its Far 
Eastern policy and Britain’s relations with Japan and attempted -  not without success -  to 
ensure that commercial rivalry should not endanger the broader goals o f British policy in the
See Alex J, Robertson, "Lancashire and the Rise of Japan, 1910-1937," Business History XXXII, no. 4 
(1990).
*'^Ubid., 94.
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region.”^^  ^This policy was formed of economic, political and strategic factors which attempted 
to maintain the status quo by steering a line between China and Japan and between the United 
States and the League of Nations.'*^^
In the context of this Anglo-Japanese tension rising in the Far East, Japan’s textile 
exports to India steadily rose and threatened Britain’s once dominant market position. Over the 
decade, Japan’s share of India’s textile imports increased from the negligible level of less than 4 
percent in the early 1920s to 30 percent by 1930, while at the same time England’s share 
declined from 75 percent to 65 percent. “During the war, partly out o f necessity and partly 
out o f fear that Japan might make sudden inroads into the Indian market. Great Britain had 
permitted India to develop her factory-manufactured cotton textiles and, at the same time, to 
abandon free trade.”'^ '^* Subsequently, India established a policy of discriminatory tariffs in 
favour o f Britain. In March 1930, a tariff rate o f 15 percent was levied against cotton piece 
goods from Britain while 20 percent was levied on foreign ones, including that from Japan.'*^  ^
Long a matter of prestige, gradually during the post-war period, through the 1920s, 
western countries once again pegged their currencies to the gold standard, which was widely
Wurm, Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and International Cartels in 
British Politics, 1924 - 1929,217.
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Fletcher, The Japanese Business Community and National Trade Policy, 1920-42, 80.
Ishii, Cotton-Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain and the United States, 1930-1936, 99. 
Wurm, Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and International Cartels in 
British Politics, 1924 -1939,232-33. For details on business efforts to secure government support 
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seen as the comer stone to sound trade policy. Coming to power in July 1929, the Hamaguchi 
government in Japan stated it was intent on restoring the gold standard at the pre-war parity, as 
anything lower “would be a shameful affront to national honor.”^^  ^An austere policy of 
deflation was embarked upon in preparation such that by 11 January 1930, Japan was once 
again on the standard. The move proved to be untimely. New York’s stock market crash in 1929 
was seen by Japanese observers to be only a “temporary set-back”^^ ’ and so government pressed 
on with its plans. As nations slid into depression, the United States market for silk, Japan’s 
largest export commodity, collapsed. Japan’s balance of payments account slipped deep into the 
red, greatly depleting its gold reserves. Unable to sustain the pre-war parity, Japan abandoned 
the gold standard in December of 1931, by which time the country had lost 786 million yen, or 
58.5 percent of its foreign exchange resources. The impact on the value of the yen was 
dramatic, sharply reducing the price of export goods. The “balance on current account moved to 
surplus and remained so until 1937.”'*^  ^In terms of trade with India, the devaluation of the yen 
moved the balance of payments in favour of Japan for the first time and, by 1932, Japan’s share 
of India’s cotton textile imports had risen to 50 percent."**® “Japan’s new success fanned the 
resentment of both native Indian industrialists who strived to raise their textile production and
Hugh T, Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920's," in Dilemmas in Growth in Prewar Japan^ ed. 
J.W. Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 253-54.
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the mill owners of Lancashire who wanted to preserve their dominance of world markets.” *^* 
The success of Japan’s cotton textile exporters threatened the country’s relations 
with both India and Britain. In the summer of 1932, the Ottawa Conference, an intercolonial 
economic gathering, erected preferential tariffs for members of the British Empire. This was 
followed by India in August of 1932 with the increase on non-British fabrics at 50 percent 
while at the same time leaving British products at 25 percent which had been set in October 
1931 Despite this increase, Japan’s exports to India continued to mount. Seeking greater 
latitude of action in dealing with Japan’s threatening export drive, India renounced in April 
1933 its long-standing commercial treaty with Japan, thereby signaling that worse might 
come. The Japanese government attempted to forestall the burgeoning trade crisis and 
discussions ensued between the two nations without, however, success, and on 6 June, India 
decreed the hefty tariff rate of 75 percent ad valorem. During that summer, talks resumed in 
an effort to resurrect the collapsed relations, followed by formal trilateral meetings in India in 
September. Negotiations managed to find a compromise position and so averted greater 
damage to trade and diplomatic relations. This friction, therefore, was an important part of the 
background to iron and steel deliberations.
Wurm, Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and International Cartels in 
British Politics, 1924 - 1939, 233.
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2. The Structure of the Shingikai Meetings
The meetings of the shingikai relating to the iron and steel industry in this period 
can be grouped around three time periods: 1) between January and March of 1926; 2) June 
1932; and 3) March 1933. The first set of meetings, running between January and March of 
1926, concerned the Proposed Revision of the Tariff Rate Law. Concomitantly, in March 
the revision of the Iron and Steel Promotion law was debated. These two sets of meetings 
were followed by further tariff talks in 1932. Finally, meetings in 1933 on the Proposed 
Law on the Japan Steel Corporation dealt specifically with the proposed amalgamation 
plan. Preceding all these meetings, late in 1924, was the publication of a petition by the 
Industrial Club of Japan. The main point to be made here about the various discussions, 
shingikai and others, during this final period of 1926 to 1933 is that though the economic 
imperatives of the time dictated in the final analysis outcomes, business did pursue its own 
ends in these talks. Even when government was determined to drive through legislation, 
forceful arguments were posited challenging the government position.
3.The Industrial Club of Japan
The ICJ report was written by the Investigation Committee on Tariff Policy, a
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committee formed from Industrial Club of Japan members. It was signed on 13 December 
1924 and entitled ‘Petition Concerning Japan’s Tariff Policy’. As its title suggests, it dealt 
with the need for the government to implement a tariff policy that would protect the 
industry. Couched in general terms, the report did not constitute a concrete plan for the 
revision of tariffs nor did it specifically refer to the iron and steel industry. However, 
discussion of this document has been included here as it did refer to the impact of economic 
change to which the industry was subject and, at one point, cited the example of the 
problem associated with weight based tariffs, which figured prominently in the previous 
chapter.
This petition was signed by Baron Nakajima Kumakichi, the chairman of the 
Tariff Policy Investigation Committee. Neither the names of the participating members nor 
the distribution list were included with this document. As was common with such 
prominent personalities, Nakajima’s sphere of influence extended beyond the business 
world and the leading roles he played in the Club. After graduating from Hitotsubashi 
University in 1897, Nakajima entered the employment of Furukawa zaibatsu and rose 
through its ranks. The trajectory of his career was one whereby he came to be seen as an 
important intermediary figure between government and the business world, and noted for
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his efforts in mediation between political parties/^^ Nakajima’s chairmanship of the 
committee suggests that the Club’s recommendations were unlikely to be shuffled to the 
bottom of the ministry in-basket.
The document commenced by mentioning that sufficient time had elapsed since 
the war had ended for the erstwhile belligerent nations to revive their industries. In turn, 
Japan had to decide on a tariff policy. With this in mind, “from the point of view of foreign 
trade competition, Japan should not miscalculate”.^^ The author indicated that during this 
period when Japan’s tariff policy had not yet been decided, the situation of both domestic 
and foreign industries was in a state of flux.^*  ^Given this situation, “at the very least, it is 
necessary to revise the tariff and the related regulations on tariffs.” *^^  Following this, the 
author observed that with regards to tariff revision, the private sector had “often been 
overlooked” In terms of recommendations, the petition focused on two points.
i) The establishment of a standing government committee for the 
investigation of tariffs
The present ad hoc approach whereby committees were formed to respond to problems was
Koizumi Tetsushi, ed., Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Tokyo; Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994), 1192.; 
Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall o f Family Enterprise Groups in Japan, 157.
Kanzei Seisaku Chosakai, "Honpô Kanzei Seisaku Ni Kan Sum Rinshin," (Tokyo: Nihon Kogyou 
Kurabu, 1924), 1. Note my pagination.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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not anticipatory. The argument was made that there needed to be created a necessity to 
create an organisation made up of members from both houses and businessmen in order to 
foresee problems and respond in a timely manner. In so doing, this would avoid the 
“dramatic shifts in the price of goods, for example those related to weight based tariffs.
ii) The establishment of deferred duty on imports for industries that already 
had a protection policy
The author indicated that deferred duty had already been implemented in Australia as a 
means of encouraging infant industries. Deferred duty was distinct from the actual 
operative tariff whereby the operative tariff is levied against imported inputs and at 
particular point in the development of the industry the operative tariff would be replaced 
with the deferred duty. This had the advantage of having set in place the necessary 
legislation during the early stages of the industry’s development and thereby obviating 
delays that might be incurred in the approval of new tariff rates necessary for the further 
development of the industry. Theoretically, the deferred duty might be either higher or 
lower than the original tariff rate. A higher rate would provide greater protection once the 
industry had established a firmer base helping ensure its long term development as opposed 
to a lower rate which would place the focus on protecting firms during their most
2.
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489vulnerable stage and later exposing them to greater competition.
Some 33 months had elapsed since the conclusion of the previous iron and steel tariff 
revision in March of 1921. Assuming that the intended scope of this JIC petition included 
the iron and steel industry, it seems clear that the Club was, at least in part, dissatisfied with 
the amendments made to the tariff schedule. However, at this point, this dissatisfaction did 
not translate into a detailed plan for changing of the schedule.
The upshot of this petition was that business entered the process of formally 
making known its views on the need for protection through tariff implementation prior to 
the start of any shingikai meetings. The documents show that at least one year prior to the 
start of these meetings, business, through its representative agency, was lobbying 
government. Strictly speaking, lobbying was not part of the shingikai deliberations, but part 
of the larger process of shaping opinion. To the extent that the Club was successful, it 
seems likely that the relative absence of disagreement in the shingikai deliberations may be 
in part attributable to this formal petitioning process.
Ibid., 3.
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4. Tariff Meetings of January and March of 1926
Upon the initiative of the Kato government, the proposal was made to increase the 
tariff on imported iron and steel in January 1926. The records themselves do not provide 
much detail of the tariff proposals but secondary sources indicate that “government had 
decided on the plan of increasing the tariff on pig iron to 7 yen based on weight”^^® from 
the existing level of 1.66 yen per ton.^^* This was an increase of more than 300 percent 
which, beyond any protection this increase might have afforded pig iron producers, was in 
itself a strong statement on the need for protection that requires some consideration. One 
interpretation is that this increase was related to the government’s other political or 
diplomatic objectives in relation to foreign competing nations. As we will see, this was 
unlikely given Japan’s concerns over its exports of cotton to India. An alternative 
interpretation is that this large increase reflected the inadequacy of the previous level of 
tariff on pig iron. Table 4.1 shows the effect of various tariff rates on the cost of pig iron.
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushî: Tekkôgyô, 241. The record is not specific about 7 yen 
increase but, as will be seen in the ensuing pages, this increase was 7 yen per ton.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 120.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Cost of Pig Iron in 1926 as Calculated by Various Tariff Rates (yen
Indian Cost of Cost of Cost of Cost of Japanese
Product! Indian Indian Indian Indian Production
on Price Pig Iron Pig Iron Pig Iron Pig Iron Price *
Less Including Includin Includin Includin
Delivery Specific gSpeciflc g gDeliver
Cost * Duty of Duty of Delivery y Cost
1.66 yen 7 yen Cost to and
per ton per ton Applied Applied
Specific Specific
Duty of Duty of
1.66 yen 7 yen
per ton per ton
22.85 " 24.51 29.85 43.66 49.00 46.22
Source: (1) Gendai nihon sangyô hattatsu shi. Vol. 4 Tekkô, p. 210
(2) Estimates o f Long-Term Economic Statistics o f Japan Since 1868, p. 232
Notes: (3) Non-adjusted price including delivery cost is 42 yen per metric ton. Delivery 
cost is 19.15 yen per metric ton (see Table 3.7), Calculation: 42 -  19.15 = 22.85 yen per metric ton.
The total delivery costs employed above are from 1922, were subject to change, but can be 
used to give a rough idea. Broadly speaking, the rate of 1.66 yen per ton provided a level of 
protection that meant that imported iron was sufficiently below the cost of the domestic 
production of pig iron, so that steel producers obtained considerable financial savings in 
purchasing Indian pig iron. At the rate of 7 yen per ton, though, there was little difference, 
and this would effectively block Indian pig iron from the Japanese domestic market. From 
the point of view of pig iron producers, this would have been ideal. The decision to propose 
an increase of 300 percent may therefore be seen as an acknowledgement to pig iron 
producers by government that they needed protection. However, as we will see, the issue 
was not whether this level would be effective in protecting pig iron producers, but rather
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whether any increase at all could be accepted. The records demonstrate that the sticking 
point was that “cabinet”^^  ^objected to the increase in the pig iron rate for reasons related to 
the cotton trade with India. As previously noted, given the importance of Japan’s textile 
exports to India, government was chary of risking trade conflict over a tariff increase in pig 
iron. The outline of the tariff meetings of this time is as follows.
Table 4.2 Outline of 1926 Tariff Meetings
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai 
Meeting
January 27, 1926 
to
February 26, 1926
5 U* Session of the Imperial Diet House of 
Representatives: The Proposed Revision of the Tariff 
Rate Law
March 11,1926 51®* Session of the Imperial Diet House of 
Representatives: The Proposed Revision of the Tariff 
Rate Law
March 11, 1926 51®* Session of the Imperial Diet House of Peers: 
Special Committee on the Proposed Revision of the 
Tariff Rate Law
March 11, 1926 51®* Session of the Imperial Diet House of Peers: 
Special Committee on the Proposed Revision of the 
Tariff Rate Law
The proposals were read in both the Lower and Upper Houses over the relatively 
short period o f about two months, in one case going through 18 Lower House meetings, 
suggesting some perceived urgency in the promulgation of the tariff rates. Whatever detail 
and concreteness the draft proposed may have had, however, discussions were rather
492 Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushî: Tekkôgyô, 241.
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superficial. The speed at which things proceeded may suggest that there was overall 
agreement over the issues at hand, and hence the relative absence of acrimony. As was 
indicated above, though, concern over trade friction with India is the more persuasive 
interpretation.
The records suggest that the relative harmoniousness of the deliberations between 
government and business representatives was importantly shaped by the context in which 
the shingikai meetings were located. Throughout this period, repeated reference was made, 
both in the Lower and Upper House meetings, to closed door secret meetings. Speakers 
either intimated or stated openly that decisions had been taken or were in the process of 
being discussed elsewhere - decisions that framed and overshadowed the present 
deliberations.
During the course of the approximately one month of the Lower House 
discussions on “The Proposed Revision of the Tariff Rate Law” , government officials were 
repeatedly confronted with questions that they were willing only partially to answer, or to 
which they simply did not know the full answer. One of the first instances when the 
inadequacy of the open forum of the shingikai to handle certain sensitive topics was 
broached came in a statement by Iwasaki Shigeo, a committee member. On 12 February 
1926, at the start of the 14* meeting, Iwasaki challenged the ministry responsible for the
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proposal by stating that, despite whatever had been said in the forum regarding protection 
for pig iron and steel materials, the tariff levels suggested by government were insufficient. 
He then added that, in fact, “in this meeting, the responses by the appropriate minister [to 
the questions asked] were only formal and committee members have not yet heard the 
details of the contents of the proposal.”^^  ^Whereas Iwasaki’s comments indicate the 
limitations of the shingikai, later discussions reveal that running parallel with these 
shingikai deliberations were closed door cabinet meetings dealing with the same issues. 
More to the point, it is stated that in the cabinet meetings, decisions were taken relating to 
tariff implementation, thus raising the question of what was the purpose of the shingikai 
meetings.
On 21 February 1926, at the outset of the 15^ meeting, committee chairman Kato 
Masanosuke commenced in the usual manner of shingikai deliberations, but added that “the 
secret meetings have been temporarily adjourned and the continuing discussions of the 
committee on the plan for the tariff rate revision law have now been opened.”'*^'* The 
implication is that there was a relationship between the conclusion of the secret meetings 
and the start of this deliberation. It is not clear from the record who attended any such
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai 
Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 649.
Ibid., 653.
278
secret meeting, or where it was held/^^ It is interesting to note that at the outset of the 
second reading on March 11, 1926 of the proposed law similar reference was made by the 
political figure Horikiri Zenbei. Horikiri indicated that he could only speak in general terms 
about the plan though it had been discussed in detail in a secret meeting and he would 
reveal its contents in this fbrum /^ The connection between the closed and open forum 
discussions was further drawn out by committee member Hashimoto Yoshizo’s comments 
that immediately followed Kato’s opening remarks.
1 have a question concerning iron. Because there were suitable answers^’  ^to the questions in the 
yesterday’s secret meeting, in general terms, what was the understanding achieved, and what 
was the decision?'*
Hashimoto continued by entering into details over possible scenarios for the protection of 
pig iron. Assuming his inquiries were driven by more than curiosity, it is interesting to note 
his approach. His line of questioning suggests that he recognized that the present forum was 
not where decisions were going to be made, nonetheless, he felt that he could at least 
discuss matters and receive first hand information on government policy decisions, if not 
perhaps influence outcomes.
There may have been more than one.
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) Dai Ichi ~ 
San Dokkai, vol. 48, Teikoku Gikai Shügiin Giji Sokkiroku - Dài 51 Kai Gikai Ge (1925) (Tokyo: Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), 738.
Hashimoto did not elaborate on what he meant by “suitable answers”.
It is unclear what Hashimoto implied by the term “suitable” in his question. He was the second speaker 
of the meeting and hence there is little background to make the judgement. Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, 
ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai 
Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 653.
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The implication o f these records is that it was accepted that the outcome of the 
tariff issue would not be determined in the shingikai meetings and, given the sense offait 
accompli that prevailed over the meetings, discussions were perhaps seen to be of little 
consequence. One possible scenario is that discussions served to provide a forum in which 
views, those of industry and others, were aired and issues debated. It is also likely that at 
least one member involved in the deliberations, for example Kataoka Naoharu'*^^, also 
attended the secret meeting. For example, in response to a question on one issue, Kataoka 
stated that approval had not been given, and also that at the secret meeting, this decision 
had not been made and there had been no public statement about it either. Further, he added 
that “I do not have a personal plan and I do not want to intervene.” ”^® This suggests that 
there was communication between the open and closed fora. Based on the comments of 
Hashimoto and others, it would seem that the shingikai meetings were used as a forum for 
the airing o f views and the debating of issues. This information would later be presented to 
the closed forum and considered in the light of the full complexity of the issues, some of 
which for reasons of sensitivity could not be discussed in the open forum. As we know, the 
remit of the shingikai was for recommendation and in this sense it may have been used here
Kataoka Naoharu was the Minister of Commerce and Industry under the Second Kato Takaaki Cabinet 
(2 Aug. 1925 -  30 Jan. 1926) and, under the First Wakatsuki Cabinet (30 Jan. 1926 -  20 Apr, 1927), 
Kataoka was again Minister of Commerce and Industry (30 Jan. 1926 -  14 Sept. 1926).
Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan - Dai Ichi Dokkai, vol. 48, 
Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin Giji Sokkiroku - Dai 51 Kai Gikai (Ge, 1925) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan 
Kai, 1983), 667.
280
as a sounding board to ascertain the views of industry.
So up to this point, running parallel with the shingikai deliberations was what the 
records refer to as a secret or closed-door meeting. During the discussions on the 23^  ^of 
February, in relation to a discrepancy regarding the proposed level of tariff, one committee 
member, Ota Shinjiro, made specific reference to à higher body.
Concerning the tariff on pig iron, there was the explanation provided by the leading minister 
and there were some points of understanding, however there is still one more concern which I 
would like to express. With regards to pig iron tariffs, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
made the original plan for the levying of 10 yen per ton for the purpose of planning for self 
sufficiency in steel. However, in the cabinet meeting this was rejected.^®'
The record does not expand on the cabinet decision or on the decision to make the original 
plan a proposal. It is important to note, though, that cabinet entered the decision making 
process and would appear to have reviewed the ministry’s draft prior to its being presented 
to the shingikai meeting. It is not clear from this example whether this was standard 
operating procedure or an exception. In either case, political input at the highest levels was 
made which shaped the eventual proposal.
The role and authority of the cabinet meeting was made clearer in comments by 
Kataoka. In response to questions from another committee member, Yamamoto Jôtarô, 
questions regarding the exclusion of non-integrated pig iron producers from the revision of
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai 
Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 662.
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the Iron and Steel Promotion Law/°^ which he indicated was closely linked with the tariff 
issue, Kataoka stated the following:
Because, also, in the secret meeting approval was not given, and because still there has not yet 
been a decision taken in cabinet... in this open forum, it [the proposal] will not be stated.^”
It is not clear from this passage whether the closed door secret meetings referred to in the
previous passages is the same as the cabinet meeting. Proposals made by the ministry and
submitted to the shingikai for discussion would therefore appear to have been subject to
cabinet approval. Furthermore, in this instance at least, there would appear to have been an
ongoing process of shingikai deliberations based on the material presented, whether it be
the original plan of the ministry or an amended version based on the deliberations taken in
higher bodies, as well as two-way communication between the Council and the higher body
relayed by members who sat on both committees.
Possible reasons for why in this case decision making took place in higher bodies 
are offered in the shingikai records themselves. Reference is made a number of times to the 
fact that the tariff issues were linked to diplomatic and foreign policy matters and, by 
implication, this meant that certain aspects could not be discussed in an open forum and
The shingikai deliberations for the revision of the Promotion of the Iron and Steel Law had not yet 
commenced. This suggests that the contents of the proposed revisions were known outside of the 
immediate circles concerned with the rewriting of the Law.
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai 
Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 667.
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that decisions had to be made elsewhere. As we know, the remit of the shingikai was 
limited to providing recommendations, and thus it comes as no surprise that authoritative 
bodies elsewhere should make the actual decisions. However, this is one of the few 
instances where the structural relationship between the shingikai and the other bodies can 
be seen in combination with what were perceived as sensitive issues which limit the 
potential role of the shingikai forum.
It was noted above how, on 12 February 1926, Iwasaki Shigeo made reference to 
circumspect comments made by a minister. Iwasaki then proceeded to outline the larger 
problem in discussing the issue of protection. In particular, he drew out the link between 
pig iron and the role it played in national defence and the necessity of implementing 
national policy with this in mind. He continued to discuss production volumes in Japan in 
comparison with Korea and elsewhere, underscoring the point that Japan was performing 
poorly. Finally, he brought up the subject of India, a sensitive topic for diplomatic reasons, 
and the relationship to foreign policy. He did not explain what the diplomatic reason was, 
but we can assume that this related to the cotton trade issue. With regards to this, he stated 
“I have some detailed questions I would like to ask ... [however] with regards to certain 
diplomatic matters, if this topic can not be discussed adequately in such a forum as this, 
then a closed meeting is also fine. If, however, this open forum is fine to discuss in detail
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such matters then I would like to ask about the relationship with India [and tariff 
protection] It was then agreed that the matter could not be discussed because the 
responsible minister was not present at the meeting. Discussion continued with members 
back to the sensitive issue of foreign policy and its relationship with tariff implementation. 
However, government respondents were unable to adequately deal with the questions.
In the end, the committee resolved that the tariff rate on steel should be raised by 
more than 30 percent, though the level for pig iron would remain untouched.^®^ On 24 
February 1926, Baron Yabuki Shôzô, vice-minister of foreign affairs, alluded directly to the 
diplomatic reasons involved in the decision not to raise the tariff on pig iron.
With regards to the decision not to raise the tariff on pig iron, this decision was not taken by the 
cabinet but occurred in the tariff committee meeting. However, with regards to this [decision], 
there was a great deal of concern over the Indian cloth tariff. Of course, this was stated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the committee meetings. This was then considered from this 
perspective by the numerous committee members and so in this way the basic plan came 
about.^506
Thus far, the examination has focused on the Lower House debates in which the 
bulk of the discussion transpired. The important point is that these deliberations were 
subordinate to the decision making authority o f a higher body. This is also evidenced by the 
open remarks of Count Yanagisawa Yasutoshi, who indicated that with respect to the
Ibid., 649.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steellndustry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 121.
^  Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan (Seifu Teishutsu) linkai 
Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Jyûhakkai - 1926 Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai, 673.
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raising o f the pig iron tariff rate, there were fears about Indian complaints. By means of 
compensation for pig iron producers, a system of subsidies was discussed, but this was 
something that “must be absolutely left up to the closed door secret meeting to discuss.” ®^^ 
With respect to Baron Yabuki’s claim that the decision had not been taken by the cabinet, 
Seiichiro Yonekura would not agree.
The government at one point decided to place a similar increase on imported iron, raising it 
from 1.66 yen to 7 yen per ton. In a cabinet meeting, however, the Foreign Minister opposed the 
iron tariff increase, because the Foreign Ministry feared retaliatory tariffs by the Indian 
government on Japanese cotton textiles.^ ®*
In the end it is very difficult to determine with certainty where precisely the 
decision was made not to raise the tariff rate on pig iron. Both the secondary sources 
consulted here and much of the comment made during the meetings, both Lower and Upper 
House, indicate that a higher body, such as the cabinet, was actively monitoring the 
shingikai meetings. On numerous occasions the foreign policy considerations were 
mentioned as overriding factors in determining the outcome of discussions. It is argued here 
that these factors framed the deliberations and mitigated the potential of the discussions to 
become far more acrimonious.
This does raise the question of why members would attend meetings when they
Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin, ed., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchü Kaisei Hôritsuan - Dai Ichi Dokkai, 787. 
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 120. Yonekura 
draws on the work of Nishikawa Hiroshi, {Nihon Teikokushugi to Mengyô, (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 1987, 
93).
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suspected, or perhaps knew, that crucial decisions would be made elsewhere. Though the 
specific time duration of each meeting was not provided in the records, there were 18 
meetings for the first shingikai and three other sets of meetings. Although, judging by the 
extent of the records, these meetings were not necessarily lengthy, overall they consumed a 
great deal o f time. High ranking members of government and business participated, 
suggesting that they felt there was something to be had by attending. Perhaps one answer to 
this question relates to the opportunity to partake in the ‘dialogue’ with the higher body.
We may assume that some members did sit at both tables and that information was relayed 
between the two, potentially providing a conduit for the exercise of influence by business 
on government decisions. Further, though, despite the overall sense o f accomplf\ not 
all the discussions completely lacked friction. Pointed questions over the tariff rate on pig 
iron proved to indicate that some members were not prepared to take the refusal to raise the 
rate lying down. Moreover, as previously mentioned, in response to the failure of 
Kataoka’s initiative to increase pig iron tariff rates, alternative compensatory measures 
were undertaken in the context of the second revision of the Promotion Law in 1926.
S.The Revision of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law of 1926
Overlapping with the final Upper House discussions on the tariff issue of 1926 was the
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beginning of debates on the revision of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law. As 
indicated in Table 4.3 below, the shingikai considering this issue dealt with three topics: the 
Promotion Law, the Proposed Special Accounting Law of Yawata^® ,^ and the Proposed 
Revision on the Tariff Law with respect to Korea. Table 4.2 is the outline of the relevant 
shingikai meetings.
Table 4.3: Outline of the Meetings on the Revision of the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion 
Law of 1926
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai Meeting
19 March 1926 
to
22 March 1926
51®* Session o f the Imperial Diet House of 
Representatives: Proposed Law on the Revision of the 
Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law; the Proposed 
Special Accounting Law of Yawata; and the Revision on 
the Proposed Tariff Law with respect to Korea
19 March 1926 
to
23 March 1926
51®* Session of the Imperial Diet House of 
Representatives: Proposed Law on the Revision of the 
Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law
23 March 1926 51®* Session of the Imperial Diet House of Peers: 
Committee chairman’s presentation on the Proposed Iron 
and Steel Industry Promotion Law Upper House debate
25 March 1926 51®* Session of the Imperial Diet House of Peers: 
Proposed Revision of the Iron and Steel Industry 
Promotion Law Upper House debates
Our concern here is specifically the proposals relating to the Promotion Law. 
Though the other two issues were related to the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry, 
they were not specifically linked to the main questions that proved to be sticking points for
There is separate set of shingikai deliberations entitled “Special Accounting Law of the Yawata Works” 
passed by the 51®* Diet in 1926 that established the works on a quasi-private basis. These debates do not 
deal with the division between pig iron and steel producers or private versus public sector which are 
central to this thesis and thus will not be addressed here.
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certain members of the industry.
The first set of meetings identified in Table 4.3, those held between 19 March and 
22 March 1926, were the longest in terms of the volume of records of this set of Promotion 
Law debates, and perhaps provide the greatest insight into the expectations of business. 
Records of the other Lower House meetings of 19 - 23 March, the second set, and the 
Upper House meetings on 23 and 25 March, suggest relatively little debate, and discussion 
largely limited to the expression of the government position and questions addressing 
particular points of clarification. These meetings, however, suggest that overall the main 
sticking point was the government position that, as opposed to the 1917 version of this law, 
which rendered both iron or steel manufacturers eligible for subsidy, only integrated sites 
were to benefit.
Judging by the brief 6 day span of deliberations that covered the period 19 March 
to 25 March 1926, passage of the proposal through the two houses was relatively swift. At 
the start of the first set o f meetings on 19 March, Nomura Karoku, a Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry parliamentary councillor, indicated that the main concern was the future 
development of the industry, and that appropriate revisions of the 1917 law were being 
considered. In particular, he cited problems stemming from external factors, such as 
cheaply made foreign products, and stated that it was felt that Japan needed to have a larger
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integrated production capacity. The purpose of this revision was to promote that aim.^^° Or, 
as he stated in more specific terms later in the day, “the main aim of the Promotion Law 
was to establish a base for the industry.” *^* This basis was seen as being an integrated one. 
Also on 19 March, during the second set of meetings, Kataoka Naoharu, the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, stated that the economic circumstances of post World War I meant 
international competition acutely heightened the need to establish an efficient domestic
production base.^’^
First of all, with regards to the intention of establishing Japan as an industrial 
country, there is great interest in the necessity to [achieve this]... I think that it is appropriate to 
put weight behind Japan’s industry, both the agricultural industry and the so-called basic 
industries.^"
This intention to promote integrated sites was reflected in the articles of the proposed law. 
In abbreviated form, the relevant articles in the revised version of the Promotion Law were 
outlined in the records of the first set of meetings and are as follows:
Article 1 : This law applies to Iron and steel sites that have a pig iron production capacity of 
35,000 tons annually or more and a steel production capacity of 35,000 tons annually or more
Article 8: Based on government decision, the sites of the production capacity stated in Article 1 
would receive subsidisation^"
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôreihô Kaisei Hôritsu an (Seifu Teishutsu) Hoka 
Niken linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ichi Kai ~ San Kai, vol. 50, Teikoku Gikai Shügiin linkai Giroku - Dai 51 
Kai Gikai (5) (1925-1926) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1981), 267.
/W ., 291.
Teikoku Gikai Shügiin, éd., Seitetsugyô Shôreihô Kaisei Hôritsuan, vol. 46, Teikoku Gikai Shügiin Giji 
Sokkiroku - Dai 51 Kai Gikai (Ge, 1925) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1982), 852.
""/W ., 857.
Tsûshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 244.
289
Thus, in contrast to the former version of this law, seen in the previous chapter, in which 
subsidisation was extended to pig iron or steel producing sites of 35,000 tons, this proposed 
revision stipulated that beneficiaries must be integrated sites.
In the debates, there was considerable friction over the fact that non-integrated 
sites were left in the cold, and certain members did fervently express their opinions. Despite 
this, one gets an overall feeling that this set of shingikai meetings was pervaded by a sense 
of foregone conclusion. As opposed to the meetings on the tariff issue, in which 
participants seemed to be conscious of the larger decision making structure in which they 
were located, here the dominant impression one gets is that from the outset government had 
a particular agenda and regardless of whatever disagreement existed, arguing would be to 
no avail.
Starting the afternoon session of the first set of meetings on March 19, 1926, Mori 
Kaku began a lengthy speech in opposition to the government position. Mori was a 
businessman with a long history of involvement in the iron and steel industry and later, 
after retirement from Mitsui Bussan in 1920, was elected to the Lower House as a member 
o f the Seiyûkai party. Viewed as an expansionist, he played a prominent role in the 
1930s in the “armed occupation of Manchuria and the eventual collapse of party
Koizumi Tetsushi, ed., Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten, 1621.
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government in Japan.”^^  ^He was known to be both aggressive and vocal in the pursuit of 
his aims. In the 59* Session of the Diet, in which there was discussion over the conclusion 
of the London Naval Treaty, Mori strongly objected to the limitations imposed on the 
Japanese navy by the treaty. According to one author, “Mori and the extremists of the 
Seiyûkai were ready to resort to any tactic to wrest control of the government from the 
party in power.” '^^  With respect to the revision of the Promotion Law, Mori said that 
government had advanced its argument for the subsidisation of integrated sites on the basis 
of economic efficiency, in that the greatest economies of scale were achieved by those sites 
that had a streamlined production process. Claiming to look at things from a business 
perspective, he pointed out that the numbers that the government put forward did not 
correspond with reality. The arguments presented thus far were based on economics, which 
were influenced by external circumstances, and these external circumstances were subject 
to change. In short, he charged the government with having presented a proposal that fell 
short of the research and clarity of thought required.
As for one doubt I have, as stated in many meetings, the government also has not really thought 
about this ... plan (the bill). We firmly do not believe in this [proposal], in particular there is a 
slim profit margin... the difference is extremely narrow. I fear that if the [economic] 
circumstances were slightly to change, it would be impossible to realize the fundamental
Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963), ix.
80.
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objective of the plan.^‘*
Later during the same afternoon, Mori continued to press the government on its position 
and, in perhaps his most heated moment, stated that “I cannot be satisfied with the 
government’s response and ... the circumstances indicated by committee member 
Kanemitsu [Tsuneo] will be in vain. The reason for this is this office’s single objective [the 
subsidisation of integrated sites to the exclusion of non-integrated p ro d u c e r s ] .G iv e n  
Mori’s previous background in Mitsui and the fact that, as we will see, Mitsui would 
benefit from this revision to the law, Mori would seem to have had little reason to express 
discontent. However, as was apparent from the heated debates in the final days of the 
original Promotion Law, though vocal members may have had extensive connections with 
big business, in the end their primary affiliation seemed to be with that part of the 
bicameral division to which they had been elected. Here, also we see Mori, a lower house 
member, defending the interests of the smaller non-integrated members. Kanemitsu 
himself, a businessman and also member of the Lower House, shared Mori’s discontent, 
lambasting the government by accusing it of letting the many sites with production capacity 
below 35000 tons become “victims”^^ ®, and claiming that government was willing to let
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôreihô Kaisei Hôritsu an (Seifu Teishutsu) Hoka 
Niken linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ichi Kai ~ San Kai, 277.
^^^Ibid, 293.
^^°/W .,286.
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them “die before your eyes.”^^*
Thus, the first set of meetings between 19 and 22 March was used by business to 
express discontent with the proposed revision of the Promotion Law and, indeed, this 
discontent was expressed in a rather pointed manner by more than one influential figure. 
That having been said, though, the overall thrust of the questions was about information 
gathering and clarification of points. By and large, the pattern was one in which particular 
points regarding the proposed plan were raised and answered by a government 
representative. Discussion then moved on to the next point.
The upshot of the meetings held between 19 March and 25 March 1926 was that 
private sector opposition to the government draft of the revision of the Promotion Law did 
not alter the original position of government. That is, subsidisation was to be awarded to 
integrated sites that had an annual capacity of more than 35,000 tons of both iron and 
steel^^ ,^ and not to separate iron or steel producers as found in the original law of 1917. 
This was in line with the government view that an efficient integrated iron and steel 
production base was required for the long term development of the industry. Similar to the 
arguments presented by government during the debates over the original Promotion Law of 
1917, efficiency was measured against the benchmark of 100 tons per day of output of iron
Ibid.
Tsüshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 244.
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and steel. Noda Tsuruo, an engineer from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, stated 
that “if  a site does not have a 100 ton furnace, it would be impossible to enter the future 
economic world.”^^  ^Echoing the sentiments of Mori and Kanemitsu, private sector rebuttal 
came from several fronts, ranging from arguments challenging the underlying rationale of 
the benchmark figure to claims that those who would not receive the benefit would wither 
away. These arguments are seen in the much more vociferous debates of the original 
Promotion Law, and in the process modification of the government position was achieved. 
This time, however, there was no modification. In comparison to the 1917 law, the debates 
were much less heated, with fewer spokesmen challenging the government position, and 
despite the objections there seemed from the outset to be a tone of acceptance. As 
mentioned, the bulk of the discussions revolved around clarification rather than business 
seeking a particular end. Explanations for this can be found outside of the shingikai forum, 
that is, examination of the structure of the industry and the nature of vested interests can 
provide some understanding of why this was so.
During the 5 f  * Diet session, Muto Sanji, a member of the Upper House and 
President of Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning Company, aired his views on the government 
position not to subsidise non-integrated producers, pointing a finger at government
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai, ed., Seitetsugyô Shôreihô Kaisei Hôritsu an (Seifu Teishutsu) Hoka 
Niken linkai Giroku (Sokki) Dai Ichi Kai ~ San Kai, 286,
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favouritism of big business. It is cited that as Japan’s cotton textile industry was “quite 
independent from both the protectionism of the government and the financial influence of 
the zaibatsu... [Muto] could be very critical of government subsidisation.”^^ '* Also, 
underlying Muto’s vocal opposition may have been, in part, factors contributing to his
cotton interests which may have conflicted with big business.
The only firms that can manufacture [everything] from iron ore to steel products are Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Okura. Why were non-integrated firms excluded? This iron and steel 
subsidization is for the protection of one part of the political merchants and the wealthy. Seen 
from the perspective of Japan’s economy, this is a waste.^ ^^
Similar to the case with the original Promotion Law of 1917, zaibatsu affiliated sites were 
the benefactors of these new proposals. Of the private sector sites, only Mitsui’s Kamaishi 
and Wanishi, Mitsuibishi’s Kenjiho, and later Asano Shipbuilding’s Steel Division, had 
achieved some level of integrated production, though they did not necessarily have a 
balanced production system, and had a production capacity above 35,000 tons. The 
economic benefits afforded to these firms by this new level of subsidisation are shown in 
Table 4.4.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 122. 
Quoted in Tsüshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 245.
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Table 4.4: Assessed Subsidy and Profit of Integrated Firms (units: 1000 yen)
Wan­
ishi
Kama­
ishi
Ken­
jiho
Asa­
no
Total
Year Profit Sub­
sidy
Profit Sub­
sidy
Profit Sub­
sidy
Profit Sub­
sidy
Profit Sub­
sidy
1926 190 174 142 199 12 272 -20 — 324 645
1927 334 274 11 307 54 517 -71 45 328 1144
1928 240 475 67 350 107 531 103 190 562 1546
1929 364 NA 173 NA 40 NA 918 NA 1495 1598
1930 -162 NA -291 NA -56 NA -836 NA -1345 1244
NA: Not available
Source: K. lida et a/ (eds), Gendai nihon sangyô hattatsu shi, IV, tekkô (Tokyo, Kojunsha, 1969), p. 272 
Note: For the year 1929, the value for the subsidy for each firm was not available, only that for total 
subsidy was available.
Though in certain years, we see that some firms did achieve profit levels above their level 
of subsidy, the total pay out in each year was in excess of any profits accrued. The profits 
afforded by this subsidisation were critical to the economic viability of these select firms. 
Moreover, non-integrated producers, in this case of both pig iron and steel, did not benefit 
from the subsidisation, regardless of their production capacity. Further, the disparity 
between the zaibatsu, which had already strengthened their positions through the absorption 
of smaller failing firms in the post-war economic downturn, and the smaller producers was 
increased.
Thus, the outcome of this revision of the Promotion Law was similar to that of 
1917, in that small producers were not afforded the benefits of subsidy. However, in stark 
contrast to the debates that culminated in the compromise position of the original law, 
despite the objections business expressed here, government succeeded in passing this bill.
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When this revision is juxtaposed against the first revision in 1921, comparison becomes 
more difficult. One reason for this is that the proceedings of the 1921 revision were 
conducted together with the debates on the revision of the tariff rate law. Moreover, 
amendments to the existing Promotion Law were not as substantial as they were in the 1926 
revision. What can perhaps be discerned across these three cases is that the extent to which 
there was friction over any particular issue was related to who were the stakeholders and 
the perception of what gains might be obtained. This underscores the point that business 
acted as an independent actor when it suited it to do so and that the forum of the shingikai 
was seen as an opportunity to express views. In the case of the Promotion Law of 1917, the 
debates were heated, in part, because there were Lower House members in the shingikai 
meetings who recognised that if government were to succeed in driving through its aim of 
only subsidising sites above 35,000 ton annual capacity, the small producers, viability 
would be in question. Indeed, as we have seen, large numbers of these producers went 
bankrupt or were absorbed by the zaibatsu. While the number of actors diminished, the 
zaibatsu, through these acquisitions and their extensive financial base, enhanced their 
economic presence and, it seems likely, their political clout. By 1926, in an industry in 
which the number of small actors had dramatically diminished and the strong ones had 
become stronger, government was capable of driving through legislation as it wished as
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long as it coincided with the interests of big business. That backroom dealing had occurred 
prior to the outset o f the meetings is indicated in at least one secondary source. Yet, despite 
this, prominent committee members such as Mori, who had only six years before retired 
from Mitsui Bussan, took the time and made the effort to voice strong objection to the 
proposal and thereby support the cause of the small producer. What this suggests is that, 
with sufficient support from key business interests, government could dictate outcomes in 
the shingikai proceedings and, at the same time, the shingikai provided a forum for 
dissenting business interests to express their views. Whether either Mori or Kanemitsu 
really believed that they would be able to amend the bill in favour of the small producer is 
perhaps a separate issue, but what they do seem to have felt is that the formal setting of the 
shingikai was an opportunity for business to exercise whatever influence the current 
circumstances allowed for.
6.Tariff Meetings of June 1932
Shortly after the restoration of the gold standard in January of 1930, the Hamaguchi 
government formed the Temporary Industrial Council with the aim of considering the 
changes needed in national economic policy in light of the recessionary economic trends. In 
its report of November 1930, entitled the “Policy Plan concerning the Regulation of the
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Iron and Steel Industry”, the council advocated a number of measures, one of which was 
the revision of the tariff rate law. This, in turn, began a movement that advanced the 
position that the pig iron tariff should also be increased.^^^ However, machinery makers 
and other steel product makers strongly objected to any increase in tariffs on either iron or 
steel, citing reasons for their objections including fear of Indian textile trade frictions and 
the fact that this increase was contrary to the interests of free trade.^^^ In face of this 
opposition, plans for the submission of a tariff revision bill to the 59* Diet in 1931 were 
abandoned. Later, on the 17* November 1931, at the urging of the Pig Iron Cooperative 
Association and the Steel Association, Kimura Kusuyata, Dan Takuma, Go Seinosuke, and 
other leading top zaikai figures approached government with a view to revising the tariff 
law.^^* This coincided with other economic developments which helped sway government 
opinion in favour of submitting the tariff revision proposal. One decisive factor was the 
abandonment of the gold standard in Dec. 1931, which precipitated a dramatic decline in 
the yen. In June of 1932, under the Saito administration, a proposal was placed before the 
62“‘* Diet session for a tariff increase on imported iron and steel.
A further factor was the current prevailing view of how India would view an
291.
Ibid., 293. No details are given on this, and we cannot be certain what their position was regarding the 
increase of the rate on pig iron.
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increase in the pig iron tariff rate. As has been discussed, over the 1920s and into the early 
1930s, parallel with the expanding share of Japan’s textile trade with India, came increasing 
trade tensions. The declining value of the yen following the abandonment of the gold 
standard increased Japan’s export competitiveness and, by extension, might be expected to 
have heightened trade tension. However, despite this background, government proceeded to 
push through this tariff increase. The rationale given is that as India had raised its own tariff 
rates in recent years, government felt less hesitant about raising its own levels of 
protection.^^^ Government had expressed concern over Indian tariff retaliation during the 
1926 tariff revision, and this was cited as a contributory factor to the decision not to 
increase the tariff rate on pig iron. Ironically, the economic and diplomatic circumstances in 
the post-1930 period were in some ways even less conducive to increasing the tariff on pig 
iron, than those midway through the 1920s. It is not the case that no concern over the 
Indian textile trade was expressed in the 1932 tariff talks, but rather that it did not figure as 
large in the talks as it had in 1926 and, in the end, did not influence the outcome, as the pig 
iron rate was nevertheless increased. Also, in 1926, there was a pervasive sense of a higher 
authoritative body deciding on the outcome of the tariff revision, one factor in whose 
calculus was the India question. This hierarchy is not apparent in the 1932 talks.
Nagashima Osamu, Semen Nihon Tekkôgyô No Kôzô Bunseki, 291.
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The passage of the bill was not smooth as the increase in the pig iron tariff met 
with considerable objection. One factor was that some pig iron producers were already 
receiving subsidies afforded by the revised Promotion Law of 1926 and this proposed 
increase in the tariff rate was argued as being excessive.^^® Despite this, one gets a 
pervasive feeling that government was determined to push through the revision and, indeed, 
in the end this is what happened. An outline of these tariff meetings is given in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Outline of 1932 Tariff Meetings
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai Meeting
June 5, 1932 
to
June 6 , 1932
62"“ Session o f the Imperial Diet House of Representatives: 
Proposed Revision of the Tariff Rate Law
June 12, 1932 
to
June 15, 1932
62"“ Session of the Imperial Diet House of Peers: Proposed 
Revision of the Tariff Rate Law
The 1932 tariff revision meetings were shorter than those of 1926 and markedly different. 
Perhaps most obvious was that government had taken up the defence of pig iron producers. 
Up to then, pig iron producers had largely found themselves opposing government. They 
were either represented by the iron and steel industry as a whole, or left to defend their own 
interests. Through the passage of this bill, substantial increases in the tariff schedule for 
both pig iron and steel producers were implemented. As for steel, an approximately 35
Tsüshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô  ^294.
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percent increase was added to the existing rates and that for pig iron was dramatically 
raised by 72 percent/^ ^
Table 4.6: Revised 1932 Tariff Schedule for Iron and Steel
Product Form er Tariff Rate 
(yen/ton)
Revised Tariff Rate 
(yen/ton)
Pig Iron 1 . 6 6 6 . 0 0
Steel(1)
Sheet Bar 8.33 11.16
Bar and Rod 18.33 24.66
Rail 15.83 21.33
Silicon Steel Plate 5.00 6 . 6 6
Thick Plate 18.33 24.66
Source: Tsüshô Sangyôshô, Shôkô Seisakushi, Tekkôgyô, Vol. 17, p. 294 
Note: (1) Steel tariff rates are weight specific
(2) Tariff rates for pig iron have been converted here from ad valorem to weight specific. Though 
the original source is not specific, we can assume that these figures are at 1932 prices.
Lower House discussions of the proposals was spread over 3 readings: the first 
reading on 5 July was decidedly the longest and the remaining two very much shorter ones 
both took place on 11 June. Arguments for and against the proposed tariff increase were 
essentially made on 5 June, with resolution to these issues swiftly achieved on 11 June. The 
position of government was quickly set out by Takahashi Korekiyo, the Minister of 
Finance, who pointed out that the situation regarding the import of and demand for the 
items proposed to be covered by tariffs, was such that they were in need of protection.^^^ 
Takahashi was followed by Nakajima Yadanji, a member of the House of Representatives, 
who challenged the government rationale for the tariff increase. Whereas there is the sense
It is not clear in the documents why pig iron tariff rates were to be calculated on an ad valorem basis 
and steel tariff rates on a wei^t specific basis.
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kamel Teiritsu Hôchû Kaisei Horitsuan Gai Ichi Ken, vol. 57, Teikoku 
Gikai Shûgiin Giji Sokkiroku - Dai 62 Kai Gikai (Tokyo: Tokyo Gaigaku Shuppan Kai, 1983), 37.
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of a predetermined decision in the records of the first set of tariff meetings, and, in 
consequence, the relative absence of friction or argumentation, here we find that 
discussions were quite forceful and argumentative. The salient feature of the exchange 
between the government and the non-government position is that, overwhelmingly, 
Nakajima was the main non-government speaker and dominated the talks. Of the 13 pages 
of transcripts which constitute the first reading, eight are taken up with Nakajima’s words. 
To a large extent, these discussions do not suggest the friction found in some other talks, 
such as those relating to the Promotion Law of 1917. It is difficult to find any short passage 
fully indicating the weight of Nakajima’s arguments. Rather, it is their extensiveness and 
the detail o f his comments that reveal the forcefulness with which Nakajima challenged the 
government position. The rebuttal by government was short, and essentially a reiteration of 
the government position established at the outset.
A graduate of Tokyo Imperial University in 1912, Nakajima’s career as a 
bureaucrat had commenced in the Ministry of Home Affairs. He later transferred to the 
Ministry of Finance and by 1924 had become the private secretary of Hamaguchi Osachi, 
who later became prime minister in July 1929. In 1927 the political party Rikken Minseito 
under Hamaguchi was founded, at which time Nakajima took up the position of the party’s 
secretary to the president. Early in the following year he was elected to the Lower House,
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holding his seat through the subsequent six elections. After his appointment as 
Hamaguchi's secretary, he was appointed to various positions including parliamentary 
councillor for railroads and parliamentary vice-minister of the Ministry of Finance, During 
his period as the prime minister’s private secretary, he became closely involved with the 
financial retrenchment plans debated at that time.^^  ^It would appear then that Nakajima’s 
career as bureaucrat and politician brought him in close proximity to those who held the 
reins of political power. The key positions that he had held suggests that his opinion carried 
weight and would have been considered important, something also reflected in the length of 
his speeches in the tariff meetings.
Among the issues raised by Nakajima was the impact on the India trade 
relationship of what he considered to be the “absurdly””  ^high increase in the tariff on pig 
iron.
I would like to ask one more question about the pig iron from “Ban”^^  ^in India on which 
the tariff rate of 36 sen per 100 kin would be levied. Is there a fear that this will create a barrier 
to future Japan and India trade? Previously there was concern over this. Because of the problem 
over cotton thread and cloth, during the period when Kataoka was the Minister of Finance, this 
problem was solved through giving a subsidy of 4 yen per ton (legislated by the 1926 
Promotion Law). However, after this, because India increased its tariff on cotton thread and 
cloth, there was no fear over trade retaliation. But, if we look at today’s situation for companies
Koizumi Tetsushi, ed., Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten, 1147-48.
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchû Kaisei Horitsuan Gai Ichi Ken, 41.
Judging from the context of the passage. Ban is an iron and steel production site. In present day India, 
there is a centre in the north west of India that is called Ban, and perhaps this is where tiiat production site 
was located.
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in India, it is one that causes the rejection of foreign products.... With regards to pig iron from 
“Ban”, if the tariff rate is increased, this will worry them. Will this not cause a fear in particular 
for rayon [producers]? Will this not create a fear over tariff retaliation?^ ^®
These concerns were dealt with by Nakajima Kumakichi, the government representative in his 
response to Nakajima Yadanji’s lengthy introductory speech. Essentially, Kumakichi’s point 
was that there was little to worry about, as the volume of export of pig iron would not cause 
concern for India.
Consider the situation that year on year, Japan has imported large amounts of raw cotton from 
India,... with respect to that part of the 150,000 tons of pig iron that is exported, I do not think 
that [export of pig iron] up to that level [will give] reason to worry about India’s attitude.®^ ^
His words were met by applause.
The considerable opposition expressed by the private sector prior to the outset of 
the meetings^^* and the forceful arguments presented by Nakajima in the meetings must 
have given government cause for reflection. However, it is not apparent from the records 
that discussion that meaningfully engaged with private sector concerns occurred. In the 
final analysis, the voices of opposition did not carry the day, and the Diet passed the bill in 
the Diet. The dramatic increase in the rate of the pig iron tariff and the pervasive feeling 
that government was prepared to ram this bill through raises the issue of how do we
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin, éd., Kanzei Teiritsu Hôchû Kaisei Horitsuan Gai Ichi Ken, 43. 
Ibid., 46.
Tsüshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 291-94.
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account for the government’s ability to achieve its objectives in this instance, but not in the 
case of the 1917 Promotion Law. One factor that is hard to judge is how far the government 
view that India would not be concerned over the increase in the tariff rate was also accepted 
by the business community. Certainly Nakajima Yadanji, for one, was sceptical. However, 
we also know that government was urged by leading members of the Industrial Club, the 
Pig Iron Association and the Steel Association, to put the tariff revision bill to the diet. This 
would suggest that a large segment of pig iron and steel producers supported the tariff 
increase. This is not to say that they necessarily believed that India would not be concerned 
over the increase, but perhaps they conveniently chose to ignore it. In this sense, Nakajima 
may have been a lone voice in the wilderness. Furthermore, wide pig iron and steel 
producer support for the bill may explain why government was able to push through the 
legislation. As was noted, there was considerable objection to the proposal from various 
related sectors, and perhaps Nakajima was speaking on their behalf. In any case, the 
opposition that was raised prior to the submission of the bill and during the discussions did 
not alter the path the government was following. In terms of what this means for the use of 
the shingikai forum as a opportunity to express opinion and shape outcomes, we see again 
the limitations imposed from without. In the case of the 1926 tariff revision, one limitation 
was the concern over India trade friction and also that higher authoritative bodies appeared
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to have circumscribed whatever influence the talks may have had. Here, in the 1932 tariff 
revision talks, the apparently critical factor was the support that had been established prior 
to submission of the bill. In this sense, if both government and the industry supported a bill, 
the extent to which the shingikai forum could be used to influence outcome was limited. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, judging by the lengthy talk by Nakajima Yadanji, the 
forum was still seen as a place in which objections could at least be raised. And perhaps, 
despite the sense of fa it accompli, the forum may still have been seen by some as an 
opportunity to shape outcomes.
Though government was able to overcome opposition to the bill and see its 
passage into legislation, the bill did not pass without amendment, as the Lower House 
stipulated that a thorough examination of the industry be conducted and rationalization be 
carried out.^^  ^The Upper House, echoing these sentiments, stipulated rationalisation as 
well, and demanded that the industry be placed on a more efficient footing.^ '^ ® “Both Houses 
were anxious about the damage to international competitiveness brought about by the 
higher material costs caused by the tariff increase. These additional resolutions of the 
Houses triggered off new moves for the consolidation of Yawata and the private flrms.” '^**
Ibid., 294.
Ibid.
Yonekura, The Japanese Steellndustry, 1850- 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 139.
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7. Japan Steel Corporation Bill
The stipulations added by the Upper and Lower Houses regarding rationalisation 
of the iron and steel industry provided the impetus for the final drive to consolidation. 
Table 4.3 provides an outline of the shingikai meetings concerned with the formation of 
Japan Steel, the product of this rationalisation.
Table 4.7: Outline of Meetings to discuss the 1933 Japan Steel Corporation Bill
Date Abridged Title of the Record of the Shingikai Meeting
I March 1933
to
II March 1933
Session 64 of the Imperial Diet House of Representatives: 
Proposed Law on the Japan Steel Corporation: Committee
Records
16 March 1933 
to
24 March 1933
Session 64 of the Imperial Diet House of Peers: Proposed Law 
on the Japan Steel Corporation: Special Committee Records
November
1 9 3 3 5 4 2
Investigation Committee on the Evaluation of the Iron and 
Steel Industry: Record of the Proceedings of Second Meeting 
of the Special Committee
As the increase in tariffs placed iron producers in a more favourable position they became 
more open to the idea of consolidation. Prior to the passage of the tariff bill, when their 
earning capacity was lower, they had feared that they would be in a disadvantageous 
position when any later evaluation of the assets of companies participating in the
Analysis of the records of this committee are not included as the establishment of the Japan Steel 
Corporation was established with the passing of the bill through the Upper House. This committee sat 
subsequently to consider the issue of asset evaluation not whether the Corporation would be established. 
Further, the minutes of the evaluation committee are not included in the records of the Lower or House 
shingikai meetings.
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amalgamation of the industry occurred. This fear was allayed by the increase in earning 
power under the protection of the new tariff and, in turn, iron producers became more 
willing to consider the merits of the amalgamation of the industry. "^*^
On the political front, developments had also transpired that helped provide a 
more favourable environment for the passage of a bill to unify the industry. Following the 
May 15 incident, in which Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated, Saito Makoto 
was appointed prime minister. He presided over a so-called “cabinet of national unity” with 
representatives from the parties, bureaucracy, and military, and “it was hoped that Saito 
would be able to secure bi-partisan support. This hope was not disappointed: the new 
cabinet included four men who were associated with the Seiyukai and two from the 
Minseito.”^^  ^A cabinet of this composite nature was important in bridging the differences 
between the parties which facilitated the relatively rapid readings and passage of the 
bills.^^  ^Additionally, both Takahashi Korekiyo and Nakajima Kumakichi were ministers in 
Saito’s cabinet, and known for their interest in consolidation, thus providing greater support 
to the movement.^"*  ^In the memoirs of Nakai Reisaku, “who was designated by Takahashi
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 139-40. 
Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1869-2000, 162.
^  Ibid,, 294-95
Tsüshô Sangyôshô, éd., Shôkô Seisakushi: Tekkôgyô, 295.
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as Chief Officer of the Yawata Works to carry out the co n s o l id a t io n , th e  transcendental 
nature of the Saito cabinet created a sense of urgency in the passage of the bill.
At the beginning, we anticipated the 13 private firms would participate in the merger, but this 
was just our idea without any consideration of their situations. However, we thought that if we 
showed the attitude that we would not carry out the consolidation without a major consensus, 
there would be so many requests from the private firms that the consolidation would be 
impossible. On the contrary, if we had the strong attitude that even if only one-company 
participated, we would implement the consolidation, we believed that the private firms would 
follow and we could make it happen. In addition, it was fortunate for the consolidation that the 
Saito Administration was a cabinet transient. Fukuda Yasudo, the section chief of the mining 
bureau at MCI at that time, said, ‘In the party-based cabinets, it had been very difficult to pass 
for the bill [the consolidation], because when the Seiyukai Cabinet proposed, the Kenseikai 
opposed, and when the Kenseikai proposed, the Seiyukai was against it.^ *^
Although there was a sense of urgency, the shingikai records reflect considerable 
controversy over the details of the consolidation, the method of asset evaluation, production 
costs, rationalisation, and the management of the consolidated company. Most germane are 
the factors relating specifically to the complaints of pig iron producers. One source of 
discontent was, as stated by Nakajima Kumakichi, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
that “when the plan is in place there will be no need for any system of subsidization for the 
iron and steel industry.” '^*^  Thus, as an indicator of how the private business sector viewed
Yonekura, The Japanese Steel Industry, 1850 - 1990: Continuity and Discontinuity, 140.
Quoted in Ibid.
Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai, ed., Nihon Seitetsu Kabushiki Kaisha Horitsuan Gai Ichi Ken linkai 
Gijiroku (Hikki) Dai Ikkai ~ Dai Kyü Kai - 1933 Dai 64 Kai Teikoku Gikai, Teikoku Gikai Shûgiin linkai 
Giroku - Mirofilm (Reels 10~12, 1932~1933) (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1989), 260.
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the debates, the loss of protection in the course of the rationalization process provided 
sufficient reason to use the shingikai forum to voice objections. However, though 
objections were raised, pig iron representatives did not present a concerted and forceful 
challenge to the government position. In other debates in which like minded members 
rallied together to press the government, or one or two strong spokesmen launched 
sustained assaults, objections were raised, a response provided and then the debate would 
move on to the next topic, offering little suggestion that the objections were expected to 
have any impact on the outcome of discussion.
For example, on March 2“** 1933, Matsumoto Shigeo, a committee member and a
spokesman for the pig iron position, challenged the government amalgamation plan by 
challenging the simple notion that by expanding scale there would necessarily be a 
reduction in production costs. He claimed that the figures provided did not sustain the 
government claims. In response, Nakai Reisaku, the director of Yawata, responded by 
making the distinction that he was referring to steel while Matsumoto was speaking of pig 
iron, and that the focus of the amalgamation plan was steel. He claimed that “pig iron will 
be bought on a joint basis as a raw m a te r ia l .M atsum oto  complained then about the loss 
of protection for pig iron producers and Nakai responded with a reiteration of the
Ibid., 269.
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amalgamation plan’s premise of reducing overall production costs, thereby underscoring 
that the specific concerns of pig iron producers were not important. Matsumoto challenged 
with the observation that though 500 ton furnaces were efficient, the bulk of the industry 
still used 200 ton furnaces and therefore were inefficient. In response, Nakai admitted that 
the situation might be more complicated, but, essentially, the exchange ended there, with 
Matsumoto asking that an expert determine whether larger furnaces would be cheaper.
In an attempt to answer why pig iron interests were paid so little heed in these 
debates, perhaps the most determining factor was that integration was about producing steel 
cheaply and eliminating the inefficiency that was partially attributable to small pig iron 
producers. Whatever arguments could have been made on the side of the continuation of 
independent pig iron production, there was little chance that Matsumoto alone would be 
able to budge the government on this fundamental issue. Moreover, pig iron was only one 
among many other issues that were dealt with in discussions. Also, as Nakai indicated, 
there was a sense of urgency on the part of the Saito administration to push through the 
legislation, and the government held a “strong attitude that even if only one company 
participated, we would implement the consolidation, we believe that the private firms 
would follow and we could make it happen.” This attitude was reflected in the essential
Ibid.
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rationale for the amalgamation which squarely placed priority on national considerations.
As explained by Nakajima, the rationale was two fold: 1) to create an efficient 
steel producing base; and 2) to ensure that Japan had a self-sufficient base for national 
defence reasons.^^^ At a later point in the discussions, Nakajima expanded on the second 
point, when he indicated that the present supply of steel was insufficient and by expanding 
the domestic base it would achieve the objective of self-sufficiency, which would be critical 
in the case of war. He stated that this was one important reason why money from the 
national coffers should be directed to expanding the steel manufacturing capacity to 
establish the requisite base.^^  ^Thus we see that from the start the government perspective 
was nationally oriented, and not specifically concerned with, for example, the welfare of 
small private sector producers.
8. Conclusion
The dominant feature of these shingikai meetings during the latter half of the 
1920s and through to the passage of the amalgamation plan in 1933 was that, in the main, 
despite whatever objections were raised by the private sector interests, the original
^^^Ibid., 259. 
301.
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proposals were driven through the bicameral system. This is not to imply that private sector 
interests were not expressed, as indeed in some instances they were, quite forcefully, but 
rather that the nature of the circumstances in which the meetings were located were such 
that objections had little impact in altering the course of events. In the case of the first set of 
tariff issues the presence of the higher authoritative body which appeared to be where 
decisions were being made muted whatever potential shingikai discussions may have had.
In other instances, both the records and the secondary literature indicate that government 
was determined from the outset to see the proposal promulgated as law. In such 
circumstances, again, objections were considered, but failed to carry the day. In certain 
instances, part of the explanation for why a more sustained and forceful role was not played 
by the dissenters may be found in considering who was to gain from the proposed revisions. 
In the case of the subsidisation of integrated sites, even those not necessarily operating fully 
or efficiently, zaibatsu owned producers were the principle beneficiaries. As we know, the 
plethora of smaller sites that had sprung up during World War I had by the latter half of the 
1920s diminished considerably and, in turn, the position of the zaibatsu had became that 
much more prominent. It stands to reason then that in the cases where zaibatsu were to gain 
from a bill, their representatives during shingikai meetings would raise few objections and, 
if not overtly, at least covertly, support the proposals. In short, though the shingikai forum
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afforded dissenters an opportunity to express their opinion, the degree to which objections 
could be sustained and have a chance to force amendments was related to the support of the 
largest actors. Similarly, for government to see its bill through as swiftly as possible meant 
the support o f these large business actors, underscoring that business approached the 
government and business relationship as an independent actor.
The larger issue introduced at the outset is that the period of roughly 1925 to 1933 
was one during which it was acknowledged that the iron and steel industry was in need of 
restructuring along more efficient lines. Certain sectors o f the industry, for example pig 
iron producers, still sought protection through tariffs, but within the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, where many of the proposals were drafted, the idea of rationalization began to 
take hold. This perspective later emerged in the form of the amalgamation plan. Thus, 
objections raised by pig iron interests held little chance of being translated into anything 
more concrete as, essentially, they were fighting the trend of the day. This does not mean 
that business failed to see the shingikai forum as a place where it could challenge and hope 
to realize its aims, as objections were raised, but there was insufficient flexibility within the 
original proposals to accommodate the objections.
The role o f the Saito cabinet, formed of both SeiyQkai and Kenseikai members, is 
cited in the secondary literature as important in forging the necessary compromise to allow
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passage of the bill. This underscores the point that political forces external to the shingikai 
forum can have a determining influence over outcomes. However, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, the analysis of Okazaki Tetsuji has argued that amalgamation attempts 
prior to 1925 spearheaded by Takahashi Korekiyo were thwarted by zaibatsu, as they 
perceived their best interest dictated otherwise. Seen from this perspective, it may be 
argued that the nature of the Saito cabinet facilitated the necessary political compromise 
but, at the same time, the economic circumstances necessary for amalgamation of the 
industry to become sufficiently compelling had also emerged. Economic policy making is 
formed of both economic and political components while the political and business 
relationship frames the interaction of the participants. This too suggests that the role of the 
shingikai was historically specific. Since shingikai did not have the remit to make 
decisions, the degree to which their discussions shaped outcomes varied according to 
circumstances, and was ultimately a case by case matter.
Finally, with respect to the issue of the influence of Indian cotton trade friction on 
Japan’s pig iron tariff rates, it is noted that the emphasis o f the secondary literature is on the 
early 1930s period and much less on the mid 1920s. This suggests that, in terms of our 
understanding of Japanese and Indian trade relations and the associated economic 
development, we perceive cotton trade issues in the mid 1920s to be comparatively less
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important. This perception, however, is not borne out in the shingikai documents 
themselves. Both in terms of expressed concern and space devoted to Indian trade relations 
and its impact on Japanese pig iron, greater emphasis is seen in the mid 1920s than the 
early 1930s. This observation is only suggestive in nature and requires further examination. 
As we have seen, government policy making was complex and the shingikai forum 
provided only one source of input into that process. Examination of Japanese and British 
foreign office records may shed light on this issue.
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion
1. How were the shingikai viewed by business?
The dominant question in the scholarly literature on the shingikai is ‘Who does the 
forum benefit?’ Is it part of the process which shapes the political decision making process as 
intended by shingikai legislation or is it, as the charge would have it, a rigged affair of the 
bureaucracy? In the main, the methodology that has been employed in such assessments is not 
based on detailed readings of the shingikai transcripts but tends to juxtapose initial positions and 
outcomes and, based on the resulting analysis, surmise that the forum is a tool of the 
bureaucracy in seeing the implementation of its policy plans. Were this true, it follows that 
business would expect little in terms of outcomes by its participation in the shingikai forum. If it 
was known that the forum was rigged and that it would consistently fail to help business realize 
it ends, business would predominantly seek its ends through informal channels. Thus, the 
central objective of this thesis has been the identification of business expectations.
In this thesis, one litmus test of business expectation is friction. If business was seen to 
argue over an issue, this can be viewed as evidence that business thought there was something 
to be gained. On the other hand, if there was no argument and only agreement, this does not
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necessarily mean that business viewed the shingikai forum as a place where their goals could 
not be realized. Depending on the situation, little or no friction might simply be because the 
issues at hand were either in accordance with business aims or the meeting was still at an 
exploratory stage. Even in those instances where the meetings were characterised by harmony, 
dissenters did use the opportunity to express their views. In such instances, what was often 
observed were lines of division within the business community. Pushing this line of reasoning 
further, one comes perilously close to the self-serving argument that regardless of whether there 
was friction or not, as long as participants attended, ipso facto, they believed the shingikai 
forum was worthwhile. In other words, does presence equate to validation?
Let us address this question by considering who participated and the often lengthy 
duration of the shingikai meetings that transpired during the amalgamation process of the iron 
and steel industry. Dan Takuma, for example, who was at one point obantô of Mitsui zaibatsu, 
and president of both the Japan Industry Club and the Japan Economic Federation, to name a 
few of his more prominent hats, would have been unlikely to have spent hours at a time over, in 
some cases, many days, listening and partaking in a forum which was essentially regarded as a 
ruse and ultimately a waste of his time.^ '^* Though the presence of high profile business figures
It has been observed in the preceding analysis that some sets of shingikai meetings followed a pattern 
whereby there was an initial period of long deliberations during which there was seemingly little direction 
in the discussions, followed by comparatively rapid passage of bills through the Diet. This pattern bears 
resemblance to the Japanese policy formulation process of nemawashi whereby views are solicited and 
the ground work is laid to facilitate the approval of proposals. For further details see Steven Reed, Making
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does suggest that the shingikai forum was considered a place where views could be expressed 
and business goals sought, the analysis here does not rest on this observation. Substantiation is 
sought through the examination of the economic and political context in which the meetings 
were located to consider business motivations and provide reasons to account for both the 
absence and presence of friction.
It should also be pointed out that in some instances participants may have viewed the 
importance of the meetings less in terms of the exchanges during the meetings but rather the 
unrecorded words said during breaks and after the closing of the forum. In this case, the clerks 
may very well have faithfully summarized the exchanges, but they were summarizing views 
which were only expressed after the initial, but crucial, jockeying for position and testing of the 
waters had already taken place. In this sense, the importance of the shingikai as a forum for 
discussion diminishes but it remained an opportunity to bring people together, providing time 
and a location where ideas and opinions were worked out; whether this was within or without 
the meeting becomes secondary. Certainly, not only in these shingikai but in others as well, elite 
members were congregated to discuss important matters although, judging by the records, only 
a small percentage of them actually participated in the formal exchanges.
It has been suggested that a potentially contributing factor to the fostering of harmony
Common Sense o f Japan (Pittsburgh; Pittsburgh University Press, 1993).
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in the shingikai meetings was the diminution of actors. During the war, a large number of 
smaller sites were founded to capitalise on the large financial gains to be had but, as we know, 
many went bankrupt or were absorbed by zaibatsu during the economic downturn that followed 
the cessation of the conflict. The reduction of actors, it must be noted, does not necessarily lead 
to greater agreement between stakeholders. In those instances where the proposals at hand were 
in line with big business interests, one could expect relative harmony in meetings and perhaps 
as well the swift passage of the bill through the diet. Conversely, if the proposal was contrary to 
the interests of a significant number of big business interests, then one might expect to see 
considerable opposition and perhaps compromise positions sought between government and 
business. Thus, the relationship between the number of stakeholders and the degree to which 
harmony may prevail was related, though not necessarily entirely, to the issue and the 
associated economic and political context in which the actors found themselves.
2. Judging business expectations
The intention in this thesis was to find a different way of addressing the issue of business 
expectations in dealing with government in the context of the shingikai meetings. Rather than 
judging business expectations by juxtaposing initial positions and outcomes, although this has
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played a part, the approach here has been to return to the records that contain the actual 
discussions between government and business. A potential weakness in this approach is that the 
evaluation of expectation here revolves around identifying points of friction where the 
aspirations and frustrations of business collided with government or, in the absence of these, 
points where relative harmony prevailed. The approach is one also sensitive to the emotions of 
participants and the closely related issue of what is disappointment in the Japanese context of a 
shingikai meeting in the 1920s. It has, however, certain strengths. The foremost of these, it is 
argued, is that the identification of friction points or, conversely, harmony, is done through the 
process of a close reading of the often near-verbatim records of the discussions. By returning to 
the actual words exchanged by government and business, we are afforded one of the few means 
at our disposal of ‘re-enacting’ the actual events. Though it is hazardous to judge what is a point 
of contention between discussants and upon that build the argument that this reflects 
expectation, it is equally as dangerous to juxtapose initial positions and outcomes and upon that 
make judgements on how business, or for that matter government, viewed the shingikai forum. 
This thesis is an attempt to shed light on how things happened in the meetings. Others may 
follow, adopting a similar methodological approach, and drawing into relief the strengths and 
weaknesses o f the work done here.
The findings here suggest that the shingikai during the amalgamation of the iron and
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Steel industry were not an orchestrated façade run by the bureaucracy. The shingikai provided a 
forum where business could air its views and, in fact, in some instances, was seen by 
participating members as where, de facto, final outcomes were decided. In cases where related 
shingikai discussions ran parallel to those specific to the iron and steel industry, some meetings 
of which were widely-known to be closed-door, the locus of the decision making process is 
difficult to determine. Where this multi-fora structure was found, whatever de facto  influence 
the shingikai specific to the industry had was diffused. In other instances, meetings were 
intentionally seen by members as preliminary and exploratory in nature. In short, business 
generally saw the shingikai as a useful forum for expressing its views and, depending on the 
circumstances, also a forum for determining outcomes.
3. Characterising government and business relations in the TaishO and early Shdwa period
We know little of how political decision making worked in this period. It was in many 
instances a process that combined formal and informal negotiation, the extent to which one 
mode was favoured over the other varying according to the instance. The process was also, in 
many cases, a multi-step one, commencing with informal discussion involving business and 
government and perhaps academics as well in identifying issues. Formal and informal
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deliberations would have occurred, possibly shaping the draft legislation. Along the way there 
were a number o f points where government and business may have had opportunity to interact. 
The vista offered by the shingikai was only one point in the process of government and business 
interaction. Thus, caution need be exercised in characterising the relationship in general terms. 
However, the shingikai forum is one of the few formal settings in which we can examine this 
interaction. Given that the shingikai forum was one of the few important points for formal 
contact, we can with greater confidence describe the formal govemment-business relationship.
It is argued here that the primary driving factor in shaping business interaction with 
government in the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry was economic. Political 
considerations, never far behind, were important, however the records indicate that the primary 
concern of business was economic. In the many pages of discussions, political concerns were 
only mentioned a few times. Certainly they were a shaping force and were important in fleshing 
out the context of the times but, in the end, business argued over profits and not politics. Where 
the conflux o f the external and the closely related domestic economic conditions dictated that it 
was decidedly in the interest of business to oppose government, business did so, and this was 
clearly seen in the records of the relevant shingikai. Conversely, where protection was critical 
for survival, business was conciliatory and harmony prevailed in discussions. The proximity of 
business to government was dictated by ends and needs.
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Some works argue that the historical legacy of the close proximity of big business and 
government is reason to believe that the seishô relationship continued through the Taishô and 
early Showa periods. It is argued here, however, that economic, political and social change in 
these periods mitigated the establishment of a sense of reciprocity or fixed manner of 
interaction. The configuration of business and government interaction in the period under 
consideration was circumstantially based. As both sides were stake holders in the industry, they 
were self-seeking entities. Throughout most of the period examined here, the iron and steel 
producers faced considerable competition from abroad but, in as far as tariffs provided 
protection and subsidies supported select producers, the industry managed to sustain itself. The 
fortunes of the industry, therefore, were often both closely linked with government protection 
and, at the same time, competing against the largest domestic producer, to wit, Yawata. The 
nature of their interaction changed over the years, something which renders the assignment of 
politico-business models extremely difficult. The inherent fixed configurations implied in these 
explanatory frameworks are of limited value in capturing the dynamics of this changing 
relationship. The Taishô and early Showa periods can be seen as a time where business and 
government interaction was fluid.
It has been suggested by many authors who explain Japan’s post-war economic 
success that the interaction of business and government is primarily behind closed doors. That
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which is overt is distant from where decisions are made and, by implication, part of the 
explanation for Japan’s economic success is attributed to this closed-door Japanese way of 
making decisions. The findings in this dissertation indicate that the situation is much more 
complex. In this case study, the shingikai were, in the main, seen by business as an important 
forum for the airing of views and, depending on the circumstances, might offer an opportunity 
to shape if not determine outcomes. This is not to suggest that decisions were always in favour 
of business nor that business exclusively relied on the open forum to seek its ends. However, it 
was an integral part of the decision making process. Certainly, covert, informal lines of 
communication continued to be used, but in conjunction with the formal legally provided forum 
of open discussions.
A broader implication of this study is that the way business and government interact in 
Japan is, as in most countries, not a fixed matter. The literature on the pre- and post-war periods 
often characterizes the interaction of these actors as covert and close. Apart from whatever 
general validity this characterization may have, it is important to bear in mind that it cannot be 
seen as an immutable feature of Japanese political decision making. The historical continuum 
since the Meiji Restoration demonstrates that despite the long legacy of close and personal 
relations between large business families and ruling powers, economic and political change can 
drive apart, as well as pull together, these actors to create a new configuration. This observation,
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I suggest, is as applicable to Japan’s contemporary situation as it is was some 70 years ago.
The Meiji Restoration brought into play a political framework which led to a Western- 
influenced democratic orientation being fused with the characteristics of the existing political 
culture. The institution of the shingikai was one part of the change. On one level this change 
was about formalizing the political decision making process, and a well-functioning Diet was 
part of this process, but it was also about incorporating extra-parliamentary influences. The 
shingikai likewise contributed to this transition. As has been discussed previously, perceptions 
vary on how this political decision making process and its related Diet operated in practise 
during the Taishô period and the early years of Showa. As Duus observes in his important work 
on the formation of political parties in this period, “professional politicians therefore operated 
within a well-defined consensus that did not admit of sharply defined ideological differences, 
and such differences played little or no role in the formation of parties.”^^ ^
Despite these efforts at incorporation and the existence of the tennosei, it was never 
completely possible to prevent the emergence of potentially damaging divisions of interest and 
opinion, or to guarantee that they could be accommodated by the decision-making process. 
Certainly, as modem business expanded, the potential for its interests diverging with those of 
government increased.
Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan, 241.
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Looking at the larger spectrum, Ishida employs the term “differentiated totality”^^ ,^ 
which refers to social strata: “at the top the integrity of the principle of imperial rule {kokutai) 
was strong enough to check extreme differentiation. At the lower levels of the society 
differentiation was limited by the strong traditional structure of the hamlet (buraku) or 
something similar thereto.”^^  ^Admitting that business groups did exercise their economic 
influence in shaping government aims, he argues that, in contrast to “Western countries”, 
because, in part, of competitive loyalty to the emperor system among interest groups in prewar 
Japan, they “could not be associations with complete autonomy from governmental control, free 
to devote themselves to specified purposes.”^^ * On the other hand, both facilitating the exercise 
of influence and underscoring incorporation, Ishida notes that “larger capitalists and zaibatsu 
families continued to exercise a powerful influence on political parties through financial 
assistance kept secret from the public.”^^  ^So, constrained by a political culture specific to 
prewar Japan and linked to politics through finance, big business operated in a circumscribed 
world.
Recent work by Kimura Masato and Matsuura Masataka have made strides in 
portraying this world as wider and less circumscribed, and have provided more complete
Ishida, "The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan," 
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^^^Ibid.,^\l.
^^Ubid., 309- 10.
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descriptions of the spectrum and degree of influence exercised by prewar business. This 
dissertation sees business as an independent actor and challenges the perception of 
incorporation. In so doing, the role of the Diet and the exercise of legislated decision making 
processes are seen here to operate more closely along the prescribed formal lines than received 
wisdom would have us believe. At the same time, backroom dealing remained part of the way 
of doing things -  then and now .
Inherent to most, if not all, political systems is the tension between formalized 
decision making processes and covert conduits of communication. Japan is not unique. The 
extent to which business was sensitive to that tension has not been examined here, however 
businessmen and politicians were aware during the Taishô period that scandals were uncovered 
and found their way into the press. The Siemens affair (1913) served as a poignant reminder of 
the hazards involved in graft and backroom dealing, even though the threat of bad publicity did 
not necessarily effectively restrict such activity. In this respect study of the impact and role 
played by the press could extend the findings of this thesis in helping us better understand why 
business chose the shingikai forum to express its views and attempt to influence outcome. For 
example, to what degree was the threat of bad press sufficient to spend hours on end in 
meetings? Part of the reason may have lain in the growing importance of political accountability 
and transparency in political decision making. Duus makes clear that this was a period when
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party politics was on the rise and more than lip service was paid to notions of democracy and 
voter representation. The tortuous process of the amalgamation of the iron and steel industry 
suggests that participating members accepted, if not believed, in formal discussions and, by 
implication, the role that such discussions played in the process of parliamentary politics.
Significant stakeholders, both government and business, had vested financial interests 
in this industry, which was both vital for the larger industrialization process and the defence of 
the Empire. This study has restricted itself to considering the influence of that stake holding. 
However, locating the discussion of amalgamation, the debate’s military and industrialisation 
context could also help further to explain the keen interest displayed by participants in outcomes 
and their willingness to sacrifice time and energy. The overwhelming message that the 
discussions delivered was about economics. Links have been drawn in this research between the 
independence of actors, the prevailing economic circumstances and the degree of friction in 
discussions and the perception that corruption is inherent in the Japanese way of political 
decision-making has been to some extent challenged. The thesis conclusions are therefore also 
inherently concerned with the nature of corporate governance, something that is equally topical 
today. The implication of this work is that what can lead participants to use formal rather than 
informal fora to resolve differences and influence outcomes is a belief that such formal 
institutions afford a real opportunity to influence outcomes. It was this realisation in the minds
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of the Meiji leaders in providing for the institution of the shingikai, and the political culture of 
the times that likewise led business to use and believe in the value of the forum.
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Appendix 1
Select List of Japanese Personal Names
Ariga Nagabumi
Asano zaibatsu is» wra
Dan Takuma mwm
Den Kenjiro
Fujita Shirô »E0H 6B
Fujiyama Raita
Furuya Hisatsuna
Go Seinosuke
Hamaguchi Osachi
Hara Kei
Hashimoto Yoshizo
Hashimoto Keizaburô
Hata Toyosuke
Hayashi Hirotaro
Horikiri Zenbei
Hotta Masatsune
Ichiki Kitokurô
Imaizumi Kaichiro
Imaoka Junichiro
Inoue Junnosuke
Inoue Kakugorô #±^131615
Inoue Tadashirô #±B E SB |5
Inukai Tsuyoshi
Inuzuka Katsutaro
Iwasaki Shigeo ëmmm
Kajiwara Nakaji
Kamata Katsutaro
Kamino Katsunosuke
Kanemitsu Tsuneo
Katô Kotarô
Katô Masanosuke
Katô Takaaki
Kataoka Naoharu
Kawasaki Saishiro W zJ 'E B IS
Kawasaki Suketarô
Kimura Kusuyata
Kobayashi Ushisaburô
Koga Renzô
Kômuchi Tsunetaka
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Kôno Hironaka
Koyama Kenzo
Kushida Manzo
Machida Chûji
Maeda Toshisada
Matsumoto Shigeo
Matsumoto Kôichi
Matsuoka Yasutake
Mori Kaku
Moriya Koresuke
Motoda Hajime Tumm
Muto Sanji
Nakai Reisaku
Nakajima Kumakichi
Nakajima Yadanji
Nakakôji Ren
Nakano Buei
Nishimura Tanjirô
Noda Tsuruo mmmm
Noda Utarô
Nomura Karoku
Okazaki Kunisuke
Ôkôchi Masatoshi
Oshikawa Norikichi
Ôta Shinjirô
Saionji Kinmochi
Saitô Makoto
Sakikawa Saishirô
Sashida Yoshio mm##
Shiba Chûzaburô
Shibusawa Eiichi
Shiraishi Motojirô
Shirani Takeshi
Suzuki Umeshirô
Takahashi Korekiyo
Takahashi Mitsutake
Tanaka Chôbei
Tokonami Takejirô
Usawa Uhachi mm^ A
WadaToyoji
Wakamiya (Given name unknown)
Yabuki Shôzô
Yamaoka Juntarô
Yamamoto Jôtarô
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Yamamoto Tatsuo
Yamazaki Kakutarô
Yanagisawa Yasutoshi mmuM
Yokota Sennosuke
Yoshikawa Yûsuke ^)mm
Select List of Terms and Institutions
Academy of Architecture
Academy of Civil Engineering
Academy of Electronics
Academy of Machinery
Academy of Munitions
Academy of Shipbuilding
Anglo-Japanese Agreement
Asano zaibatsu
Bar Segments Agreement
Ben Xi Hua Coal and Iron Company
Chambers of Commercial Law
Chôsakai
Code of Law Investigative Council
Deliberative councils
Deferred Duty
Elder Statesmen 7C *
Emperor system
Financial clique M K
Financial world
Furukawa zaibatsu
Gakushiki keikensha
House of Representatives
House of Peers
Hitachi Shipbuilding
Hokkaido Iron Company
Imperial Prerogative
linkai
Iron and Steel Institute of Japan
Japan Economic Federation
Japan Industrial Bank
Japan Industrial Club
Japanese Mining Academy
Japan Oil
Japan Steel Corporation
Joint Purchase Association of Steelmakers
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Kaigi
Kamaishi Mining
Kamaishi Seitetsujo
Kanto Steel Materials Sales Association
Kenjiho Seitetsujo
Kenkyûkai
Kokutai
Konwakai
Kondankai
Kyogikai
Mitsubishi Iron Works
Mitsubishi zaibatsu
Mitsui zaibatsu
National League of Chambers of 
Commerce
National Federation of Industrial 
Organizations
Nemawashi «mu
Nihon Kokan (NKK)
Okura zaibatsu
Pig Iron Cooperative Association
Private advisory bodies’
Privy Council
Rengo Danwa Kai
Ringisei
Ringisho mm#
Sangiin
2"“ Movement for the Protection of the 
Constitution
Shinsakai
Ship Building Encouragement Law
Steel Association
Steel Union
Sumitomo zaibatsu tt&wra
Takarada Oil
Ta Yeh Mine
Tetsuzai Jikyû Toron Kai
Tokubetsu iinkai mmm^
Tôyô Iron Works
Wanishi Iron Works
Yasuda zaibatsu
Yawata Ammmi ( # - # # # # )
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Select List of Reports and Committee Names
Investigation Committee of the Iron and 
Steel Industry
Investigation Committee on Fiscal Policy 
and Economics
Investigation into Matters Dealing with the 
Establishment of Standards and Criteria
Investigation into the Present and Future 
Demand for Iron and Steel Products
Investigation Committee on Tariff Policy
Opinion on Japan’s Iron and Steel Industry
Petition Concerning Japan’s Tariff Policy
Petition Concerning Tariff Policy
Policy Plan Concerning the Regulation of 
the Iron and Steel Industry
Proposal for the Establishment of a 
Committee of Inquiry into Joint Public- 
Private Iron and Steel Manufacture
Temporary Committee on Industry
Temporary Industrial Council
Opinion Regarding the Third Expansion of 
Yawata
Report of the Investigation Committee on 
the Iron and Steel Industry
Report on Opinion regarding the Future 
Protection of Our Iron and Steel Industry
Necessity and Reasons for Tariff 
Protection in Japan’s Iron and Steel 
Industry
Recommendations Concerning the 
Promotion and Protection of the Iron and 
Steel Industry
The Relationship Between the Iron and 
Steel Industry and Protective Tariffs’
m # # #  f  /  rm
Consultation Number 3 -  ‘What is the 
fundamental policy concerning the 
promotion of the iron and steel industry?’
Consultation Number 4 -  ‘What is the 
fundamental policy concerning the 
maintenance and development o f the ship 
building industry’
Opinion on Japan’s Iron and Steel Industry
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Appendix 2
List of Full Titles of Japanese Records for the Shingikai and their Committee Meetings 
Table 2.3 Committee Meetings
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
January 22, 1916 
to
February 24, 1916
June 29,1917 
to
July 9,1917
H —[hI~3E[h]
July 11,1917 
to
July 12,1917
July 13,1917
Table 3.4 : Outline of Tem porary Investigation Committee Meetings
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
July 9,1919^^"
July 18, 1919^ *^
Nov 10, 1919
Nov 29,1919
i
November 8, 1920
February 14, 1921
March 22,1924’“
Yasui Kunio, Senkanki Nihon Tekkôgyô to Keizai Seisaku, 59.
The start date of this session is not clear from the record, but Yasui gives this date.
Note according to the record, the archives at Takebashi have bundled together with
However, the record that deals with the issue of iron and steel production is
labeled as H i t
Yasui Kunio, Senkanki Nihon Tekkôgyô to Keizai Seisaku, 59.
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Table 3.10: Outline of Meetings on the Tariff Rate Law and the Iron and Steel Industry 
Promotion Law
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
Tariff Rate Law
March 19'"", 1921 
to
March 22, 1921
Iron and Steel Business Promotion Law
March 23, 1921 
to
March 25,1921
March 24, 1921 
to
March 25, 1921
Table 4.1 Outline of Tariff Meetings
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
January 27,1926 
to
February 26, 1926
March 11,1926
March 11, 1926
æ - n i
March 11,1926
Table 4.2: Outline of Meetings (1926)
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
19 March, 1926 
to
22 March, 1926 ife lf tltü }  (® E )
19 March, 1926 
to
The record of this shingikai (19 March 1921) indicates that on the previous day, 18 March, the 
Committee chairman had been selected.
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23 March, 1926
23 March, 1926
25 March, 1926
Table 4.3: Outline of T ariff Meetings (1932)
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
June 5, 1932 
to
June 6, 1932
June 12, 1932 
to
June 15, 1932
Table 4.4: Outline of Meetings on the Japan Steel Corporation Bill
Date Unabridged Title of the Japanese Record for the Shingikai Meeting
March 1, 1933 
to
11 March, 1933
« h t ^ + e  0
( * E )  # - i s i - : f n m
March 16, 1933 
to
March 24, 1933
November
1933
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